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RETRIEVING LOST IDEALS: UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARD BRAZIL 1960-1968
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth century American foreign 
policy has been characterized by decisions that are made in 
contradistinction to policy proclamations. This trend pre­
sented a paradox which heightened during the post World War 
II era and climaxed in the American foreign policy of the 
I960's.^ This trend of duplicity has eroded the credibility 
of American diplomacy, has caused other nations to view 
American foreign policy with suspicion, and has cast doubts 
on the validity of American policy proclamations.
'In 19 61 President John Fitzgerald Kennedy proclaimed 
the Alliance for Progress, a product of democratic idealism 
and a statement of United States policy toward Latin America:
Hans J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign 
Policy (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 
p. 7,
For our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the 
entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for 
economic progress and social justice can best be 
achieved by free men working within a framework of 
democratic institutions ... If we are to meet a 
problem so staggering in its dimensions, our ap­
proach must be equally bold, an approach consistent 
with the majestic concept of Operation Pan America. 
Therefore, I have called on all people of the Hemi­
sphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress-a vast 
cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and 
nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of 
the American people.1
The Alliance for Progress, the massive United States
program for Latin America during the 1960's, represents a
glaring example of this failure in American foreign policy.
The Alliance for Progress was the embodiment of United States
policy toward Latin America during the 1960's. The decisions
of the United States officials during the 1960's conflicted
with the Alliance for Progress. These conflicts constitute
evidence of both the trend and the resulting failure to make
the means conform to the ends in policy-making. Through an
analysis of the Alliance for Progress and the United States
activities in Latin America, one would readily conclude the
validity of Hans J. Morgenthau's statement:
Official pronouncements and practice moved farther 
and farther apart until today the former tend to 
have hardly any relevance for the latter... Practice 
has become uninformed by any general principle and 
reacts without discrimination to the pressures of 
the hour.2
^Agency for International Development-U.S. Department 
of State, President Kennedy Speaks on the Alliance for Progress: 
Addresses and Remarks-The First Year (Washington D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 4-5.
2Morgenthau, Op. Cit., p. 7.
within the scope of its total history, the general
theme of American foreign policy toward Latin America can be
expressed in terms of tlie broad concept of national security.
J. Lloyd Mecham, accordingly, states:
The basic objectives of United States policy-making 
toward Latin America have been relatively consistent 
over the years. From the era of Latin American eman­
cipation to the present day, they have reflected con­
stantly the vital necessities of national security...
In contrast to the pronounced consistency in the 
fundamental objectives of United States policy toward 
Latin America, the means to attain these ends have 
not always conformed to a uniform pattern.^
The original proclamation of United States policy
toward Latin America was the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe
Doctrine of 1823, a unilateral statement of policy, was
originally intended to protect the Western Hemisphere from
Western Europe's incursions in order to enhance the security
of the United States.^ it constituted guidelines for policy
which the Washington policy-makers would persistently refer
to as constituting the basis for all United States actions
within Latin America. The interpretations of the national
^J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin 
American Relations (New York : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955) ,
p. 459.
^Ibid., pp. 38-52. The Monroe Doctrine focused on the 
geopolitical concerns of United States proximity to Latin 
America. Accordingly, the view was that the welfare and 
safety of the United States was based on the maintenance of 
the independence of all American Republics. The Monroe Doc­
trine was based on the view that the New World was separated 
from the Old World by economic, social, and political factors, 
as well as by geographical factors.
security content in the Monroe Doctrine have been both 
strategic and economic.^
The dawning of the twentieth century found American 
officials making decisions toward Latin America that were 
distinctly detached from the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Yet, the policy-makers referred to the Monroe Doctrine to 
sanctify their actions. These initial expressions of the 
national security content within the Monroe Doctrine were 
economic.2 However, the economic expressions of a vigorous 
trade and investment drive in Latin Zutierica were accompanied 
by United States intervention in Latin Am.erican countries.
The assertion of the right to intervene in Latin America 
was based on the rationale of the "right to protect American 
lives and property in foreign countries", and was rationalized 
by elaborations of the Monroe Doctrine. The expansionism and 
the correlative elaborations of the Monroe Doctrine included 
the Platt Amendment, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Wilsonian 
adherence to a policy of withholding recognition until regimes 
have been legitimized through democratic processes, and the 
Olney Extension. These elaborations of the Monroe Doctrine, 
coupled with the interventions in Latin America, constituted
^Edwin Lieuwen, The United States Policy in Latin 
America (New York: Praeger, 1955).
2Ibid. Mecham, Op. Cit., p. 1.
an unfortunate series of actions that greatly distorted the 
policy proclaimed in the Monroe Doctrine. This imperialism, 
which characterized early twentieth century policy toward 
Latin America, caused a rise in the Latin Americans' hostility 
toward the United States that persisted until the administra­
tion of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ushered in the 
Good Neighbor era.^
The 1930's marked the commencement of tlie Good Neigh­
bor era (non-intervention), a period characterized by: (1) 
considerable cooperation between the United States and Latin 
American nations; (2) a decline of American economic protec­
tion relative to the products of Latin American countries; 
and (3) cooperation in the World War II effort against the 
Axis.2 Highly significant to the developments of this era 
was the restoration of the original meaning of the Monroe 
Doctrine in Washington policy-making circles. The Clark 
Memorandum of 19 33 was emphatic in its announcement that the 
Monroe Doctrine did not justify the Roosevelt Corollary. The 
United States, adhering to the Clark Memorandum, thus, re­
nounced the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
the Latin American nations, and initiated the Pan American-
^Ibid., pp. 110-130. 
2Ibid., pp. 136-155.
ized Monroe Doctrine. This, in essence, was an attempt to 
establish an inter-American security system, as opposed to 
the unilateral character of the original announcement in 
1823.1
The emergence of European fascism during the late 
1930's constituted a serious external threat which altered 
the nature of inter-American cooperation. At the Buenos 
Aires Conference in 1936, President Roosevelt requested the 
establishment of the inter-American security system. Presi­
dent Roosevelt's request was fulfilled by continuation of 
hemispheric cooperation during World War II, intensive col­
laboration in the area of strategic supplies, and overt Latin 
American activities in support of the Allies. From this 
point on, the inter-American System would focus on security.
The American desire to establish an inter-American 
security system was extended into the post World War II era, 
and seemed to be fulfilled by the postwar hemispheric cooper­
ation which the Act of Chapultepec, the Rio Treaty of Recipro­
cal Assistance, and the Organization of American States Chart-
^Ibid., pp. 110-130. (Hereafter referred to as Mecham, 
U.S.-Latin America Relations); According to Mecham, the key 
factor in the development of the inter-American system of the 
Good Neighbor era was the "principle of nonintervention". 
Secretary of State Hughes took the initial steps in this di­
rection.
2Ibid., pp. 134-155; See also Federico Gil, Latin 
America-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and Janovich, 19 71) .
er wrought.1 Just as the appearance of the fascistic ex­
ternal threat during the late thirties caused the establish­
ment of tlie inter-American security effort, the external 
threat of international communism sustained the effort during 
the post World War II era. However, it was during the years 
that followed World War II that considerable controversy be­
tween the United States and the Latin American nations would 
stem from tliis prime concern of United States policy-makers.
^Ibid., pp. 199-208. These actions underscored the 
effort to maintain an inter-American security system and 
hemispheric cooperation on strategic matters. The Act of 
Chapultepec, a defensive military alliance which was proposed 
at the Chapultepec Conference in 1945, later became a perma­
nent act after World War II. The Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, otherwise called the Rio Treaty, was 
the outcome of the meeting of the Inter-American Conference 
for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in 19 47. Through 
this treaty, which created a permanent defense alliance among 
Latin American nations, the inter-American system was greatly 
strengthened. The treaty provided for reciprocal assistance 
in the event of any form of aggression against a member of 
the alliance. A Governing Board was established to act as a 
provisional consulting arm in cases of emergencies. The 
Organization of American States Charter, adopted at the Bogota 
Conference of 1948, formalized the Latin American association 
of states and served as its legal basis. Aside from the 
general machinery of the Organization of American States which 
provided collective security through the Inter-American De­
fense Board, the OAS Charter provided for a specialized con­
ference to deal with technical matters and formally expanded 
the political powers of the Council. The Counc" serves as 
the permanent executive body of the OAS; See also Mecham, 
United States-Latin American Relations, pp. 80-81; Also Julius 
Pratt, A History of United States Foreign"Policv (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), pp. 529-530; 
Also Milton Eisenhower, "The Historical Roots of the Alliance 
for Progress", ed. John Dreier, The Alliance for Progress: 
Problems and Perspectives (Baltimore. Maryland: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1962), pp. 6-7.
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The postwar era of American foreign policy toward 
Latin American can be divided into two periods, in which 
contrasting approaches were designated by the key administra­
tors. The two approaches were: (1) the traditional foreign
policy, which spanned the administrations of Harry S. Truman 
and Dwight D. Eisenhower; and (2) the New Frontier foreign 
policy, an effort of the Kennedy Administration to change 
the traditional policy.^
In September of 19 49 Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
announced the traditional foreign policy toward Latin Ameri­
ca. This enunciation was in response to the following de­
mands of Latin American nations: (1) large-scale grants or
loans on easy terms; (2) public loans; and (3) assistance in 
stabilizing the prices of their coffee, metals, and petroleum 
at profitable levels. The policy stated by Acheson as the 
foreign policy of the Truman Administration was a mere con­
tinuation of the policy which the United States had pursued 
under President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II.
The policy was also the same policy that the Eisenhower Ad­
ministration would later pursue.^
^J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and the Inter- 
American Security System, 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas: Univer- 
sity of Texas Press, 1963); The "New Frontier" policy was not 
a total abandonment of the traditional policy objectives, but 
it was a revision, an attempt to consider the significance of 
emerging revolutionary forces. While the approaches that were 
announced had nuances of differences, those that were utilized 
did not.
^Ibid., p. 359; The criticisms that were aimed at 
Eisenhower and Dulles were similar to those which Truman and 
Acheson had received.
The United States objectives toward Latin America, 
under the traditional policy position were:
1. security of the United States and the Hemisphere;
2. the encouragement of democratic representative institu­
tions ;
3. positive cooperation in the field of economics;
4. the extension of public loans for projects, only if 
private capital was not available, and the utilization
of public funds merely as a supplement to private capital;
5. the encouragement of increased investment in Latin Ameri­
ca, through the negotiation of treaties with Latin Ameri­
can countries providing for the guaranty of investments;
6. the protection of American domestic production by the 
continued device of tariffs on selected imports; and
7. opposition to the development of a common market in 
Latin America.^
At the time of Acheson's announcement of the policy 
toward Latin America, the Truman Administration appeared 
oblivious to the realities of Latin America's conditions. The 
countries of Latin America, like other Third World countries, 
were experiencing the "revolution of rising aspiration" in 
the midst of their "end of the war crisis". Typical of Latin 
American societies were wide economic disparities in which 
tiny elites prevailed over small middle-classes and the masses
^Ibid. , pp. 359-360; Lieuwen, Op. Cit.
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of illiterate have-nots. The Truman Administration tended
to ignore this situation, and concentrated on those regions
of the world that it considered key targets of communist sub- 
1version.
President Truman's inaugural address in 19 49 included 
a proposal for a small-scale program of economic development 
for tlie less-developed countries, as a part of his braod 
line of policy. This proposal, later called the Point Four 
Program, was intended to make the Third World countries bul­
warks against the communist threat. The initial program was 
not intended or declared to be a large-scale capital assist­
ance program. Latin American nations, during this era, com­
plained of American neglect. And even as the United States 
perspective of the conditions in Latin America changed, the 
nature of the American foreign assistance program reflected 
a continuing ignorance or misperception of the needs of Latin
pAmerican societies.^
As the United States began to consider the threat of
communist subversion as existing in Latin America during the
1950's, the following developments occurred:
1. the Mutual Security Act of 19 51 was passed;
2. bilateral agreements, pertinent to the Mutual Security
Act of 1951, were negctiate'd for twelve Latin American
nations.
^Ibid.; Milton Eisenhower, "The Historic Roots of the 
Alliance for Progress", ed. Dreier, Op. Cit., pp. 7-10.
^Mecham, United States and Latin America Pplofions.
p. 190.
1.1
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 stressed that "military 
assistance be furnished to the other American republics... 
to participate in missions important to the defense of the 
Hemisphere". Under this act, the prevailing view was that 
support to the professional military in Latin America was 
the most effective approach to preventing communist take­
overs. ̂
United States economic assistance to Latin America 
increased as a result of these initiatives; yet the economic 
assistance allocated to the Latin American countries was still 
small in proportion to the total assistance program of the 
United States. Furthermore, the bulk of the assistance was
2in military aid, which bolstered harsh military governments.
An additional factor that reinforced the build up of mili­
tary governments was the overriding emphasis on short-range 
security concerns focused on the requisite of a constant sup­
ply of strategic raw materials. The Washington policy hier­
archy considered the military in Latin America as the vital 
force for maintaining the stability necessary for assuring 
continued access to these supplies from Latin America.^
Thus, the perceived threat of a communist take-over
^Ibid., p. 180; See also Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; The bi­
lateral agreements were military in nature.
2Gil. , Op. Cit.
^Lieuwen, Op. Cit.
12
caused the United States, during the 1950's, to revert to 
its former position under Franklin D. Roosevelt, "freezing 
in power any incumbent government", regardless of the regime 
The failure of the United States to distinguish between mili­
tary dictatorships and civilian democracies in the admini­
stration of its economic assistance program gave impetus to 
the already rising Latin American animosity.
The Eisenhower Administration's approach was character­
ized by continued adherence to the traditional policy toward 
Latin America that had persisted during the Truman Admini­
stration. When John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, an­
nounced a "New Look", Walter Lippman was quick to point out 
that the "New Look" was, in reality, the traditional policy 
as espoused by Acheson.^
Simultaneously, the American foreign assistance pro­
gram failed to address the conditions of gross inequities in 
the Latin American economies. The failure to address this 
problem and the American tendency to support military regimes 
caused persistent Latin American resentment of the United 
States. In the face of the "revolution of rising aspirations",
^Ibid.
^Norman Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition: American 
Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1961); See also Thurston B. Morton (Assistant 
Secretary for Congressional Relations) "Our Foreign Policy 
in Today's World", U.S. Department of State Bulletin v. 30, 
February 8, 1954, p. 361.
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a new force of Latin American intellectuals began to lead 
the discontented masses. They focused their criticisms on 
the American private capital investments, which they claimed 
helped to strengthen the oppressive systems and helped to 
perpetuate the injustices in Latin America.^
According to John Dreier, the awareness of inequality 
and injustices appeared as a new phenomenon in Latin America. 
It converged with and accelerated the multiple array of 
forces that demanded change and would lead to the Alliance
pfor Progress proclamation.
The United States was concerned with the stability 
of Latin American regimes and intent on ensuring 
that the communist movement should not gain a foot­
hold in the inter-American system. The states of 
Latin America were concerned with their own economic 
growth and could not see why the United States, as 
it set up programs of economic assistance elsewhere 
in the world to check communism, should not meet 
the needs for economic improvement in Latin America. 
Policy, negotiations, agreements, program, and 
action gravitated between these poles of interests.
The priority of Latin Americans was cooperation in 
socio-economic and health areas. Latin Americans tended to 
view the communist threat as an internal threat that might
^Milton Eisenhower, "The Historic Roots of the Alli­
ance for Progress, ed. Dreier, Op. Cit., p. 11.
^Ibid.
Morton A. Kaplan et al., United States Foreign Policy, 
1945-1955 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956).
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easily be eliminated by changing those conditions that cause
1 2 a population to be discontented. The events in Guatemala
had alerted the Eisenhower Administration to the existence 
of tremendous Latin American resentment of the United States 
in 1954. As early as 1953, the Eisenhower Report had stress­
ed the need for a reappraisal of United States policy toward 
Latin America. Yet, the first indications of a possible re­
appraisal would await the anti-Mixon demonstrations in Latin 
America in 1958.^
The hostile reception of Vice-President Nixon, which 
followed the failure to reach agreement at the Buenos Aires 
Conference of 1957, called President Eisenhower's attention 
to the dimensions of the problems. His reaction to these 
demonstrations was slow. Even following the anti-Nixon de­
monstrations, the Eisenhower Administration received the 
195 8 Operation Pan America proposal of Brazil's President 
Kubitschek with considerable skepticism.^ Ultimately, the
Ipratt, Op. Cit.
2Gil, Op. Cit.; The United States made efforts to un­
seat the leftist government of Col. Arbenz and supported the 
corrupt government of Castillo Armas in Guatemala. The Castil­
lo Armas government, despite the U.S. economic assistance, 
proved unstable, and the U.S. efforts there caused consider­




full awareness of the enormous dimensions of Latin American 
resentment of the United States, which dawned upon the Eisen­
hower Administration near its termination, was brought about 
by the threat of Castro to export the Cuban Revolution to 
other Latin American countries. The effort to reappraise 
United States foreign policy toward Latin America, aside 
from the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank 
and the Inter-American Social Development Fund in I960, re­
mained the major responsibility of the incoming administra­
tion of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.^
In 1961 John Fitzgerald Kennedy became the President 
of the United States. The Kennedy Administration immediate­
ly undertook the appraisal of the United States foreign poli­
cy from the perspective of the "New Frontier" policy stance. 
The "New Frontier" policy stance, which was the revision of 
the traditional policy approach, incorporated the following 
tenets in the United States relationship with Latin America:
1. the extension of public loans;
2. movement toward free trade ; and
3. stabilization of prices of the chief exports of Latin 
American countries.^
^Dreier, Op. Cit.; Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; Mecham, United 
States and Latin American Relations ; The establishment of the 
Inter-American Development Bank reflected a change in U.S. 
policy. Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That 
Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress 
(Chicago, Illinois: Quadrangle Books, 1970); Greater changes 
in foreign policy style came with John F. Kennedy.
2Mecham, Ibid.; Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; Victor Alba, Alli­
ance Without Allies (New York: Praeger, 1965).
16
The reappraisal took the form of the Alliance for 
Progress program. The Alliance for Progress was an effort 
to place the international environment of the 1960's within 
the spectrum of liberal analysis and to treat the causes of 
Latin American discontent. The tendency to capsule all 
existing international forces under communism was temporari­
ly replaced by a tendency to recognize that the forces of 
nationalism, populism, neutralism, and the "revolution of 
rising aspirations" were a part of a general desire for a 
social revolution within the indigenous societies. Under the 
Alliance, the view was that the social revolution had already 
been set in motion and that the United States might channel 
the revolution toward peaceful change.^
The broad objectives of the Alliance for Progress are 
stated in Title I of the Charter of Punta del Este. They 
clarify tiie United States commitment to assist in the cooper­
ative effort of the Latin American peoples to achieve economic, 
social, and political development.
It is the purpose of the Alliance for Progress to 
enlist the full energies of the peoples and govern­
ments of the American republics in a great coopera­
tive effort to accelerate the economic and social 
development of the participating countries of Latin 
America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of
Simon Hansen, Five Years of the Alliance for Progress 
(Washington D.C.: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1967); Mor­
gen th au, Op. Cit.; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; Under the 
Alliance for Progress, the U.S. hoped to protect the process 
of peaceful revolution from Castro inspired disruption.
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well-being, with equal opportunities for all, in 
democratic societies adapted to their own needs 
and desires.1
Considerable controversy would follow attempts to 
implement the democratic idealism so characteristically in­
cluded in this enormous program. The initiative to move to­
ward this democratic idealism was evident in the proclamation
and the financial commitment. But unfortunately, the Kennedy
2men almost immediately saw their efforts in shambles. Short­
ly after the Alliance for Progress was proclaimed, its promise 
to support democratic regimes was mocked by the build up of 
authoritarian military regimes and the lack of financial aid 
supplied to the more democratic regimes of Latin America.
The promise to support social development and reform seemed 
to be revealed as mere rhetoric as Washington policy-makers 
supported the downfall of reformist regimes. The promise 
to support economic development was flayed by a commitment 
to techno-military and political-security concerns and the 
neglect of socio-economic priorities of Latin American peoples, 
Scholars of American foreign policy agree on the fail­
ure of the Alliance for Progress, despite their recognition
Organization of American States Official Records 
OEA/Ser. H/X.I ES-RE-Document 105 (Washington D.C. : Pan Ameri­
can Union, 1962).
2Christopher Mitchell, "Dominance and Fragmentation", 
in Julio Cotier and Richard Fagen, eds., Latin American and 
the United States (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, iy/4).
^See Chapter IV for discussion of the United States 
support of unconstitutional regimes.
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of its sporadic achievements.! While many scholars and of­
ficials have decried the idealistic basis of the Alliance 
for Progress, this dissertation is based on the view that the 
ideals contained in the objectives were rationally deliber­
ated, laudable, and were conceived by the Kennedy men as a 
sincere effort to solve Latin American problems. Covey T. 
Oliver has stated:
We of this Hemisphere who work with optimism and 
energy to achieve the goals of the Alliance for 
Progress should never be ashamed of being ideal­
istic, for idealism is essential to the attain­
ment of great goals. The objectives of tlie Al­
liance do indeed represent a shining ideal worthy 
of dedication of governments and millions of indi­
viduals who can both contribute and benefit ...
Thus, tile se objectives are the ideal, the genuine 
desire giving direction to our foreign policy...
We have but to believe tin at it can be done and 
to keep our ideals clearly in focus, as we set 
about doing what we can with determination, step 
by step, day by day.^
The failure of American officials to make decisions 
that would implement these stated commitments, and the taking 
of overt actions that impede the achievement of these ideals 
caused a general erosion of confidence in the United States 
proclamations (as we have noted) . This is a detriment to tlie 
United States interests. The decisions made by Washington 
policy-makers in contradistinction to the Alliance for Progress
^Mecham, United States and Latin American Relations,Op. Cit,
2„ Covey T. Oliver, 'The Alliance for Progress Moves
On", ed. Richard Gray, Latin America and the United States 
in the 1970's (Itasca, Illinois : Peacock Publishers, 1971) .
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may be seen as points of erosion which led to its ultimate 
demise. The contradictory decisions were prevalent in Ameri­
can policy toward all participating Latin American countries. 
However, this analysis will focus on the decisions toward 
Brazil during the period 1960 through 196 8, which constituted 
the major initiative under the Alliance for Progress. Brazil, 
the largest and most populous country in Latin America, had 
for sometime considered itself as potentially the most power­
ful entity in the continent.^ The United States officials 
tended to view Brazil as having the power potential to con­
trol the continent, either to the benefit or to the detriment 
of the United States. Consequently, Brazil received the 
greatest portion of the United States financial commitment 
under the Alliance for Progress. Yet, ironically, subsequent 
developments in Brazil identified Brazil as one of the most 
flagrant cases in which the United States, during the 1960's.
Donald Worcester, Brazil, From Colony to World Power 
(New York: Scribner, 19 7 3); See also Charles Wagley, An In­
troduction to Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press,
196 3); Adolf A. Berle, Latin America-Ciplomacv and Reality 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1952), p. 19; According to Berle 
Brazil would "go forth". Berle described the Brazilian 
economy as not unlike that of the United States in 1900. He 
foresaw a Brazilian boom for the 1970's. The boom, which he 
based on preconditions of government stability, fiscal respon­
sibility, and socially conscious administration, would propel 
the Brazilian economy to the economic level of the Western 
European countries; Lincoln Gordon, A New Deal for Latin Ameri­
ca; The Alliance for Progress (Cambridge, Massachusetts : 
Harvard University Press, 1963); Ambassador Gordon consider­
ed Brazil a potential power in the Western Hemisphere.
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bolstered the development of a political system and societal 
basis that contrasted with the ideal model depicted in the 
Alliance for Progress.^
In April of 1964, immediately following the military 
coup d'etat in Brazil which removed the constitutional govern­
ment of Joao Goulart, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a 
message to acting President Raneiri Mazzilli which expressed 
his "admiration for the resolute will of the Brazilian com­
munity to resolve their difficulties through constitutional 
government".2 Also in April of 196 4, Secretary of State 
Rusk praised the Brazilian coup d'etat of 196 4 as "an ex­
pression of support for constitutional government".^ These 
statements constituted more than a tacit recognition of the 
Brazilian military regime. As subsequent events in the po- 
litcal milieu of Brazil revealed, the United States sancti-
^Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil;
The Emergence of a Modernizing Authoritarian Regime (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Schneider describes 
Brazil as a highly authoritarian regime; See also Joao Quartim, 
Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil (London, England: 
N.L.B., 1971).
2Peter Bell, "Brazilian-American Relations", ed.
Riordan Roett, Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, Tennessee: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1972); Seaialso "Message from 
President of the United States (Johnson) To Acting President 
of Brazil (Mazzilli)", American Foreign Policy; Current Docu­
ments 1964, April 2, 1964, p. 378.
^"U.S. Views on the Coup d'Etat in Brazil: Replies 
Made by Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked at a 
News Conference on April 3, 19 64", American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents 196 4, April 3, 1964, p. 378.
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fication of the military government in Brazil demonstrated 
the continuing trend of duplicity in American foreign policy. 
Although the Alliance for Progress was hypothetically intend­
ed to end the military interventions and military incursions 
that were so characteristic of Latin American politics during 
the 1950's, the Brazilian military (which became increasing­
ly repressive and persistent in retaining the reins of govern­
ment) was greatly encouraged by the Washington policy-makers.^ 
Under the military government which was established in 
1954, Brazil has made tremendous progress in her industrial­
ization drive. Despite continuing problems of inflation and 
the effects of the energy crisis, the economy is now highly 
developed in selected sectors.^ For almost two decades,
Brazil had focused upon the problem of promoting its exports 
of manufactures. Once the military had replaced the elected 
democratic government in 196 4, these efforts were successful.^ 
Unfortunately, the success in the drive for industrialization
^Schneider, Op. Cit.; Schneider discussed the immediate 
authoritarian trend of the Brazilian military government; See 
also Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964; An Ex­
periment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967); In Chapter IV of this dissertation, the author dis­
cusses the nature of the military regime and the United States 
strategic actors' encouragement of the military regime. By 
extending recognition to the Brazilian military government. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson encouraged it.
^Steven M. Arnold, "Export Promotion in an Authoritar­
ian Regime: The Politics of the Brazilian Miracle," ed. S. 
Raichur et al. The Politics of Aid, Trade, and Investment 
(New York: Sags Publications, 1971).
3lbid.
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and export promotion has not been accompanied by success 
in social and political development.^ On the contrary, the 
military government of Brazil is now among the most oppres­
sive forces in Latin America.^ This reflects modernization 
as a main thrust, and the virtual ignoring of political, 
social, and economic development.^
Recognizing that, due to inherent obstacles and 
limitations, perfect rationality is impossible, this inquiry 
is not intended to condemn those men whose judgments appear 
less than rational, in the light of more recent knowledge, 
data, and insights. By recognizing and analyzing variables 
that have thwarted rational judgments, we can provide the 
basis for a more enlightened and rational decision-making 
process for the future.
This inquiry into the causes of the failure to imple­
ment the Alliance for Progress goals must begin with the 
selection of an appropriate theoretical tool. Currently, 
four distinct approaches to the analysis of foreign policy
^See Chapter IV of this dissertation for a detailed 
discussion of the successful industrialization of Brazil 
and the continuous problems of authoritarian and repressive 
government and economic and social dualism; See also H. Jon 
Rosenbaum and William Tyler, Contemporary Brazil: Issues in 
Economic and Political Development (New York; Praeger, 1972).
^Quartim, Op. Cit.; Also see Alfred Stepan, ed., 
Authoritarian Brazil (Mew Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1972) .
3Brady Tyson, "The Emerging Role of the Military as 
National Modernizers in Latin America", ed. David Pollock and
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decision-making are recognized (aside from the Richard Snyder 
model); (1) the rational actor approach; (2) the organization 
process model; (3) the bureaucratic politics model; and (4) 
the group dynamics approach.^
The rational actor approach of Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Arnold Wolfers, and Raymond Aron, assumes that government 
is the rational and unitary actor. This approach visualizes 
the actor as goal-oriented.^ The organization process model 
of Herbert Simon and James March assumes that government 
action is an organizational output, that the actions of 
government are those of the semi-autonomous organizations 
that make up the government, and emphasizes the factors that 
limit rationality in decision-making.^ The bureaucratic 
politics model of Graham T. Allison, Charles Lindblom, and
Arch R. Ritter, Latin American Prospects for the 1970's;
What Kinds of Revolutions? (New York: Praeger, 19 73); See 
also Helio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A 
Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968); Celso Furtado, 
Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1965); H. Jon Rosenbaum and 
William Tyler, Op. Cit.
^Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explain- 
ing the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Massachusetts; Little, 
Brown, and Co., 19 71).
^Ibid.; See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 
(New York: Knopf, 1973); Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in Inter­
national Politics," ed. William Fox, Theoretical Aspects of 
International Relations (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame.
1959).
^Allison, Op. Cit.; See James March and Herbert Simon, 
Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); James March 
ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago, Illinois: Rand
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Richard D. Neustadt rejects the notion of a unitary actor 
and focuses on the "intrusions of the game of domestic poli­
tics into the competitive game of international relations'-'.^ 
The group dynamics approach of Irving Janis assumes that 
members of policy-making groups are subjected to pressures 
widely observed in groups of ordinary citizens, that indi­
viduals in the group tend to develop informal goals to pre­
serve cordial intra-group relations, and that this is a part 
of the hidden agenda to their meeting.^
Abraham Lowenthal has suggested that Graham T. Alli­
son's bureaucratic politics model is useful for analyzing 
United States policy toward Latin American countries during
McNally, 1965); Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, 
Foreign Policy Decision-making (Glencoe, Illinois; The Free 
Press, 1962); Snyder incorporates some aspects of organiza­
tion theory in his decision-making approach; Roberts Wohlsetet­
ter, Pearl Harbor: War and Decision (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1962); Wohlstetter also incorporates 
aspects of organizational theory in her work.
^Allison, Op. Cit.; See David Braybrooke and Charles 
Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (Glencoe, Illinois: Free 
Press, 1963); Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Demo­
c racy (New York: Free Press, 1965); Richard D. Neustadt, 
Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
2Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psycholngj- 
cal Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972).
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the era of the Alliance for Progress.^ According to the 
bureaucratic politics model, decision-making is a game of 
politics in which bargaining takes place along regularized 
circuits among players within the government. The signifi­
cant components in the decision-making process are:
1. diverse goals and values that demand reconciliation as a 
prerequisite for reaching decisions;
2. the competitive groups that exist within the key concen­
tric circle and identify with alternative goals and 
policies.^
The fundamental assumptions of this model are:
1. multiple actors, as opposed to the unitary actor;
2. the tendency for actors to focus on many diverse intra-
^Abraham Lowenthal, "Liberal, Radical, and Bureaucrat­
ic Perspectives on United States Latin American Policy: The 
Alliance for Progress in Retrospect", ed. Cotier and Fagen,
Op. Cit.; Most analyses of U.S. policy toward Latin America 
are based on the rational actor approach (viz. Riordan Roett's 
The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast and
T h a »  W = = .  a m ^ ^ r d i n O  t o
Lowenthal, analyses of the U.S. policy toward Latin America 
during the 19 60's that are based on the rational actor ap­
proach have the underlying erroneous assumption that the Al­
liance for Progress constituted a coherent group of policies 
which a central apparatus had generated. Other critiques of 
the rational actor approach include that of Raymond Aron and 
James Rosenau; James Rosenau ed. International Politics and 
Foreign Policy (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1961); Rosenau's 
critiques focused on the overly simplistic and organismic 
nature of the rational actor approach; Raymond Aron, Peace and 
War: A Theory of International Relations "(New York: Doubleday, 
1966); Aron's critique of the rational actor approach focused 
on the assumption of a single goal. He argued that it is more 
realistic to assume the governments pursue many goals.
2Allison, Op. Cit.
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national problems, as opposed to one single strategic 
issue;
3. the tendency for actors to act in accordance with vari­
ous conceptions of national, organizational, and person­
al goals, as opposed to a consistent set of strategic 
objectives ;
4. the tendency for actors to make decisions on the basis
. of politics, as opposed to rational choice; and
5. the tendency for the decisions and actions to contrast
with or differ from the intentions of the strategic 
actors.^
Roger Hilsman, concurring with the basic assumptions
of the bureaucratic politics model, has indicated that the
very nature of American foreign policy-making is political,
a characteristic which ultimately leads to distortion.
These are some of the facets of policy-making and 
the decisions that move nations-separate institu­
tions sharing power, the press, experts, and others 
who influence policy without holding formal power, 
selfish and unselfish interest groups that exert a 
different kind of power, the difficulties and com­
plexities of analysis, prediction, and judgment... 
Policy faces inward as much as outward, seeking to 
reconcile conflicting goals, to adjust aspirations 
to available means, and to accommodate the different 
advocates of these competing goals and aspirations 
to one another. It is here that the essence of 
policy-making seems to lie in a process that is in 
its deepest sense political.2
llbid.
^Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy-making in De­
fense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971),
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The very nature of the foreign policy-making process 
in the United States is political, and the politics surround­
ing it operates in a society of multiple and competing elites, 
with individuals placed in strategic positions. Decisions 
are, then, the end result of this bargaining process.^
The bureaucratic politics paradigm is the fundamental 
model that is utilized in this dissertation. The assumption 
that "government is neither a unitary actor nor an aggrega­
tion of organizations, but an arena of competition among in­
dividuals that are strategically placed and possess their 
respective individual perceptions and interests" is funda­
mental to this analysis. Accordingly, the Alliance for Pro­
gress, as the embodiment of genuine commitments, represents 
the consensus of the hand-picked authors. The authors of the 
Alliance for Progress were the Kennedy men, individuals who
2had personal stakes in promoting democracy and social reform.
The decisions and actions of the strategic actors that 
are considered within the framework of this paradigm are:
1. the United States decision to prepare to intervene, if 
necessary, in support of the Brazilian military in the
llbid.
^Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op.Cit.; Jerome Levinson 
and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical 
Report on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago, Illinois: Qua­
drangle Books, 19 70).
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19 64 coup d'etat;
2. the United States immediate recognition of the Brazilian 
military government in 1964;
3. the Mann Doctrine; and
4. the decision to greatly increase the United States for­
eign assistance (economic) to Brazil under the military 
regime, as opposed to the reformist regime of the Goulart 
era.
Brazil's alignment with the United States was the 
ultimate goal for all participants. In pursuit of this goal, 
the cast was dichotomized. Kennedy men opposed career men 
in the struggle to see their policy alternative, the Alli­
ance for Progress, adopted as the means of achieving the ul­
timate goal. In essence, while the recognized goal of both 
groups of actors was to retain Brazil's alignment with the 
United States, tile preferred approaches were in opposition. 
Kennedy men vied against the career men in order to preserve 
Brazil's alignment through the approach of extending assist­
ance for the socio-economic development of the poverty- 
strickened regions of Brazil. Career men vied against the 
Kennedy men in order to preserve Brazil's alignment with the 
United States through the containment of radical forces in 
order to preserve a political environment that was favorable 
toward United States private investments.^ Definitions and
^Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979. 
Jerome I. Levinson, Chief of Capital Development in Brazil
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identifications of these groups of strategic actors, along 
with their designated prerogatives and stakes, will be pin­
pointed in more detail within the following paradigm.
First of all, the arena in which the strategic actors 
bargained for their policy options must be depicted. The 
broader arena in which actors bargained for their policy op­
tions (which related to the Alliance for Progress) lacked a 
formal organization. According to Jerome I. Levinson, there 
was no formal organization charged with the responsibility 
of implementing the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Rath­
er, several agencies and institutions combined to form the 
instrument through which the Alliance for Progress program
during the 1960's, designated the dichotomy of strategic 
actors relative to the Alliance for Progress proclamation. 
According to Levinson, the dichotomy existed between Kennedy 
men, who were the authors and supporters of the Alliance for 
Progress, and the career men, who opposed the Alliance for 
Progress's idealistic goals.
Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976. Niles Bond, 
Charge d'Affaires at the United States Embassy in Brazil at 
the beginning of the Kennedy Administration and Consul Gen­
eral in Sao Paulo from 1964 to 1969, verified this categori­
zation of the strategic actors, but failed to give an exten­
sive account of the varied approaches.
Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 1976. Robert 
Ballantyne, Deputy Director of Brazilian Affairs during the 
1960's, also verified the dichotomy between the Kennedy men 
and the career men.
Interview with Joseph Page, June 21, 1979. Joseph Page, 
Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center and author of The 
Revolution that Never VJas, also discussed the dichotomy, but 
failed to give an extensive account of the varied approches.
Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
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would be administered.^ This instrument included;
1. the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress;
2. the Latin American Bureau of the Agency for Internation­
al Development; and
3. the Latin American Bureau of the United States Department 
of State.^
The Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress was a 
hybird, neither fully a part of the Agency of In­
ternational Development nor fully a part of the 
State Department. The question is what were the 
lines of authority between the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Coor­
dinator of the Alliance for Progress? The lines 
of authority were not clear. There was conflict 
because of this gray area. Teodoro Moscoso, as 
coordinator, had more of a White House connection 
than did the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs.3
According to Levinson, the Committee of Nine, a group 
of experts whose duty was to evaluate long-term development 
programs for Latin American countries and make recommenda­
tions, met for only about a year and a half. The Committee 
of Nine never really worked, because the United States dealt 
bilaterally with Latin American countries.^ in addition to
^Interview with Jerome Levinson, September 1979; 
Levinson and Juan de Onis, Ibid.
2Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September 1979; 
See Levinson and d Onis, Op. Cit.; Harvey S. Perloff, The 
Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making (Bal­
timore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).
^nb id., Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
^Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; 
Perloff, Op. Cit.; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
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the Committee of Nine, which later became CIAP, there was 
the Developmental Loan Committee. This Committee, otherwise 
called the Capital Assistance Executive Committee, was the 
vehicle within the United States government through which 
loans were reviewed and conditions for loans were considered, 
and through which United States policy toward Latin American 
countries was really coordinated. The duration of this com­
mittee was also very brief.^
Secondly, the players must be identified and associ­
ated with their respective positions. The players consider­
ed in this dissertation are strategic actors (individuals) 
within governmental organizations who had an interest in 
Brazil, but were subject to various institutional perspect- 
ives. The key players were;
1. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President of the United States;
2. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States;
3. William T. Dentzer, Jr., Special Assistant, Agency for 
International Development;
4. Ralph Anthony Dungan, Special Assistant to the President 
of the United States;
5. Jerome I. Levinson, Financial Officer, The Agency for
^Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; 
Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; Perloff, Op. Cit.
2Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.-
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International Development, and Director of Capital De­
velopment in Brazil, The Agency for International De­
velopment ;
6. Lincoln Gordon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotent­
iary to Brazil;
7. Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant Administrator for the Latin 
American Regional Bureau, Agency for International De­
velopment, and United States Coordinator, Alliance for 
Progress ;
8. William D. Rogers, Special Counsel for the Alliance for 
Progress;
9. Jack B. Kubisch, Director, Agency for International De­
velopment Office in Rio de Janeiro, with personal rank 
of minister;
10. Donor Lion, Director of Agency for International Develop­
ment Mission in Recife ;
11. Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs;
12. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State;
13. George McGovern, Food for Peace; and
14. Col. Vernon Walters, United States Military Attache.^
^Other strategic actors served on Kennedy's Latin 
American Task Force. They are listed in the footnotes on page 
34 as Kennedy men, and are characterized in Chapter III.
Interview with Jerome Levinson; Levinson and de Onis, Op. 
Cit.; United States Department of State, Biographic Register 
(1960-1968) (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Print­
ing Office) United States Department of State, Foreign Service 
List (1960-1968) (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
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All players perceived the United States as having a 
stake in Brazil. The consensus was that Brazil was important 
because of its size, location, resources, and its ability to 
influence other Latin American nations.^
Thirdly, tiie various players' assumptions about the 
nature of Northeast Brazil's problem must be pinpointed.
While the consensus of the players (in all government organ­
izations) was that Brazil was an influential and important 
country in Latin America and should be the prime target under 
the Alliance for Progress, there was never a consensus about 
the nature of the Northeast problem or how the United States' 
interests should be pursued in Brazil.^
The players, as noted previously, were dichotomized 
over approaches to achieving the goal of Brazilian alignment 
with the United States. One group of players followed the 
outline of the New Frontier approach that was written into 
the Alliance for Progress. This group of players consisted 
largely of political appointees under John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
Printing Office); Peter Bell, "Brazilian-American Relations", 
in Riordan Roett, ed., Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, 
Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).
^Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.
^Lowenthal, Op. Cit.; Allison, Op, Cit.
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977.
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They focused their attention on the poverty strickened 
Northeastern region of Brazil. These players, called Kennedy 
men, were interested in pursuing their goal of ensuring Bra­
zil's alignment with the United States by focusing on efforts 
to assist in socio-economic development of the Northeast 
through the extension of public capital flows into the North­
east and by encouraging land reform. Specifically, these 
players included William T. Dentzer, Jerome I. Levinson, 
Lincoln Gordon, William D. Rogers, and Donor Lion.^
On the other hand, an opposition group of players 
existed in the State Department. Among this group of players 
were Dean Rusk and Thomas C. Mann. These men (in conjunction 
with the Department of Treasury) preferred the traditional 
political approach. They assumed that it was not in our in­
terest to pursue the radical economic and social reforms en­
visioned in the Alliance for Progress. These men, called 
career men, pursued their interests by trying to create a 
stable political climate that would be friendly toward United
^Kennedy men also included Adolf Berle, Robert Alex­
ander, Theodore Sorenson, Richard Goodwin, Arthur Whitaker, 
Robert Kennedy, Teodoro Moscoso, and David Bronheim; See 
Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
Interview witli Niles Bond, December 30 , 1976.
Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 1976.
Biographic Register, Op. Cit.; Foreign Service List. Op. Cit. ----------------------
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States investments. As traditionalists, they were skeptical 
of the goal of socio-economic and political development along 
democratic lines, and they preferred the use of private Ameri­
can capital investment in the development of Brazil.^
The fourth task in developing the framework for this 
dissertation is to associate the players with the government 
agencies involved. The assumptions of the Kennedy men that 
the United States interests lay in the pursuit of the socio­
economic development of the Northeast coincided with the 
Agency for International Development's mission to assist the 
Latin American countries in socio-economic and political 
development along democratic lines. The assumptions of the 
career men that the United States interest in Brazil was 
mainly political coincided with the State Department's mission 
of ensuring stability.^
The fifth task, in developing the paradigm for this 
dissertation, is to indicate the mechanism that existed to 
ensure that the perspective of the President and the White 
House Staff would be shared by State Department and the Agency 
for International Development officials in Rio and Recife.
Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979, 
Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 1976. 
Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.
^Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.;
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.
36
The primary mechanism by which the President ensured that 
the State Department and Agency for International Development 
officials in Rio and Recife would share his perspective was 
by appointing key officials who were interested in Brazil, 
and who appeared favorable toward the approach of pursuing 
the goals of socio-economic development and political de­
velopment along democratic lines.
The sixth task in developing the framework for this 
dissertation is to designate, roughly, the period of time 
that the varying interests were pursued. In designating the 
period of time that the varying interests were pursued, the 
groups of players, their positions, and their approaches 
must, again be categorized, and power changes and political 
pressures must be pinpointed.
Allison, in considering the styles of play, indicates 
that changes in administration are significant as determinants 
of the beha^ûor of bureaucratic careerists. Under the 
bureaucratic politics model, the assumptions are that bureau­
cratic careerists adopt codes of conformity to survive the
^Interview with Levinson, September, 19 79; Allison, 
Op. Cit,; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.
^Ibid.; Allison, Op. Cit.
^Allison, Op. Cit.
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inevitable changes of administration and personnel, and that 
the president is a super power among actors.^ These assump­
tions are significant in describing the time frames of power 
plays under the administrations involved in the game.
The Kennedy men gained entrance into the pockets of 
power through the election of President Kennedy in 1960.
They were Kennedy's handpicked advisors and foreign officers 
whom Kennedy chose because they seemed interested in his 
resolve to assist in the socio-economic and political de­
velopment of the Latin American countries.^ They were usually 
appointed by Kennedy to positions in the newly established 
Agency for International Development. The period of time 
in which they were able to pursue their goals was from the 
initiation of the Alliance for Progress up to the Kennedy 
assassination and the Lyndon B. Johnson presidency in late 
1963.3
^Ibid.
2Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979. 
According to levins on, since the Kennedy Administration 
assigned high priority to the Alliance, the Latin American 
Bureau began to attract highly motivated FSO's and outside 
talent who had shunned Latin American affairs during the 
Eisenhower Administration. Donor Lion represented this cate­
gory, and because of his emphasis on socio-economic develop­
ment, we label him a Kennedy man.
Interview with Donor Lion, April 30, 1976 and July 
21, 1977. Donor Lion stressed that his views on development 
in Brazil were similar to those of Lincoln Gordon.
3 L e v in s o n  a n d  d e  O n is ,  Op. Cit.;
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979; 
Christopher Mitchell, Op. Cit.
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During the period which preceded the Kennedy assasina- 
tion, there were instances in which the Kennedy initiative 
and the Kennedy men seemed to wane and waver in their efforts, 
One case in point is the decision to use impact aid in the 
Northeast as opposed to developmental aid.^ But in most in­
stances, Kennedy tried to maintain good relations with the 
reformist regime by pursuing socio-economic and political 
development along democratic lines.^ The Kennedy men lost 
their power when Lyndon B. Johnson came to power and reor­
ganized the power hierarchy for Latin American affairs.
As indicated previously, the career men were tradi­
tionalists in their positions on United States policy toward 
Latin America. Theirs was the position of utilizing private 
American investment in the effort to assist in the develop­
ment of Brazil and of ensuring a secure political and econom­
ic environment for United States investments.3 While the
Riordan Roett describes this as the direct result of 
political pressures to see quick results in the Alliance for 
Progress Program. See Riordan Roett, The Politics of Foreign 
Aid in -^e Brazilian Northeast (Nashville, Tennessee: Vander- 
bilt University Press, 1972).
^Kennedy's actions and decisions were not always posi­
tive in the pursuit of Alliance goals. However, aside from 
gross errors in Cuba and Guyana, he tended to be self-correct­
ing. Especially in Brazil, Kennedy tried to maintain good re­
lations with the reformist government (Goulart regime) , while 
being confronted with xenophobic nationalism.
^Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.
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first years of the Alliance for Progress saw the career men 
considerably weakened by the Kennedy thrust, four factors 
afforted the career men the opportunity to regain power. They 
were:
1. the Brazilian structural crisis and the appearance of 
radical elements in positions of power;
2. the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy;
3. the rise of Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency;
i. the appointment of Thomas C. Mann to the post of the
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; 
and
5. the elevation, by Lyndon B. Johnson, of the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the most 
powerful post in the hierarchy for considering United 
States policy toward Latin American countries.^
Once the Brazilian structural crisis appeared, ex­
posing the apparent degree of radicalization that was occur- 
ing in the Brazilian government, the career men were joined 
by businessmen who sought the protection of their investments 
and by congressmen who sought likewise to protect United 
States private investments. Both groups also saw the radi­
calization in Brazil as a trend toward communism, and there-
^Mitchell, Op. Cit.; Phyllis Parker, Brazil and the 
Quiet Intervention (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 
1979.
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fore, a threat to national security. Hence, the career men's 
desire to protect private investments converged with the de­
sire to prevent radicalisation and thereby defend the nation's 
security. The convergence of these two ideals occurred si­
multaneously with the rise of Lyndon B. Johnson to power as 
President. Lyndon B. Johnson, seeking to attain a favorable 
investment and political environment in Brazil, appointed 
Thomas C. Mann, a career diplomat, as the Assistant Secre­
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and elevated the 
position to the most powerful post in inter-American affairs, 
within the United States.
Thomas C. Mann, a noted cold warrior, brought, through 
the Mann Doctrine, the renewed concept of containment of rad­
ical forces in Latin America. His doctrine stressed the util­
ity of the military in preventing the trend toward communism.^ 
This was the logical conclusion of the career men's alterna­
tive. Its ramifications were seen through the United States 
decision to prepare to intervene in the Brazilian military 
coup d'etat of 1964, if necessary, and in the United States 
decision to immediately recognize the Brazilian military 
government.
The Brazilian military government began to serve the 
interests of the career men and their coalition of interests.
^Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.;
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 19 79; 
Mitchell, Op. Cit.
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In essence, the career men had taken the reins of power in 
the American foreign policy-making amalgam, and were success­
ful in implementing their own approach, which conflicted 
with the Alliance for Progress. The military government in 
Brazil took on the task that the State Department had long 
desired for some organizational entity, that of preserving 
a favorable climate for United States investments and the 
containment of radical forces in Brazil.
The determination of factors that were causal in the 
failure to implement the Alliance for Progress goals requires 
knowledge of the environment. Although the fundamental in­
strument for this dissertation is the bureaucratic politics 
model, the epistimology becomes somewhat eclectic in that the 
decision-making theories of Richard Snyder and Joseph Frankel 
are utilized. Also the ideas of Morgenthau come into play. 
Frankel and Snyder differ in their viewpoints as to how the 
environment must be treated in a decision-making inquiry. 
Snyder has indicated a preference for considering only the 
perceived environment. On the other hand, Frankel argues 
that the objective environment must be taken into account.^
^Richard C. Snyder, "Decision-making as an Approach 
to the Study of International Politics", eds. Richard C.
Snyder, Burton Sapin, and H.Vv. Bruck, Foreign Policy Decision­
making (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 65; Joseph Frankeh 
The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-making 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Harold and Margaret 
Sprout, Foundations of International Behavior (Princeton, New 
Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962); Frankel's decision to 
consider both the perceived environment and the objective en­
vironment is an acceptance of the Sprouts thesis that a
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I have included, as facets of this inquiry, both the 
objective and the perceived environment. Allison indicates 
that games are not played under conditions of perfect in­
formation, and that considerable misperception is a standard 
part of the functioning of each government.^ Hans J. Morgen­
thau has designated the misperception of the international 
system in the 1960's as a leading cause of the failure in 
American foreign policy. In characterizing this mispercep­
tion, he utilizes the concomitant of a description of the 
objective environment.^
Morgenthau, thus, characterizes the objective environ­
ment of the international system as far more complex than 
that of the tight bipolar system of the late 1940's, in which 
the major phenomenon appeared to be the international com­
munist force in Europe. Accordingly, he describes the inter­
national environment of the late 19 50's as the composite of
distinction must be drawn between the psychological environ­
ment and the operational environment since tlie two might be 
quite different; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Op. Cit., pp. 312- 
333.
^Allison, Op. Cit.
^Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policv;
See also John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, 
Russia, and America (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 3-5; 
Stoessinger alludes to the fact that under certain conditions 
the strategic actors in international politics respond to the 
fictions that they themselves have created rather than re­
sponding to realities. Yet, according to Stoessinger, the 
tendency to ignore the relevance of objective reality can be 
disastrous.
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many international social forces and indigenous forces. He 
proceeds to enumerate these multiple forces, "the revolution 
of rising aspirations", nationalism, and the changing force 
of communism. (His thesis on misperception is discussed, 
along with the application of remedies, in more detail, at 
the end of the designation of this model).^
Problems of misperception cannot be clarified if the 
objective picture is missing. Thus, concurring with Frankel 
and Morganthau, I have designated as the seventh task, the 
explanation of the operative situation or the objective en­
vironment, which the American strategic actors perceived and 
to which they responded. The following aspects of the Bra­
zilian environment are put forth as relevant phenomena during 
the early 1960's:
1. the Brazilian economy, society, and political scene;
2. the Brazilian political ethos and prominent social forces 
(nationalism, populism, and communism); and
3. the foreign policy of the reformist government.
Aside from the arena of American foreign policy-making 
that has already been described within this paradigm, the 
American situation is described briefly, in terms of economic
llbid.; See also Stoessinger, Op. Cit., p. 154; Stoes­
singer notes that by 19 49 the cold war had become a tug of 
war between two competing theologies. Within this competi­
tion, the role of perception was central. These perceptions 
persisted long after the communist monolithic arrangement 
had become polycentric.
44
situations and political conditions.
The eighth task is to designate the constraints of 
the game. Dual factors act as constraints on the types of
decisions that are made by the strategic actors. These fac­
tors are:
1. the parameters of the game; and
2. the action-channels of tlie game.^
The parameters of the game are the shared values and images
of the participants of the ga m e .2 As a whole, the strategic 
actors share definite values and images which make them tend 
to conform in their decision-making, despite their political 
opposition.
The American ideology is the fundamental composite of 
the shared values and partial-determinants of the images of 
the participants of the game, and is therefore, examined in 
this inquiry. Dominant themes in the American ideology con­
stitute these shared values and images, and may be referred 
to as parameters, since they determine the boundaries within
^Allison, Op. Cit.; Lowenthal, Op. Cit.
^Ibid-
William C. Vocke, American Foreign Policy: An Analyti­
cal Approach (New York: Free Press, 19 76) ; Vocke discusses 
cultural factors as partial-determinants of foreign policy; 
See also Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third 
World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social 
Science (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1966) ; Packenham discusses the American ideology relative to 
United States policy toward developing areas.
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which decisions must be made.^
The constant factors of the game, which are couched 
in the American ideology, consist of
1. aversion to radicalism;
2. aversion to communism;
3. belief in the sanctity of private enterprise; and
4. belief in the overwhelming importance of national securi- 
ty, relegated in the final analysis to national defense.
These parameters weighed heavily on the side of the 
career men, and helped to push them into pockets of power. 
Furthermore, these factors were variables that afforded the 
career men the opportunity to form effective coalitions with 
performance entities in Brazil and with special interests 
and officials in the United States.
The second consideration of constraints in this game 
focuses on the action-channels. According to Allison, action- 
channels are regularized means of taking governmental action
3on specific kinds of issues. Since action channels structure 
the game, they are crucial to this inquiry. Action-channels 
are viewed as the variables that structure the game, because
^Allison, Op. Cit.
^Packenham, Op. Cit.; Steven Ambrose and James Barber, 




they pre-select the major players and determine the major 
players' usual points of entry into the game.^ Moreover, 
action-channels distribute the advantages and disadvantages 
to the strategic actors. In as much as the action-channels 
distribute the advantages and disadvantages to the strategic 
actors, they invariably act as major determinants of "who 
has the game" or "which department's men actually do what is 
decided upon".^
The action-channels for the game under scrutiny in­
cluded:
1. the manner in which appropriations for extending United 
States economic assistance to Latin America were initi-, 
ated; and
2. the autonomous nature of the Rio Office relative to the 
mission at Recife.^
In as much as the appropriations for extending United 
States economic assistance to Latin American countries were 
initiated through the congressional system, the United States 




^Riordan Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the 
Brazilian Northeast. '
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Congressional pressures on the presidential efforts to gain 
appropriations and congressional attitudes toward the policy- 
officials who administered the economic assistance programs 
had an enormous impact on the Alliance for Progress.
The autonomous nature of the Rio Office relative to 
the Recife Mission may be visualized as another important 
action-channel. The mission of the Alliance for Progress was 
to assist in development of the poverty strickened regions 
of Brazil,^ The Recife Mission was established to serve the 
poverty strickened Northeast region, rather than the more 
affluent regions. In this respect, the role of the Recife 
Mission was to fulfill the objectives of the Alliance for 
Progress.2 Despite this convergence, the Rio office, which 
served the more prosperous regions of Brazil, had tile greater 
capacity for influencing the developments in the Alliance 
for Progress in Brazil.^
By utilizing the following variables, I can begin to 
examine the strategic actors' perceptions of the relevant 
phenomena and the operative situation, and relate them to 
the decisions and actions that were taken. These variables,
llbid.
2Interview with Donor Lioni
^Ibid.; Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the 
Brazilian Northeast.
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many of which have been pinpointed previously within this 
chapter, are:
1. the designated game;
2. the identified strategic actors;
3. the two competing categories of actors with their rela­
tive government agencies ;
4. the designated relationship between the strategic actors 
and agencies ;
5. the defined situation;
6. the identified parameters of the game;
7. the identified action-channels of the game; and
8. the relevant events, actions, and decisions.
The designated variables, the perceptions of the stra­
tegic actors, and the actions and decisions that were taken 
in United States policy-making toward Brazil are analyzed 
against the background of the operative situation in order 
to test the relative hypotheses of this dissertation. The 
following hypotheses combine to form the thesis of this dis­
sertation:
1. The mission of the Agency for International Development 
was positively related to the idealistic goals of the 
Alliance for Progress.
2. The mission of the U.S. Department of State was negatively 
related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.
3. The organization of the Agency for International Develop­
ment Mission at Recife was positively related to the Al-
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liance for Progress.
4. The parameters of the game were negatively related to 
the Alliance for Progress.
5. The action-channels of the game were negatively related 
to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.
6. The prominent forces in Brazil were positively related 
to stated goals of the Alliance for Progress.
7. The prominent forces in Brazil were negatively related 
to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.
I know of no other work in which the bureaucratic 
politics approach is utilized to analyze United States poli­
cy toward Brazil during the 1960's. The most recent works 
on United States policy toward Brazil during that era are 
Jan Knippers Black's United States Penetration of Brazil 
(19 77) and Phyllis Parker's Brazil and the Quiet Interven- 
tion (1979). Neither of these works show evidence of utiliz­
ing the bureaucratic politics paradigm in their analyses.
Jan Knippers Black utilizes linkage theory in her analysis, 
and Phyllis Parker gives an historical account of the events 
of the era.
In the effort to test the hypotheses that I have 
stated in this introduction, I have utilized the following 
sources :
1. interviews with strategic actors, other officials, and 
observers of the given situation;
2. relevant documents of the United States government;
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3. relevant data and general sources from international 
organizations ;
4. files of the Agency for International Development-State 
Department;
5. interviews with leading scholars who have focused their 
research on United States-Brazilian relations;
6. leading newspapers and periodicals; and
7. books and articles from scholarly journals.
Interviews with tlie strategic actors, officials, and 
observers include: Jerome I. Levinson, General Counsel, In­
ter-American Development Bank, former Director of Capital 
Development in Brazil and former General Counsel for the Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations; 
Donor Lion, Director of Agency for International Development 
in Jamaica, former Director of the AID Mission in Recife; Niles 
Bond, Charge d'Affaires of United States Embassy in Brazil 
in 1961 and Consul General in Sao Paulo from 196 4-196 8; Archie 
Lang, Administrative Officer in United States Embassy in Rio 
from 1962-1965, and Field Support Officer of Brazilian Affairs, 
U.S. Department of State, 1965-1966; Robert Ballantyne,
Deputy Director of Brazilian Affairs, AID-State Department, 
1966-1972, and Brazilian Desk Officer, AID, 1976; Frank Haend- 
ler, former American Consulate General for Political Affairs 
in Sao Paulo and former Secretary and Political Officer at 
the American Embassy (196 7-1969); David Mein, Deputy Director 
of Office of Management, Technical Assistance Program, AID-
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State Department; Lewis H. Duiquid, Foreign Affairs Office 
of the Washington Post; Robert Miller, Foreign Service Of­
ficer at Recife Mission in Brazil; and Virginia Moye, Reports 
Officer, Capital Development, Latin American Bureau, AID- 
State Department during the Alliance for Progress.
The United States government documents that are uti­
lized in this inquiry are: copies of declassified memorandums 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Northeast Survev Team 
Report, The Congressional Record, special reports from the 
United States Department of State, Report of the United 
States Department of Commerce Trade Mission to Brazil. Con­
gressional Hearings, the United States Agency for Interna­
tional Development's Annual Proposed Mutual Defense and De­
velopment Program: Summary Presentation to the Congress,
The U.S. Department of State Historical Office's American 
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, special monographs and 
papers from the files of the Agency for International De­
velopment-State Department, the Council on Foreign Relations's 
Documents on American Foreign Policy, the United States De­
partment of State's Biographic Register, and.the U.S. Depart­
ment of State's Foreign Service List.
United Nations publications that are utilized in this 
study are the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin 
America's Economic Survey of Latin America and other publica­
tions on the economies of Latin America. In addition, the 
Organization of American States's documents were examined.
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Scholars of Brazilian politics and government, along 
with their pertinent works, have been consulted on problems 
of data and to clarify and elaborate their own interpreta­
tions of the operative situation. These scholars include: 
Keith Larry Storrs, former missionary to Brazil, Professor 
of Latin American Studies at George Washington University, 
Latin American Analyst in the Foreign Affairs Office of Con­
gressional Reference Service, Library of Congress, and author 
of Brazil's Independent Foreign Policv; Riordan Roett, Pro­
fessor of Latin American Studies at Johns Hopkins University 
School of Advanced International Studies, and author of 
many key works on Brazil (viz. Brazil in the Sixties, Brazil 
in tlie Seventies, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian 
Northeast, and Brazil Politics in a Patrimonial Society;
Brady Tyson, former missionary to Brazil, Professor of Latin 
American Studies at American University, Foreign Affairs 
Officer, U.S. Mission to the United Nations and author of 
"The Emerging Role of the Military as Modernizer"; Joseph 
Page, Professor at tlie Georgetown Law Center and author of 
The Revolution That Never Was; and H. Jon Rosenbaum, Special 
Assistant to Senator Jacob Javitz, Professor of Political 
Science at the City University of New York, former Professor 
in the Brazilian School of Public Administration at the 
Getulio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro, author of "A 
Emenda Hickenlooper: Analise dos Resultados", and co-editor 
of Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political
53
Development.
The periodicals and journals, as well as newspapers, 
that I have examined include: America, American Universities 
Field Staff Reports, Business Week. American Political Srienrm 
Review, Latin American Research Review, Orbis, Christian 
Science Monitor, Current History, Foreign Affairs, Fortune 
Magazine, Harvard Business Review, Inter-American Studies 
and World Affairs, National Review, New York Times, New 
Statesman, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, The World Today, Wall Street Journal, 
Washington Post, International Affairs, The Christian Century, 
and Commonweal, Journal of International Affairs, The Western 
Political Quarterly, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign 
Policy Studies, Journal of Politics, Wilson Quarterly, Head­
line Series, International Legal Materials. and The Econo­
mist.
Latin American sources have been utilized to a much 
lesser degree. They include: documents from the Presidency
of the Republic, Three Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development; Conjuntura Economie; Revista de Direito Publico 
e Ciencas Politics, Brazilian Bulletin, A Economia Brasileira 
e Suas Perspectives, Politics Externa Independents, Estrate- 
gia, and Jornal do Brasil.
The dissertation, format includes:
1. the design of the paradigm for analyzing United States 
policy toward Brazil and a review of major themes in
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American policy toward Latin America, matters which have 
been accomplished within this introductory chapter;
2. the description of the operative situation in Brazil, 
which is included in Chapter Two;
3. the analysis of the Kennedy men's perceptions, actions, 
and decisions, as well as thorough discussion of the 
parameters and action-channels of the game, which is 
included in Chapter Three;
4. the analysis of the career men's perceptions, actions, 
and decisions, as well as discussion of the Brazilian 
coup d'etat, which is included in Chapter Four; and
5. an indepth analysis of United States policy toward Bra­
zil during the 1960's, which is included in the con­
cluding chapter. Within the chapter, major hypotheses 
are tested by applying the designated variables of the 
game, and conclusions are drawn, based on the supporting 





BRAZIL IN PERSPECTIVE; 1960-1961 THE POLITICS, 
THE ECONOI/IY, THE SOCIETY, AND THE POLITICAL ETHOS
In 1960 Janio Quadros was elected as President of 
Brazil. The election of Quadros ushered in a new era in 
Brazil's foreign policy, which contrasted greatly with that 
of his predecessor in the late 19 50's. Under Juscelino 
Kubitschek, the president who preceded Quadros, the Brazilian 
Monetary Authority had instituted SUMOC^ Instruction 113, 
which allowed foreign private investment in high priority 
sectors favorable conditions for their investments. Official 
attitudes, at that time, also created a secure political 
climate for foreign companies in Brazil. Considerable op­
position to the 1955 initiative was evident in the domestic 
industrial sector and in the realm of the nationalist ideo­
logists. Although radical nationalists opposed Kubitschek's 
policies during the early stages of his administration, the 
success of his economic policies tended to forestall excessive 
conflict until the turn of the decade.^
^Superintendency of Money and Credit. '
^Nathaniel Leff, Economic Policy-making and Develop­
ment in Brazil, 19 47-196 4 (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
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During the latter part of his administration, Kubits­
chek began to lean more toward a xenophobic nationalistic 
position. However, this shift was very slight, and result­
ed from his fear that the fiscal and monetary measures im­
posed by the International Monetary Fund authorities and the 
United States might jeopardize his development goals. The 
two pesidents that would follow Kubitschek, Quadros and 
Joao "Jango" Goulart, would take an increasingly nationalistic 
line.^
By 1960 Brazil had reached the peak of what E. Brad­
ford Burns has labeled "twentieth century offensive national­
ism". Twentieth century offensive nationalism had its rami­
fications in the emergency of the "new Brazilian", nurtured 
by progress and prosperity and projecting self-confidence, 
rising aspirations, and the desire to improve the nation.
At its 1960 peak, the thrust of this nationalism and its new 
Brazilians became "the liberation of Brazil from foreign 
control" and the "development of a modern, industrialized.
1968); Instruction 113 was instituted in 1955, pp. 59, 66; 
Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964; An Experi­
ment in Democracy (New York; Oxford University Press, 1967); 
Skidmore notes that the domestic industrialists feared the 
competition of foreign trade and allied with the nationalists, 
who had become numerous by the last of the Kubitschek term.
llbid. Xenophobia is a term to describe the national­
ist's rejection of the foreigner. In this sense, the early 
1960's represented an era of xenophobic nationalism.
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indigenous society".^
At the onset of the Quadros Administration, Thomas 
Lynn Smith portrayed Brazil as an "awakening giant." Brazil's 
vast territory, which encompassed over three million square 
miles and included approximately fifty percent of all South 
America, was an area of considerable diversity. This di­
versity was reflected in geography, in the broad spectrum 
of races, and in the regional variations. Uneven develop­
ment was an obvious feature of the Brazilian economic and 
social conditions. The contrast between the drought strick­
ened and impoverished Northeast and the prosperous Southeast 
indicates that the economic progress which Brazil experienced 
during the Kubitschek era had not been beneficial to all of 
Brazil. In 1950 the vast and diverse territory of Brazil 
was populated by more than sixty million people of European, 
African, and Asiatic descent, as well as the American Indians.
Significant proportions of this population suffered from
2poverty and its concomitant despair.
Brazil, the "awakening giant" had made its ascent into 
the industrialized world and was standing on the threshold of
E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil : A Historical
Survey (New York: Praeger, 1968); Burns uses the term "offensive
nationalism" to discuss the rise of xenophobic nationalism in 
the early 1960's. A thorough discussion of the rise of national­
ism is given in the latter part of this chapter under the sub- 
topic, Prominent Forces.
2Thomas Lynn Smith, "The Giant Awakens: Brazil", The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
March, 1961, pp. 95-102.
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a new era, in which it hoped to emerge as a great power. A 
new middle class was emerging, with the rise of white collar 
workers and professionals as the pace of industrialization 
quickened. This expanding new middle class had aspirations 
for a higher standard of living, and therefore, they placed 
additional demands on the fragile political system. Aside 
from the emerging middle class, there was also a changing 
new upper class. In as much as the patron system had de­
clined considerably during the first half of the twentieth 
century, the descendants of the traditional upper class ex­
perienced a dual process of transformation and diversifica­
tion. At the roots of this process was the factor of in­
dustrialization, which acted as an impetus for many changes 
during this era.^
Charles Wagley describes the manner in which this 
transformation affected the upper class by noting three 
variants of the old elite. They include: (1) that segment
whose relationship with metropolitan centers was severed, 
but continued as great seigneurial figures in the backlands?
(2) a segment which constituted the urban bureaucracy and
^Thomas Lynn Smith. Brazil: People and Institutions. 
Revised Edition. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State 
University Press, 195 8; Charles Wagley. An Introduction to 
Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 196 3), pp. 106- 
128; VJagley discusses the patron system as the means through 
which the landed aristocracy attempted to pacify the peasants, 
and was therefore, able to forestal the politicization.
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professional groups, and began to merge with the expanding 
middle class; and (3) an additional segment that managed to 
preserve their influence and power on the national scene 
through industrializing and by diversifying their investments. 
At the lower strata of Brazilian society were the rural pro­
letariat, dispossessed of its patron system, and the urban 
lower class, composed of the slum dwell’èrs.^
The traditional Brazilian social system encompassed a 
two class system (upper and lower), which was intimately 
associated with a two way racial division in Brazil. This 
division consisted of the white landed gentry or traditional 
upper class, on the one hand, and the Black, American Indian 
or mixed slaves, peasants, and manual workers, on the other 
hand. By 1960 middle class Black society did not exist 
separately from White middle class society. Basic to the 
understanding of class and race is the fact that the "non­
white populations have not improved their status because the 
socio-economic system of Brazil has offered them few opportuni­
ties for vertical mobility". Western industrialized nations 
have traditionally been condenscending in their perceptions 
of Africans. Brazilian culture is imbued with African themes. 
Before World War I Brazilians tended to be skeptical of pro­
jecting these African themes on the global scene. However,
^Ibid.; The decline of the patron system left the 
masses alienated.
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with the rise of the intelligentsia, Brazilians developed 
a sense of pride which changed such attitudes during the 
post World War II era. By 1960 Brazilian pride and new 
economic strength combined to strengthen the existing nation­
alism, a factor which began to influence Brazil's foreign 
relations.^
The Brazilian Economy At The Turn Of The Decade
Brazilian aspirations for great power status was the 
logical consequence of two features: (1) the Brazilians
very early concerted and disciplined efforts to industrial­
ize; and (2) the developmental revolution which Brazil shared 
with other Third World countries. The economic well-being 
that Brazil had attained by 1960 showed that industrial prog­
ress was the major phenomenon of the Brazilian economy. The 
economic progress which Brazil had experienced under Kubits­
chek was an extension of the earlier efforts to industrial­
ize. Brazil made its ascent from its nineteenth century 
position as a traditional supplier of primary goods and an 
economy that was reflexive and monocultural, to a nation­
state that had reached a relatively high stage of industrial-
Ibid. Thomas E. Skidmore describes the racial 
characteristics of the Brazilian culture and the concept of 
"racial democracy" in Black Into White: Race and Nationality 
in Brazilian Thought (Wew York: Oxford University Press,
19 74); For a discussion of the existing Brazilian nationalism 
and its effects on Brazil's foreign policy see pp. 96-107 
of Chapter II under Quadros's Independent Foreign Policy.
His foreign policy was controversial in both Brazil and the 
U.S. since it was based on neutralism.
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ization during the twentieth century. Brazil's industrial­
ization was the result of three factors, in general:
(1) the import substitution process of industrialization;
(2) the entrepreneurial ability of the private sector; and
(3) the Brazilian government's economic policy.^
The entrepreneurial capability of the private sector 
had been set in motion by the process of import substitution^ 
Joel Bergsman has noted that the tendency for the demand for 
imports (in developing countries) to grow at a more rapid 
rate than the per capita income in developing countries ag­
gravates the usual balance-of-payments problems. Due to the 
reflexive nature of their economies, developing countries are 
usually forced to rely on the foreign exchange that they can 
obtain from exports. Unfortunately, the exports of the de­
veloping countries are typically primary products. Primary 
products, except for strategic minerals and fuels, have a low 
demand on the international market. Thus, the developing 
nations' desire to obtain foreign exchange as a supplement 
to generally low levels of income remains unfulfilled. On the 
contrary, the demand for imports is not met by the process of 
exporting primary products (which invariably command only low
^United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
The Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. 9, No. 1, March, 
196 4, pp. 1-60,
^Import substitution means substituting domestic pro­
duction for goods that were previously imported.
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prices), but by increasing balance-of-payments deficits.^
In opting for a solution for the problem, developing 
countries have two alternative strategies:
(1) that of reducing the demand for imports by placing duties 
on imports ; or
(2) that of substituting domestic production for goods that 
were previously imported.
The second alternative is, of course, import substitution.
Most developing countries choose import substitution since
it requires industrialization and the decision-makers are un-
2aware of its hazards.
The Brazilian government, unaware of the hazards, 
chose the second alternative, and thus, began a process of 
industrialization with import substitution, among other poli­
cies. The government's economic policy included two features:
(1) a foreign trade policy, which discriminated against non- 
strategic imports and consumer goods; (2) an investment poli­
cy, which stressed the elimination of key bottlenecks in in-
Ijoel Bergsman. "Foreign Trade Policy and Develop­
ment", eds. H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler, Contemporary 
Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development (Mew 
York: Praeger, 1972).
^Ibid. The hazards include forestalling the produc­
tion of non-durable consumer goods and some durable consumer 
goods; David Mein, Deputy Director of Office for Management 
Assistance Bureau, AID-State Department, who was in Brazil ■ 
during the Kubitschek-Quadros-Goulart era as the son of a 
Foreign Service Officer, noted the scarcity of consumer goods 
in Brazil.
Interview with David Mein, April 28, 19 76.
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frastructure sectors and the financing of other basic in­
vestments through Banco Nacicnal do Desenvolvimento Economico.^
In considering the history of Brazil's process of im­
port substitution, several periods must be viewed. The ini­
tial period followed the great depression of the 1930's. It 
was a period of rapid recovery of domestic activity, and it 
occurred as a result of the Brazilian government's policy 
which stressed protection against the imports of other coun­
tries. Following this period, the era of World War II set a 
stage in which the government actually entered the steel in­
dustry, organizing a plant at Volta Redonda. The third peri­
od was the post World War II era, and it was largely charac­
terized by the continuous process of expansion and structural 
changes in the Brazilian industries. During this period, 
three distinct stages can be distinguished. They include:
(1) Stage I, which began in 19 45 and lasted until 19 48;
(2) Stage II, which began in 1948 and ended in 1954; and
(3) Stage III, which began in 19 55 and extended into the 
early 1960's.^
Stages I and II witnessed considerable improvement in 
the conditions of tlie external sector; a rise in the Brazil­
ian economy's capacity to import on a par with pre-depression
^U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Op. Cit.
^Ibid.
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levels; considerable economic growth, which was directed 
more toward th.e expansion of the export sector and less to­
ward the process of import substitution. Stage II was large­
ly characterized by rapid industrial development, with an 
increase in the capacity to import. This coincided with a 
large increase in the purchasing power of the export sector.
A considerable increase in national income occurred. Con­
sequently, domestic import substitution industries flourished.^
Stage III, the last recorded stage of import substi­
tution which began in 1955 and extended into the early 1960's, 
was characterized by: (1) a substantial increase in the di­
rect and indirect participation of the Brazilian government 
in basic investment; (2) a considerable inflow of foreign pri­
vate capital in the form of direct investment and also public 
capital; (3) the intensive installation of dynamic industries 
(including motor vehicles and heavy electrical equipment);
and (4) the expansion of steel, petroleum, and heavy chemical
2industries. This was a stage of intensive industrialization.
The process of import substitution in Brazil changed 
the composition of the Brazilian imports. There was a de­
cline in the share of goods destined for consumption (10 per­
cent decline) between 1949 and 1959. The major portion of 




of durable consumer goods and building materials. The im­
portation of nonmetallic intermediate products and fuels 
increased substantially. Capital goods remained at the pre­
vious level.1 The greatest changes occurred as a result of 
the Kubitschek industrial development program during the 
late 1950's.
The Brazilian Economy; Kubitschek's Tniti.ativps 
Kubitschek, anxious to see the postwar dynamism of 
the Brazilian economy continue, abandoned the economic sta­
bility program of the previous administration and embarked 
upon a policy of industrial expansion and diversification. 
During the Kubitschek era there was a continued reliance on 
foreign supplies of capital goods. However, this continuing 
trend of minor reflexive conditions in the Brazilian economy 
was offset by the excellent conditions of market growth which 
provided considerable opportunities for securing external 
investment and credit. The Kubitschek program for industrial 
expansion and diversification was embodied in the Target 
Plan.2
^United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America. 
Economic Survey of Latin America 196 4. New York: United Na­
tions, 1966; Economic Development of Latin America in the 
Post-War Period. New York: United Nations, 1964, pp. 115-117.
^United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America. 196 4, p. 209; United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic Sur­
vey of Latin America 196 4, p. 290.
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The theoretical bases of the Target Plan had been 
established by the Technical Advisory Council of Vargas' 
second administration, the Joint Brazil-United States Com­
mission, and the Joint Economic Commission of Latin America/ 
BNDE Group. Four general objectives were put forth by the 
Target Plan:
(1) the removal or drastic reduction of the main bottlenecks 
affecting the infrastructure;
(2) the remedying of the most serious maladjustments or in­
adequacies in the intermediate industries;
(3) diversification of the structure of industry; and
(4) the construction of the new capital city, Brasilia.^
The Kubitschek Administration sought to achieve these 
objectives by obtaining a given level of investment and by 
allocating investment to selected activities. In as much as 
the attainment of a required volume of investment was needed 
to achieve the objectives of the industrialization program, 
the government adopted a very liberal policy toward the im­
portation of foreign capital. The Banco do Brasil was granted 
the power of extending additional benefits to sectors that 
were deemed "particularly important for the development of the 
economy". From 1957 through 1961, the growth of the Brazil­
ian industrial sector accelerated. During this brief period
^Ibid.; BNDE refers to Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento 
Economico.
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the industrial product increased substantially, and the 
industrial sector's share of the gross domestic product rose 
to 31.6 percent in 1959-1961, up from 19.4 percent in 1947-49.^ 
Under the Target Plan, Kubitschek's main endeavor was 
to achieve an expansion of electric generating capacity. The 
postwar industrial development of Brazil had made the rapid 
development of Brazil's electric power mandatory. The rate 
of investment in electric power had failed to keep pace with 
the demand during the imeediate postwar years. By the early 
1950's an insufficient allocation of capital investment had 
been provided for electric power. This exacerbated the orig­
inal scarcity of power. Under the Kubitschek industrial 
drive, the critical shortage in electric power was overcome, 
(for details see Table 1.)^










1960 . • 4,800
Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
^Ibid., p. 295. 
^Ibid.
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The Kubitschek Administration also worked toward the 
remodeling of the structure of transportation. The program 
for remodeling the transportation structure entailed four 
major aspects: (1) re-equiping the railway network; (2) mod­
ernizing the merchant marine; (3) extending and paving the 
highways; and (4) improving port facilities. At the time of 
Kubitschek's ascent to the presidency, inadequate transporta­
tion constituted the major bottleneck in the Brazilian econo­
my.^
The railroads and highways ... had their beginnings 
in the heavier concentrations of population. They 
originally extended only to the hinterland served by 
each coastal settlement. For many years coastal ship­
ping was the only link between the settlements. High­
way construction was stimulated immediately prior to 
and following World War II. This construction follow­
ed the deterioration of the railroads and the coastal 
shipping fleet.^
Almost thirty percent of Brazil's total railway track 
was in the Sao Paulo-Rio de Janeiro area, the industrial
3center. Thus, extending the railway network was a serious 
problem. To alleviate the disequillibrium in the railway 
network, heavy investment was needed. Between 1955 and 1961, 
the length of the railway network in Bra-
^Ibid.
2U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Com­
merce . Report of the United States Department of Commerce 




zil was extended slightly from 37,092 kilometers to 38,185 
kilometers. (For details of the increase in network and the 
increased investment in railroads in Brazil see Table 2 and 
3.):
Table 2. Brazil; Railway Network, 1955 & 1961




Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
Table 3. Brazil: Gross Investment in Railways as a Per-




Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
Under the Target Plan, the objective for intermediate 
industries was to ensure that a sufficient supply of steel 
would be produced for the requirements of economic growth 
and, at the same time, not exert undue pressure on the balance
^U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Op. Cit.,
p. 297.
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of payments situation. Given the tremendous production of 
ingots and rolled products, the Kubitschek Administration 
was highly successful in this endeavor. (For details see 
Table 4.)^
Table 4. Brazil: Steel making, 1956-61
(Thousands of tons)
Steel Ingots Rolled ProductsYear Domestic Domestic
Production Imports Production Imports
1956 ... 1,365 339 1,074 2421957 ... 1,470 509 1,130 3831958 ... 1,659 279 1,304 2051959 ... 1,866 651 1,492 4991960 ... 2,279 558 1,707 4341961 2,485 433 1,928 331
Source: U.N. Economic Commission tor Latin America
The Economic Development of Brazil : An Analysis and -An
Assessment
In this dissertation economic development is viewed 
from a broad perspective, and therefore, includes the struc­
tural changes that are necessary to bring about social and 
political development. In this respect, our definition of 
economic development would coincide with the Celso Furtado 
concept of socio-economic development. In essence, it in­
cludes :
(1) the vital changes that must occur within the economy
llbid., p. 298.
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(eg. increasing rates of gross national product, in­
creasing rates of per capita income, abundance of natural 
resources) in order to achieve sustained growth;
(2) the vital changes that must occur vzithin the societal
bases (eg. social mobility, decline of dualism, rising
standards of living for the population as a whole; and
(3) the vital changes that must occur within the polity to
ensure accessibility of the entire population to the 
power structures and give them their share of the in­
creasing gross national product, social justice, and 
human dignity.^
Economic development as socio-economic development in 
which structural change occurs differs from economic moderni­
zation. Economic modernization is synonymous with techno- 
economic development. Its focus is on "tire big push", the 
economic dynamo that is based on industry as the lead sector. 
Its stress on the economic dynamo aggravates the already
^Charles P. Kindleberger. Economic Development (New 
York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966); Kindleberger notes 
that economic growth focuses on gross product, while economic 
development implies both more output and changes in the struc­
ture of the distribution. Also economic development implies 
that a country has achieved a measure of growth and is con­
tinuing to grow (sustained growth); Celso Furtado. The Econom­
ic Growth of Brazil; A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times 
(Berkeley, California; University of California Press, 1063); 
Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris. Society, Politics and Econom­
ic Development; A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Brady Tyson, "The Emerging Role 
of the Military as Modernizers in Latin America", eds. David 
Pollock and Arch R. Ritter, Latin American Prospects for the 
1970's; What Kinds of Revolutions? (New York; Praeger, 1973) ; 
Helio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development; A
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existing problems of dualism that are so characteristic of 
developing societies. While the proponents of economic mod­
ernization promise that humanization of the regime and the 
quest for social justice will be vigorously pursued following 
that stage in which the nation-state emerges as a prosperous 
nation, the contrary usually occurs. Rather than pursue a 
course of humanization and the quest for social justice, those 
nations that have first pursued a course of techno-economic 
development geared to the goal of a prosperous and dynamic 
sectoral development, at the neglect of humanization and 
social justice, tend to grow more authoritarian and oppres­
sive once the goal of prosperity has been attained. The 
promise of humanization becomes an eternal procrastination.^
In an effort to focus on the more humanistic aspects 
of the developmental process, Adelman and Morris have in­
cluded social and political aspects as correlative with the 
process of economic development. Jaguaribe's discussion of 
political development relates to the socio-economic theme 
presented by Celso Furtado and the structuralists. While the 
key variables in this analysis have been taken from the
Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 196 8); Octavio lanni, 
Crisis in Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
llbid., Tyson, Op, Cit.
74
Adelman-Morris model of economic development; Gabriel Almond 
and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.'s structural-functional model is 
utilized for the political analysis, in conjunction with the 
micro-variables of the Adelman-Morris model.^
From a standpoint of sectoral development the economic 
indicators of 1960 attest to the success of the Kubitschek 
industrialization drive. Traditionally, agriculture has 
been the principal occupation in Brazil. In 1950, the agri­
cultural sector was, by far the greatest contributor to the 
gross domestic product. Table 5 on Page 75 shows the sec­
toral proportions of the gross domestic product during the 
period 1950 to 1960. (For details see Table 5.) More than 
31 percent of the gross domestic product came from the agri­
cultural sector in 1950. The industrial sector was the
The structuralists, a school of economists in Latin 
America, were of the Prebisch viewpoint that transformation 
of the institutions would lead to economic development, and 
that the route to development could not be fiscal and monetary 
operations. Celso Furtado, a proponent of socio-economic de­
velopment, was a leading economist in Brazil. As head of the 
SUDENE, he stressed extensive reform and the development of 
infrastructure. See Furtado, Op. Cit.; Jaguaribe, Op. Cit.; 
Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit.; Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham 
Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach 
(Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1966);
See also Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Compara­
tive Politics: System, Process, and Policy (Boston, Massa­
chusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1978).
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Table 5. Brazil: Changes in Structure of Gross Domestic
__________Product______
Percentage of Total Gross 
Sector Domestic Product
1950 1955 1960
Agriculture ..............  31.3 31.0 28.3
Mining........................  0. 3 0.3 0.5
Industry   16.5 18.9 23.4
Construction ..............  1.1 1.1 1.2
Public Utili­




tions   6.4 7.0 7.6
Trade and
Finance   13.8 14.8 15.3
Housing .......... . 4.7 4. 3 3.9
Pubic Admini­
stration   10.0 8.7 7.4
Other    15.2 13.3 11.4
Total   100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
second largest contributor to the gross domestic product.
Its secondary status had been attained largely through the 
import substitution process of industrialization that began 
after World War II. Although the industrial sector had be­
come the second largest contributor, its contribution was 
only 16.5 percent, about 50 percent less than that of the 
agricultural sector. The trade and finance sector followed 
the industrial sector closely with almost 14 percent, re­
flecting a continuing trend of reflexiveness in the Brazilian 
1economy.
^The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post­
war Period. New York: United Nations, 1966, p. 74.
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As the decade progressed the industrial sector grew 
considerably. By 1955 its share of tlie gross domestic pro­
duct reached almost 19 percent, a rise of nearly 3 percent 
over the 1950 level. Agriculture's contribution declined 
minutely, remaining at the 31 percent level. However, its 
lead had declined considerably relative to the surging in­
dustrial sector. The industrial sector's contribution was 
almost two-thirds of the sum which the agricultural sector 
presented. The trade and finance sector remained about the 
same, rising only one percent (from 13.8 percent in 1950 to 
14.8 percent in 1955).^
By 1960, the trend of industrial progress was obvious. 
Industry's contribution to the gross domestic product con­
stituted more than 23 percent. Agriculture, while still re­
maining the leading sector, had declined. Its drop of about 
3 percent from the 1955 level brought it down to a little
over 28 percent. At this level, its lead over the industrial
2sector was sustained by as little as 5 percent, roughly.
Thus, at the onset of the Quadros Administration, Bra­
zilian industry comprised modern industrial plants that had 
been financed and built by the United States and European 
countries. These industrial plants were producing a variety 




Brazil's production of steel had increased substantially and 
its petroleum resources were being developed by PETROBRAS.
This emphasis on steel and petroleum had resulted in Brazil's 
reduced dependence on petroleum and steel imports. By 1960 
Brazil also possessed one of the world's greatest hydro­
electric power potentials. Aside from the hydro-electric 
potential, Brazil also had large reserves of high grade iron 
ore deposits.^
Despite the tremendous progress of Brazil's industrial 
sector throughout the Kubitschek era, Brazil had been un­
successful in terms of developmental goals. The Target Plan, 
which embodied the Kubitschek industrial drive, was not an 
over-all development plan. It was not based on a general 
diagnosis of the existing economic situation and its problems. 
In as much as it was not based on an understanding of the 
Brazilian economy as a whole, it failed to consider some key 
sectors. H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler have stressed 
that the rapid economic growth during the 1950's left a legacy 
of persisting problems. Among these problems were listed:
(1) the intensification of economic and social dualism;
(2) the concentration of growth exclusively in the industrial 
sector and import substituting industrialization, which 
had left the agricultural sector largely intact; and
(3) the capital intensive development of the Brazilian in-
^U.S. Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.
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dus try ̂ extremely low educational levels and high popu­
lation growth, which have aggravated the problem of un­
employment. ̂
In order to check the validity of the Rosenbaum-Tyler 
thesis on the Kubitschek industrial drive, the micro-variables 
of the Adelman and Morris model will be used. The variables 
utilized in the model are;
(1) the size of the traditional agricultural sector;
(2) dualism;
(3) rate of growth of gross product (the sume of all goods
produced in the country for a year); and
(4) rate of growth of per capita product (the sum of all goods
produced in the country for a year divided by the popu­
lation. ) ̂
The size of the traditional agricultural sector in 
1960 substantiates the Rosenbaum and Tyler contention that 
despite Kubitschek's industrialization drive the agricultural 
sector was left largely intact. Brazil's population was still 
largely agrarian by 1960. In 1957 and 1958 agriculture con­
stituted over 85 percent of the total exports from Brazil and 
only 15 percent of total imports. Coffee constituted 58 per-
^U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 196 4. New York; United Nations, 1966; 
H. Jon Rosenbaum and william Tyler, eds. Contemporary Brazil; 
Issues in Economic and Political Development (New York;
Praeger, 1972).
^Ibid., Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit.
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cent of all foreign exchange earnings.^
Dualism was the most apparent result of the Kubitschek 
era. By 1960 the contrasts that existed in the Brazilian 
society during the late 1940's had been compounded to in 
elude :
(1) rural as opposed to urban society;
(2) agricultural as opposed to industrial society;
(3) North and Northeast regions as opposed to Central-South;
(4) traditional as opposed to modern society; and
2(5) poor as opposed to rich.
The regional disparities were largely reflected in 
the continuing problems of the poverty strickened Northeast. 
The nature of the distribution of transportation facilities 
within Brazil coincide with the general disparities. Almost 
30 percent of Brazil's total railway trackage, as mentioned 
previously, was in the Sao-Paulo-Rio de Janeiro area, the in­
dustrial center. Minas Gerais, the mining region, possessed 
almost 25 percent of the trackage. The Northeast's only link
3to the Central-South was through coastal shipping.
^U.So Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.; U.N. Economic 
Commission for Latin America.
2Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.
Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.
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To assess the macro-performance of the Brazilian 
economy, gross product rates of growth over time are con­
sidered along with the rates of growth of per capita product 
over time. The brief period of Kubitschek's industrial drive, 
1955-1960, encompassed some instability in the macro-perform­
ance of the Brazilian economy. The rate of growth in the 
gross product fell almost 1 percent during the period 1955- 
1959 (from 6.9 percent to 5.6 percent), but resurged con­
siderably within 1960 (to 9.7 percent). As for per capita 
product, the period 1956-1959 was also one of slight decline. 
Per capita product declined more than 1 percent (from 3.8 
percent to 2.5 percent), but it also resurged considerably in 
1960. The hint of instability revealed through these econom­
ic indicators, suggests that the Brazilian economy had not 
overcome the tendency toward economic growth (short spurts 
of rising income) and thus had not been able to move toward 
economic development (sustained growth periods). For details 
see Table 6 below.


















1955 6.9 3.8 1,423 1,307 16.81956 3.2 0.2 1,482 1,234 23.21957 8.1 5.0 1,392 1,489 13.21958 7.7 4.6 1,243 1,353 11.11959 5.6 2.5 1,282 1,374 29.21960 9.7 6.5 1,269 1,462 26.3
sion for Latin America.
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Other economic problems in Brazil included a con­
tinuing problem of inflation (which was aggravated by Kubit­
schek' s extravagance), a scarcity of consumer goods, and ex­
tremely low wages. Telephone communications were problematic 
since they were in the initial stage.^
The Brazilian Political Svstem At The Turn Of The Decade 
The Brazilian political system has traditionally been 
elitist and patrimonial. Throughout the history of Brazil, 
the ruling group was composed of the landed aristocracy and 
potential power contenders that, from time to time, aligned 
themselves with the aristocracy and dominated the Brazilian 
political system. This oligarchy has been sustained by the 
following features of the Brazilian society:
(1) the patrimonial character of society;
(2) the masses' acceptance of the hierarchical theme in the
Brazilian political ethos ;
(3) the tendency for emerging social groups (potential power 
contenders) to emulate the behavior çf the existing 
elites ;
(4) the failure of emerging social groups to counter the 
political conduct of the elite; and
(5) a high degree of elite consensus on political ideas.^
^Department of Commerce, Op. Cit.
2Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial 
Society (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1972); 
Hereafter referred to as Patrimonial Society; See also Riordan
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The "patrimonial regime" designates the existence of 
a paternalistic, but very flexible, public order. It has as 
its underlying motivation self-maintenance and continuity 
and the preservation of the nation-state. In Brazil the 
patrimonial state is a bureaucratic state. The administra­
tive structure of the central government maintains the public 
order. The bureaucracy is dichotomized so that one segment, 
the civil service, performs the technical duties such as 
economic planning and another segment, the "spoils" bureau­
cracy, has become the ruling elite's instrument of political 
patronage. This clientelistic nature of the Brazilian bureau­
cracy has been conceptualized by Helio Jaguaribe as the car- 
torial state (a system in which public employment serves as 
a means of co-option and political control).^
The consequences of elite rule and the patrimonial 
state have been:
(1) a relatively static society in which the levels of social 
mobility were very low over time;
(2) ineffective interest aggregation among the masses; and
Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, Revised Edi­
tion (Boston, Hassacnusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1978).
llbid. , Ronald M. Schneider. The Political System, of 
Brazil; Emergence of a Modern Authoritarian Brazil (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 19 72); The civil service is com­
posed of tecnicos, largely highly competent economists who 
are responsible for the key economic policies. Clientelistic 
refers to the system of decision-making that is characterized 
by an exchange of substantive favors, legal privileges or pro­
tection from punishment among political actors.
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(3) a consensus among the elites to limit popular partici­
pation.^
Although the Republic ushered in an era of incipient 
social mobilization after 19 46, the mobilization was cir­
cumscribed and did not sufficiently challenge the entrenched 
elite domination. The perpetuation of elite rule through 
the patrimonial character of society has hindered the de­
velopment of democratic institutions in Brazil.^
Adelman and Morris, within their model of development, 
have introduced the following micro-variables as necessary 
for political development:
(1) character and orientation of political administration 
and leadership, entailing efficiency and political 
strength of key groups as well as the commitment to 
economic development;
(2) stable, but sensitive, political mechanisms for relating 
the interests and demands of the society to political 
power, entailing the strength of democratic institutions, 
the existence of competitive political parties, and the 
degree of freedom of political opposition; and
(3) political stability, including the extent of internal 
security, the extent of continuity in the form of govern-
^Roett, Patrimonial Society. 
^Ibid.
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ment, and consensus about the prevailing form of 
government.^
The character and orientation of Brazil's political 
administration and leadership (on the basis of efficiency, 
capabilities, and commitment to economic development) in 
1960-1961 was characterized by:
(1) the pervasiveness of elite rule (maintained through the 
patrimonial character of the society) which extended 
into the 1960's;
(2) a Brazilian national elite which could be permeated, 
but in which recruitment of new members was based on 
tlie aspirants' willingness to accept and defend the 
basic rules and prerogatives of the patrimonial state;
(3) a set of basic rules and prerogatives that the aspirants 
were required to abide by. They are:
(a) to avoid the political mobilization of the masses;
(b) to prohibit illiterates from voting;
(c) to subordinate overall economic development programs
to the needs of national security;
(d) to stress industrialization through import substi­
tution; and
(e) to oppose land reform.^
Unlike the previous administrations of the Republic,
^Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit. 
^Roett, Patrimonial Society.
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Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart headed a reformist regime.
They embarked upon programs that would politicize and en­
franchise the masses and bring extensive reform. Rather than 
stress industrialization and the needs of national security, 
they opted for socio-economic development. In this sense, 
the Quadros-Goulart regime was "outside of the Brazilian 
elite". For the first time since the beginning of the Re­
public, the Brazilian political administration was not emu­
lating the elite and was not supporting the patrimonial 
state. Rather, the Quadros-Goulart regime opted for a change 
from the clientelistic politics and was committed to economic, 
political, and social development. In taking this position, 
the new regime had designated itself as the power contender, 
ready to challenge a system that had prevailed since the Em­
pire. The logical consequences of the Quadros-Goulart pre­
rogatives were formidable opposition and excessive constraints.^
In addition to the confrontations that resulted from 
its reformist nature, the Quadros-Goulart regime had the mis­
fortune of coming to office at the climax of Kubitschek's ex­
travagant industrial drive. The galloping inflation, which 
had been aggravated by the Kubitschek Administration, was an
llbid.; Thomas E. Skidmore. Politics in Brazil, 19 30- 
196 4; An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967); As a power contender, the Quadros-Goulart re­
gime presented a real threat to the patrimonial order. Their 
genuine effort to reform the economic and social system was 
feared by the elites and their powerful allies.
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initial hindrance to Quadros. The tendency of conservatives 
to link the proponents of socio-economic development (and 
their involvement with the forces of nationalism, neutralism, 
and populism) to an international communist conspiracy, com­
pounded the problems of the reformist regime. The military 
and the conservative elites of the international community 
(United States elites) used the cold war theme to counter 
efforts toward social reform. Moreover, the military, al­
though settling the disputed Goulart succession in a consti­
tutional manner, had been suspicious of Goulart from the 
beginning due to allegations of his leftist activities in 
the Getulio Vargas regime. The United States had also 
watched Goulart cautiously.^
In essence, the Quadros-Goulart regime was efficient 
and capable and was committed to economic development. The 
state had an exceptional reserve of expertise upon which to 
draw for understanding economic conditions and policy postures, 
However, even the most capable of men are-within the para­
meters of legitimate and constitutional power-unable to sur-
Ibid.; Skidmore discusses the controversy over the 
Goulart succession and the problems of the Quadros regime 
with inflation. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics; 
Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey; Prince- 
ton University Press, 19 71); Stepan points to the anti-com­
munist theme in the National Security Doctrine of the Nation­
al War College as an indicator of the military's skepticism 
of the new social forces and the reformist regime; Bell, Op. 
Cit.; U.S. skepticism toward Goulart is described in the work. 
Bell, in Roett's volume, indicates that the U.S. Embassy de­
cided, after careful deliberation, to treat Goulart cordially.
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mount an encirclement of oppositional forces that inhere in 
the character of the society itself and are perpetuated by 
the powerful external forces. Given such adverse circum­
stances any productive schemes that were devised by Quadros 
and Goulart would ultimately fail.^
The rapid industrialization of the late 1950's, and 
the subsequent urbanization, did not result in the develop­
ment of a national industrial elite. A national industrial 
elite might have served as a powerful bourgeoisie, capable 
of mobilizing and organizing significant and necessary chal­
lenges to the elitist power structure. However, the emergent 
urban middle class, held to the traditional tendency to emu­
late the landed aristocracy, and merely joined forces with 
them in the contemporary patrimonial society. The military, 
traditionally the power wielding institution in the Brazilian 
polity, was obviously the dominant institution in the Bra­
zilian society. However, the military claimed that it was 
incapable of directing the political affairs of the country 
and would prefer to remain the "poder moderado". As the 
"poder moderado", its role was negative in the early 1960's. 
It flayed the efforts for reform and served as the great sup-
No constitutional regime regardless of its capabili­
ties, can survive if the strongest and most effectively organ­
ized institutions seek its demise. It will either fall or 
change into a highly repressive regime.
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porter of the patrimonial order.^
Thus, the Brazilian polity, by virtue of the decline 
of the traditional patronage relationship that existed be­
tween the indigents and the landed aristocracy and the rise 
of an urban middle class that failed to relate to the needs 
of the peasants and the urban proletariat, was left a very 
deep void, which has not yet been filled. In the wake of 
these circumstances, the Brazilian society was ill-equipped 
for the task of political development. And political develop­
ment was a crucial factor during this era of rising aspira­
tions and tension. In the face of this failure of the middle 
class to relate to the problems of the peasants and the pro­
letariat, the question for political development was to whom 
might the indigents look for organization, for mobilization, 
and for polticization?^
The initial efforts to politicize the masses had begun 
in 19 46, but the politicization of the masses had never really 
been achieved. Their organization was characteristically weak 
and ad hoc. Almost 50 percent of the adult population was 
disenfranchised due to illiteracy. In as much as the majority
^Roett, Patrimonial Society; Adelman and Morris, Op. 
Cit.} Adleman and Morris refer to the bourgeoisie as a poten­
tial force for mobilization of the masses; Donnel Kirchner, 
"Brazil Eight Years After", America.- June 3, 1972, p. 589. 
Kirchner cites Gen. Humberto Castelo Branco's statement that 
the military did not possess the capacity or the legitimacy 
to rule.
^Wagley, Op. Cit.; Roett, Patrimonial Society.
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of the illiterates were rural lower class, the urban elect­
orate had a disproportionately large share in the conduct 
of the affairs of Brazil. Thus, the masses, as a whole, 
were denied access to the usual democratic channels through 
which they might have expressed their grievances.^
Given the conditions of gross inequality and dualism 
in the Brazilian society, the development of political mech­
anisms that possessed the "capacity and will" to relate the 
demands of the alienated masses to political power was the 
optimum solution to the Brazilian crisis. Adelman and Morris 
have posited the existence of stable, but sensitive, political 
mechanisms as a major indicator of poltical development. Did 
there exist within the Brazilian polity of the early 1960's 
any institution that was capable, stable, and sufficiently 
committed to challenge the patrimonial society to move toward 
democracy
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. have described 
the political system as a process encompassing interacting 
roles, structures, and subsystems. The process entails: inputs 
from the environment or from the political system itself; the
^Rosenbaum & Tyler, Op. Cit.
2Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973) 
Adelman and Morris, Op. Cit.
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conversion of these inputs within the system; and the pro­
duction of outputs into the environment. The inputs into 
the political system are transformed through the conversion 
process of rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudica­
tion. The structures of the political system which have been 
designated as the performance entities for these coversion 
processes are the executive branch (including the leadership 
of the Presidency), the judiciary, and the legislature. Janio 
Quadros, as Chief Executive of Brazil in 1961, was responsible 
for the conversion process, and rule application. As mention­
ed previously, by his words and his deeds, Quadros demonstrated 
that the executive branch of the Brazilian government was a 
political mechanism that was sensitive to the needs of the 
masses, but incapable of meeting these needs with viable pro­
grams.^
Among the interest articulating structures of Brazil, 
the support for popular demands was extremely limited in 1960. 
The political parties, leading institutional groups in most 
democratic societies, were nonprogrammatic and populistic.
The Brazilian party system of 1960-61 can be characterized by 
four features:
(1) the tendency for most of the parties to possess the same 
program in general;
^Almond and Powell, Op. Cit.
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(2) the multiplicity of parties;
(3) the tendency for most of the parties to appeal to all 
segments of the population (electorate); and
(4) the extreme factionalization of the party system and 
the parties themselves, which led to a constant resort 
to inter-party coalitions and thus rendered platforms 
meaningless.^
As Ronald Schneider noted:
The established parties, suffering from a lack of 
coherence and inadequate organization, as well as 
from their conservative orientation, were most un­
suitable vehicles for the socialization of the new 
urban masses entering the electorate. Along side 
the still relatively effective clientelistic poli­
tics, new types of populist leaders and movements 
emerged, particularly filling the vacuum resulting 
from the elimination of the one ideological party 
of the left, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), 
outlawed in 19 47.2
Among the major parties were the National Democratic 
Union (UDN), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and the Bra­
zilian Workers Party (PTB). The National Democratic Union 
had been founded by Getulio Vargas' opposition in the 19 40's, 
with the intention of supporting conservative doctrines and 
of supporting the interests of the traditional oligarchy.
Ipoett, Patrimonial Societv; David D. Burks and Karl M. 
Schmitt. Evolution or Chaos; Dynamics of Latin American Govern­
ment, and Pnlitirs (New York: Praeger, 196 3).
2Schneider, Op. Cit.
92
In 1960 it was largely composed of landowners and industrial­
ists, and was tied most closely to the urban middle class.
The National Democratic Union, resting on twin principles 
of laissez faire and pro-Americanism, had.,, in 1945, stressed 
the need for foreign capital in the Brazilian effort to in­
dustrialize. Consequently, the rising nationalism of the era 
found a very strong adversary in the National Democratic 
Union party. Ironically, the party supported Quadros for the 
Presidency.^
The Social Democratic Party was controlled by those 
who hoped to continue the Vargas policies. The Brazilian 
Workers Party possessed some elite leadership, but was large­
ly composed of organized labor, lower income groups, and 
Getulistas during the 1940's. However, in order to achieve 
the decisive victory of Vargas in 1950, the class character 
of the Brazilian Workers Party was weakened. Together with 
the Social Democratic Party, the Brazilian Workers Party, 
formed a coalition that opposed the National Democratic Union, 
on most issues.2
The military, as the key institutional group, appeared 
on the scene in 1960-61 as the opposition to the Quadros re-
^Burks and Schmitt, Op. Cit.; Schneider, Op. Cit. 
^Ibid.
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form program of promoting social and political progress 
(through an expansion of the electorate and broadening of 
participation). It formed an extremely conservative coali­
tion with the civilian bureaucracy and the urban middle class, 
in general. As a conservative force, this coalition opposed 
the weak and poorly organized efforts of the new populists, 
tlie radical nationalists, and the Quadros regime to politi­
cize and incorporate the masses into the Brazilian political 
system. (The military as a member of the elite has been dis­
cussed briefly on pagel09of this dissertation.)^
This conservative coalition, dominated by the military, 
succeeded in eroding the very limited power of the Peasants 
Leagues under the leadership of Francisco Juliao, the new 
populist regime of Miguel Arraes, and the democratic thinkers 
of the Catholic clergy, by discrediting them as the instru­
ments of international communism and an internal security 
threat. Hence, the Brazilian political system, upon the ini­
tiation of a "democratic revolution", found itself unable to 
embark upon a viable path toward political development, for 
it lacked political mechanisms capable of acting as the "en­
gines of change" in the face of an adverse political ethos 
and the powerful opposition of domestic forces. The opposi­
tion was able to rally a powerful force (the United States) 
to its cause by rationalizing their position in the context
^Skidmore, Politics in Brazil.
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of the cold war. Under these conditions of constant tension 
and overwhelming opposition, the Quadros-Goulart option for 
socio-economic development was doomed to failure. The regime 
was easily labeled unstable by its opposition, who from the 
very beginning had worked for its demise.^
The Brazilian Political Ethos And Prominent Social Forces 
Brazilians have been described as a nation of prag­
matic people who possess considerable talent for conciliation 
and accommodation. The conception that reality is harsh and 
unpredictable and yields to clever manipulation rather than 
hard work constitutes the nucleus of the Brazilian political 
ethos. Dual consequences result from this central theme in
^Joseph Page. The Revolution That Never Was: Northeast 
Brazil, 1955-1964 (New York: Grossman, 1972); Page discusses 
the struggle of the Peasants Leagues in the Northeast; Schneid­
er, Op. Cit.; Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit., p. 4. They refer 
to the efforts the reformist regime made to initiate a "demo­
cratic revolution" (the emergence of a stable democracy). The 
military prevented the development of political mechanisms 
that were potentially capable of mobilizing the masses. In 
this way, they also prevented the integration of the masses 
into the Brazilian society (polity). In as much as the inte­
gration of the masses into the society is a necessary condi­
tion for the emergence of a stable democracy, the military 
had prevented political development by preventing integration 
of the masses; George C. Lodge. Engines of Change: United 
States Interests and Revolution in Latin America (New York: 
Knopf, 1970); John J. Johnson. "Brazil in Quandary". Current 
History. January, 1965, p. 9. Upon the resignation of Quadros, 
a large-scale movement was led by the armed forces to prevent 
Goulart from taking the office of the presidency (through 
legal succession). The armed forces, from that point forward, 
worked for the fall of the Goulart regime ; James W. Rowe. 
"Revolution or Counter revolution in Brazil?." American Uni­
versities Field Staff Report (Nos. 4 and 5, June, 196 4, p.
655. As Labor Minister under Vargas (1951-54), Goulart was 
forced to resign when the military accused him of flirting
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the Brazilian political ethos: (1) Brazilians' pragmatic
and compromising nature; and (2) Brazilians' tendency to 
avoid rational calculation and analysis, to disregard basic 
dogmas or tenets, and to rely on improvisation. The pragma­
tism of the Brazilian population is revealed through three 
key sources: (1) Brazil's peaceful evolution; (2) Brazil's
jeito (ingenuity in blending law, regulations or principles 
to the moment's needs); and (3) Brazilians' tendency to 
achieve major social and political transformations without 
ideological guides and without the mobilization of mass 
opinion.^
During the early 1960's Brazil was an arena for the 
interplay of a multiplicity of forces. Prominent among these 
multiple forces were nationalism, populism, neutralism, com­
munism, and militarism. Nationalism and populism were very 
pronounced and were indigenous forces, but were often mis­
taken for the force of international communism. Neutralism, 
necessary in the design of Quadros' independent foreign poli­
cy, was also deemed as an affront to the capitalistic nations. 
Communism as a force was weak, institutionalized only in the 
outlawed Brazilian Communist Party (which had continued its
with communism. Goulart was, thus controversial from the 
very beginning. He had been re-elected as Quadros' vice- 
president by a very narrow margin.
^Frank Bonilla. "A National Ideology for Development: 
Brazil," ed. K.H. Silvert, Expectant Peoples; Nationalism 
and Development (New York: Random House, 196 3).
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activities on an underground basis and placed its candidates 
on the tickets of other parties) , but was the most contro­
versial force in Brazil. The existence of communist elements 
in Brazil seemed to overwhelm the minds of the National Demo­
cratic Union leaders and the minds of the powerful anti­
communist military, and therefore, obscure the existence of 
all other key forces.^
Prominent Social Forces: Nationalism
E. Bradford Burns has noted that Brazilian nationalism 
appeared to reach its apogee during the early 1960's. This 
stage of nationalism was the last of three variants of na­
tionalism that Brazil had passed through since the early six­
teenth century. The earlier variants were; (1) colonial 
nativism, a nationalism which embraced the colonists' pride 
in the land and precluded antagonism toward Portugal; (2) nine­
teenth century defensive nationalism, the continuation of de­
votion to the fatherland, the beginning of mistrust of the 
foreigners, and a rising consciousness of Brazil's isolation 
from the Spanish speaking Latin American countries; and (5) 
twentieth century offensive nationalism.^
^Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.; Although militarism 
was among the forces of the early 1960's, it was represented 
in a well-organized and effective organization. It was not in 
search of a constituency or group to which to appeal. Thus, 
it was unlike the other forces, which are discussed in this 
section. In as much as militarism was an entirely different 
force, it will not be discussed in this section. Rather, an 
extensive discussion of militarism is included in Chapter II 
of this dissertation.
^Burns, Nationalism in Brazil.
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During the era of twentieth century nationalism, the 
Brazilian intellectuals began to be critical in their judg­
ment of the nation. They sought to improve the conditions 
in the nation. They recommended changes that would, hope­
fully, create a more viable Brazil. Under the guidance of 
the intellectuals, the nationalists concentrated on the de­
struction of feudal institutions, liberating Brazil from 
foreign control, and developing a modern, industrialized 
society. In addition to these features, the focus of the 
nationalists was the continuation of the promotion of the 
national culture. Efforts were made to define and to in­
sulate the Brazilian national culture, as a means of awaken­
ing the national consciousness. By the middle of the twen­
tieth century, Brazilian nationalism shifted its focus to 
economic problems. Contemporary nationalist scholars, in 
the midst of the developmental revolution, tended to stress 
change as the route to development. In keeping with this 
theme, Helio Jaguaribe and Candido Mendes de Almeida often 
referred to nationalism as "an instrument for change and a 
key to development",^
The national character of the Brazilian population has 
been described as including such characteristics as a tendency 
to disregard basic dogmas or tenets, to improvise, and ignore 
ideological considerations. Despite the tendency to disregard
^Ibid.
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basic dogmas and to ignore ideological considerations, Brazil 
possessed a well elaborated nationalist ideology by 1960. 
However, nationalism was not a powerful nor well-organized 
movement. Although every leading political party portrayed 
itself as the chief defender of the national interest, there 
was not a single party that was firmly committed to a coherent 
"nationalist program". Politicians tended to operate on the 
premise that the Brazilian masses would respond to national­
istic appeals. In the presidential election of 1960, how­
ever, those parties that had depended on nationalistic ap­
peals were defeated. Despite the dearth of men who possessed 
the capacity and the political formulas to mobilize a viable 
nationalistic movement in Brazil, the well-elaborated nation­
alist ideologies had considerable potential and the national­
ists possessed substantial influence.^
Nationalists of varying persuasions in Brazil agreed 
on: (1) planned action toward a highly productive economy
of self-sustained growth under control of Brazilians; (2) 
higher standards of living for all; (3) an independent foreign 
policy; and (4) an end to the alienation and discontent which 
plagued Brazil. Also nationalists of every segment of the 
population viewed Brazil as potentially capable of hemispheric 
and world leadership. The nationalism of Brazil, during the
^Bonilla, Op. Cit.; Roger W. Fontaine. Brazil and the 
United States: Toward a Maturing Relationship (Washington,
B.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1974) .
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Quadros Administration, had as its intellectual bases; (1) 
the Institute Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB), found­
ed in 19 55 as an independent unit for study and research at 
the graduate level within the Ministry of Education, and 
possessing a rightist nationalist stance; and (2) the Revista 
Brasiliense, also organized in 1955, but possessing a leftist 
nationalist stance which stressed that (in opposition to 
ISEB's view) the Brazilian bourgeoisie was incapable of 
leading in the process of national development, and opposed 
foreign participation in the exploitation of Brazil's oil 
resources. The two groups split on these issues in 1958, 
when the ISEB produced a publication that gave credence to 
the idea of bourgeoisie leadership in the process of national 
development and took a rather conciliatory attitude with re­
spect to external participation in the exploitation of Brazil's 
oil resources. The publication, in addition to revealing the 
ideological gulf between ISEB and the Revista Brasiliense, 
served to set in motion a division within the ranks of ISEB 
itself. Despite the factional disputes, the ISEB provided a 
valuable intellectual service for the nationalists.^
The principal objective of nationalism in Brazil, dur­
ing this period, was economic development. The aim of the 
nationalists was the achievement of a well-operated, highly 
productive, industrial process, controlled by Brazilians, and
^Bonilla, Op. Cit.
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the achievement of an economy that would facilitate a more 
equitable distribution of the production. Brazil, signifi­
cantly lacking the status of a truly underdeveloped nation, 
possessed a nationalism that tended to lack a revolutionary 
basis, in most instances. While the foundations of national­
ist doctrine were the central planning and direction of de­
velopment by the state, the legal and administrative appara­
tus through which this state activity would operate was not 
designated, in most instances. Nationalists of various 
schools emphasized that; (1) the state must repossess the 
political functions which tlie powerful private corporations 
have come to claim; (2) foreign private enterprise is inca­
pable of devising and financing a well-coordinated plan for 
development; and (3) political and legal direction of the 
economy is an imperative for preventing internal dislocations 
and for making possible a firm and coherent foreign policy.^ 
Thomas Skidmore puts forth two operative variants of 
nationalism as significant forces in Brazil during the era 
under scrutiny. The two operative variants of nationalism to 
which he refers are: (1) developmentalist-nationalism; and
(2) radical nationalism. Developmentalist-nationalism, em­
braced by Kubitschek, stemmed from the tenantes and the later 
state directed industrialization thrusts of the Estado Novo.^
llbid.
2Skidmore, Politics in Brazil; Roett, Patrimonial. 
Society; Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.
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The underlying premises of radical nationalism were:
(1) Brazil has an imperative to industrialize;
(2) The spontaneous forces through which the United States 
and Europe have achieved industrialization are inadequate 
for industrialization in Brazil;
(3) Free operation of the price mechanism and the continued 
free mobility of factors will hinder Brazil's efforts 
to industrialize; and
(4) Brazil needs a new strategy of a mixed economy.^
Developmentalist-nationalism was significantly lacking 
in the anti-Americanism and attacks on imperialism which are 
traditionally associated with xenophobic nationalism, and it 
pursued an anti-communist stance. These were ideas which a 
large number of military officers could support. The pro­
ponents of developmentalist-nationalism comprised: (1) army 
officers who insisted that Brazil's national security would 
be endangered by allowing foreign investors and capitalists 
to exploit certain natural resources; and (2) younger tech­
nocrats and intellectuals who abhorred Brazil's traditional 
role as supplier of tropical exports for the United States 
and viewed industrialization as the only means of improving 




The Brazilian foreign policy toward the United States, 
under the Kubitschek Administration, found its basis in the 
tenets of developmentalist-nationalism. Fundamental to 
Kubitschek's policy toward the United States was the view 
that the success of Brazil's industrialization drive required 
the close cooperation of the United States government and of 
United States private investors. Pursuing this theme, Kubit­
schek made special efforts to:
(1) give foreign firms special incentives to invest in Bra­
zilian industry;
(2) encourage foreign firms to bring industrial equipment 
into Brazil through extensive use of SUMOC Directive 
No. 113;
(3) offer liberal credit policies for Brazil's businessmen 
with the promise of a higher level of demand; and
(4) initiate an increased program of public investment in 
order to overcome structural bottlenecks in transporta­
tion and power production.^
Under Kubitschek, developmentalist-nationalism reached 
its apogee, but declined as nationalism became slightly xeno­
phobic. Kubitschek's turn toward a more xenophobic stance 
was the result of his collision with the International Monetary 
Fund authorities and the United States over inflation and of
^Ibid.; SUMOC Directive No. 113 is discussed on the 
first page of this chapter.
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the perfunctory reception which President Eisenhower and 
Secretary of State Dulles gave to his Operation Pan America.^ 
In contrast to developmentalist-nationalism, radical 
nationalism was based on the following assumptions:
(1) The existing economic and social structures tend to be 
exploitative and require radical change.
(2) Private investors are aligned with capitalist govern­
ments in the industrialized world in an effort to limit 
Brazil's role to that of exporter of low-priced primary 
products.
(3) Industrialized countries will not cooperate in the in­
dustrialization of Brazil,
(4) Fundamental to Brazil's underdeveloped conditions are 
those domestic sectors that are tied to export-import 
trade and Brazilians who work for foreign firms.^
Radical-nationalists made an effort to discredit the 
political elite in the ordering of the social structure. Janio 
Quadros, as president of Brazil, would, during his last days 
in office, lean strongly toward radical-nationalism. But radi- 
cal-nationalism would not reach its apogee in Brazil until
^Skidmore, Politics in Brazil - See also, Storrs, Op. Cit, 
2Skidmore, Politics in Brazil
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Joao "Jango" Goulart received the mandate for leadership 
under a full-presidential system.^
Prominent Social Forces; Populism 
In addition to nationalism, several varieties of popu­
lism appeared on the Brazilian scene in the early 1960's. 
Ronald Schneider defines populism as:
... a non-traditional direct relationship between 
the masses and a leader in which the leader pos­
sesses the allegiance and the active support of the
masses.2
The leadership of the populist movements in Latin America 
possessed the following characteristics:
(1) lack of a sufficiently clear political philosophy;
(2) a tactical propensity to appeal to many diverse sectors;
(3) charismatic capabilities;
(4) an inclination for state planning and state intervention 
in the economic sphere;
(5) a belief in developing through private initiative; and
(6) possession of an ambiguous view of precisely what should 
be the role of the state and the' role of the private
llbid.; A full discussion of the Goulart struggle for 
the presidency and the initial parliamentary system that was 
set up as a compromise for his succession is given in Chapter 
III of this dissertation. Under -the parliamentary system 
Goulart's powers were circumscribed. The problem of gaining 
full powers under a presidential system occupied the bulk of 
his activities and strength. It is little wonder thathe had 
insufficient strength to fight the forces that were also at 




The ambiguous nature of the political philosophy of 
the populist leadership is the direct result of the attempt 
to appeal to many diverse sectors of the society. This 
tendency has had the unfortunate result of preventing the 
leaders from defining their economic policies. Rather than 
devise a clear cut economic policy and promulgate a precise 
political philosophy, populist leaders merely support the 
general principles announced within the general framework of 
economic development. In this area, the populists have a 
nationalist theme. They recognize the necessity of industri­
alization in the developmental effort and stress social re­
distribution of wealth and opportunities.%
Helio Jaguaribe has noted that the ambiguity of the 
populists' conceptions caused a distorted image of the popu­
listic governments. The powerful and well-organized con­
servative elites accepted the radical image that the popu­
lists had tactically projected as a genuine characterization 
of the populist position. Consequently, they tended to fear 
the rise of populist governments and sought to discredit and 
weaken them as a political force. On the other hand, the 
tactical projection of a radical image drew some limited sup-
Helio Jaguaribe, Political Development: A General 




port from the masses, who believed that populists were sup­
portive of their interests.^
In Brazil, populism appeared as the vanguard of the 
indigents. Populism filled the political vacuum which had 
existed in Brazil since 1947, the year in which the Brazil­
ian Communist Party was outlawed. The Brazilian Communist 
Party (PCB) was the only ideological party on the left. By 
the 1960's populism was the vehicle used to mobilize the 
burgeoning urban population and its demands for wider parti­
cipation and higher standard of living. The new populist 
parties of the early 1960's were nationalistic and of the 
left. According to Ronald Schneider they included:
(1) Janio Quadros's moralistic ideas; and
(2) Miguel Arraes's tenets for improving the plight of the 
forgotten masses of the Northeast.^
In as much as the conservative elites feared the rise of 
populist governments, the conservative elites had tradition­
ally tried to discredit the populists.
Ibid.; The case of Goulart in Brazil indicates just 
how limited the support of the masses was for even the popu­
lists. The tendency for the masses to remain unpoliticized 
and their failure to mobilize, despite efforts on the part 
of the elightened potential power contenders, was obvious 
when Goulart failed to gain any support from the masses or 
indigents during the 1964 military coup d'etat.
2Schneider, Op. Cit.; Schneider also mentioned Leonel 
Brizola. However, I hesitate to consider Brizola among the 
populists, as Jaguaribe has defined populism in Latin America. 
This hesitation is the result of Brizola's self-avowed com­
munism; Archie Lang (Administrative Officer for the American 
Embassy in Brazil during the Quadros-Goulart era) in an inter-
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The rise of new populist parties in the 1960's similarly, 
caused considerable concern among the more conservative 
populists such as Carlos Lacerda and the military leaders.
The reaction within the military and within Lacerda's Demo­
cratic National Union Party (UDN) would lead to a confrontation
in which populists would be labeled as communists during the
•  ̂ 1 period.
Prominent Social Forces ; Communism 
Communism as a force within Brazil was significantly 
lacking in strength. Bedeviled by the paradox of whether to 
base its organization on the peasant rural masses or upon 
the urban proletariat, the Brazilian Communist Party was con­
siderably fragmented. The draft programs of the Brazilian 
Communist Party stressed forming a democratic front with the 
working class as the vanguard. However, Luis Carlos Prestes 
and his Soviety-styled Communist Party continued to be plagued, 
in their efforts, by the failure of the working class to move 
in a communist direction. In an effort to achieve a demo­
cratic front. Prestes and his party appealed to the. middle 
sectors to display their support of the people. While Prestes 
view stated that Brizola was- a self-avowed communist.
Interview with H. Jon Rosenbaum, May, 19 77. All of the 
new populists in Brazil were not communistic. Only Brizola 
was communistic. However, the tendency for the populists to 
converge on many issues with the community gave the cold 
warriors of Brazil and the United States an excuse to identify 
them as one and the same; Schneider, Op. Cit.
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called for a democratic front with the working class as van­
guard, in contrast, the left socialist leadership had em­
braced those theories oriented toward the inclusion of the 
urban workers and rural peasants in a common front. Fran­
cisco Juliao sought a peasant solution, and excluded the 
industrial workers from his program. During the Vargas Ad­
ministration, Prestes and his Communist Party obtained the 
support of a conservative constituency to oppose the Labor 
Party. This colaboration with the conservative elements 
caused many of the Brazilian proletariat and intellectuals 
to consider the Brazilian Communist Party conservative.^ 
During the early 1960's Brazilian socialists and 
Brazilian communists continued to clash on basic issues.
The communists began to stress tolerance of all classes 
while the socialists were trying to institute restrictions 
on the Brazilian capitalists. Brazilian industrial labor 
forces were wedded to the nation, rather than class. They 
stressed nationalism, rather than internationalism. These 
postures helped to render the Brazilian Communist Party in­
effective and helped to erode its status to that of a minori­
ty. While the Brazilian Communist Party was of minority 
status, it was at the same time accepted within the Brazil­
ian power structure. There was no effort made to prosecute
Roett, Patrimonial Society; Irving Louis Horowitz, 
Revolution in Brazil; Politics and Society in a Developing 
Nation (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1964).
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the communists and there was a general lack of persecution, 
despite the illegal status of the party.^
Brazilian Militarism: A Counter Force During the
Reformist Regime
L.I. Radway has defined militarism by designating the 
following features:
(1) a doctrine or system that accords primacy in state and 
society to the armed forces;
(2) a doctrine or system that exalts an institutional struc­
ture for the armed forces ; and
(3) a doctrine or system that implies a military policy and 
power orientation.
Militarism had been a traditional feature of the Bra­
zilian society since the Empire. By the early 1960's mili­
tarism was a major force in Brazil. The military was gaining 
considerable power and increasingly institutionalizing its 
structure. Brazil, like other South American nations, had 
become a "source of providential solutions and set of rules 
to be broken" by the military at its discretion. The military 
had traditionally designated itself as the performance entity
^Horowitz, Op. Cit.
^Laurence I. Radway. "Militarism" in International 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. X. (ed.) David L. Sills 
(New York: Free Press, 1968); Also see John J. Johnson, The 
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962) ; Brazil's mili­
tarism became quite visible during the late 1950's and early 
1960's.
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(institutional structure) responsible for and capable of 
usurping the power of the existing inefficient and incapable 
government at a time of grave crisis.^
The "power grab" of the military had been accepted as 
a legitimate function on the rationale of the doctrine of 
"dignified illegality", a sanctification of the use of 
limited violence to remove a regime that has gone wrong. The 
doctrine, an accepted custom among the Latin American nations 
and Brazil, thus legitimized the military as the institution­
al remedy for the political instability which results from 
open conflict between power contenders and the existing 
government. Political instability was often the direct re­
sult of the crisis of rising popular demands and the dearth 
of capable political institutions to gratify or supply popu­
lar aspirations. This situation of excessive demands and 
weak political apparatus appeared in Brazil as the process 
of urbanization occurred, and the dominant elites resisted 
the impetus for corresponding changes in the polity.
Brazilian militarism, as a tradition, dates back to 
1889 and the unification of the empire. The Brazilian mili­
tary overturned the monarchy in 1889 and assumed the role of
Ijorge Tallet, "Understanding Latin America", eds. 
Francisco Jose Moreno and Barbara Mitrani, Conflict and Vio­
lence in Latin America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1971)
^Ibid.; Charles Anderson. Politics and Economic Change 
in Latin America. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1967); 
Stepan, The_Militarv in Politics.
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the poder moderador (moderating power). From that point in 
history until 1964 the Brazilian military has retained the 
role as the poder moderador. Although some scholars refer 
to the period following the military domination of Deodoro 
and Floriano as the era of civilian rule, the military 
brought pressure to bear on the civilian rulers of that era. 
Military incursions into politics reappeared in 1918, after 
a brief period of inactivity during World War I. The incep­
tion of military uprisings during this era ultimately crystal­
lized in the successful revolution that placed Getulio Vargas 
in the role of Chief Executive. The military also demonstrated 
its role as poder moderador in 19 45 by removing Vargas.^
Traditionally, tlie Brazilian military was not politi­
cally ambitious. However, the rising professionalization of 
Latin American armies and the rise of the cold war in the post 
war era caused considerable change. The rise in professional­
ization was accompanied by the development of a military com­
plex which was powerful and highly bureaucratized. With the 
Revolution of 1930 the armed forces gradually gained influ­
ence as a political force, and began determining which power
2contenders should rule and how. John J. Johnson contends
^Claudio Veliz, The Handbook of Latin America (New 
York; Praeger, 1968); Schneider, Op. Cit.
^Stepan, The Military in Politics; Schneider, Op. Cit.; 
John J. Johnson, "The Military in Society", ed. Robert D. 
Tomasek, Latin American Politics: Studies of the Contemporary 
Scene (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1970).
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that the 1930 Revolution placed the armed forces in "center 
of politics and the locus of power has resided in them ever 
since".^
Since 1945, when the dictatorship was terminated, the 
president has tried to have his "dispositive militar", a 
group of officers who guarantee him in office. The recurring 
theme of military incursions to restrain or overthrow the 
president in order to save the country was exemplified in 
1955, when a military coup d'etat brought Kubitschek's demo- 
cratic and stable rule to the Brazilian nation.
By the beginning of the Quadros Administration, the 
armed forces possessed tremendous power potential and were 
experiencing a broadening scope of concern and activity. A 
changing political environment, nationally and internationally 
heightened the role of the military in Brazil. The inter­
national environment changed as Castro rose in Cuba, making 
internal security a higher priority than hemisphere security 
within military policy.^
In order to stop the "communists' internal warfare 
and subversion", the United States stressed that the Latin
Ijbid.
2Ibid.; Schneider, Op. Cit.
3Stepan, The Military in Politics,.
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American military should move toward counter-insurgency and 
civic action. According to Alfred Stepan, United States 
policy urging the Latin American military to "become more 
deeply involved in all phases of society in order to wage an 
effective campaign against internal warfare encouraged a 
deeper involvement of the military in politics. Thus, by 
19 64, given the rising capabilities of the military and the 
new rationale to broaden its scope, militarism was an ob­
vious feature that was growing in Brazil.^
The orientation of the Brazilian military was pro- 
United States. This orientation stemmed from the period, 
of World War II, in which the Brazilian military established 
a special relationship with the United States. Brazil's FEB 
(Brazilian Expeditionary Force) had fought on an integrated 
basis with a United States army corps in Italy during World 
War II. Following the war, upon Brazil's request, a United 
States advisory mission to aid in the formation of a special 
school which would formulate a new doctrine of development 
and national security was established in Brazil. The Bra-
Ibid.; An anti-communist theme existed before U.S. 
influence, during the late 1950's and early 1960's. However,
U.S. influence heightened this trend toward militarism; Edwin 
Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
stated U.S. policy toward the Latin American Military on Octo­
ber 6, 196 3. In his statement he encouraged the military to 
become more involved in civic action programs. U.S. Depart­
ment of State Historical Office, American Foreign Policy; 
Current Documents, 196 3, pp. 323-325.
^Stepan, The Military in Politics.
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zilian military,, thus, countered the efforts of the reform­
ist regime and tihe nationalists to initiate change. The 
resistance to change included countering the drastic revision 
of Brazil's traditional foreign policy and countering exten­
sive social and political reforms.^
Towards a New Foireiqn Policy For Brazil; Agonizing Reappraisal
During th>e early 1960's, the traditional foreign 
policy of Brazil, was subjected to rigorous analysis and 
agonizing reaapraisal. The traditional policy, which in­
cluded close cooperation with the United States as a major 
goal, had prevailed as the guidepost of Brazil's relationship 
with the United States throughout the twentieth century. The 
effort to revise-, the prevailing foreign policy was divisive 
within Brazil, i.ttself, and had far reaching implications for
iRoger W. Fontaine, Brazil mnd tlip United statAS! To­
ward a Maturing Relationship (Washington, B.C.: American En­
terprise Institu.±e for Public Policy, Research, 1974) , pp. 72- 
93; The Brazilian military was not monolithic. There were 
three major factions within the Brazilian military. They 
were: the nationalists led by Gen. Estillac Leal, Gen. Nelson 
Werneck Sodre, and Marshal Osvino Alves; the Sorbonne group, 
a moderate faction, led by Gen. Golbery Couto e Silva, Gen. 
Carlos de Meira Mattos and Marshal Castelo Branco; and the 
Linha Dura (hard, liners), a conservative faction, led by 
Generals Costa e- Silva, Emilio Garrastazu Medici, Odilio Denys, 
and Admiral Silvio Heck. Although the Brazilian military was 
factionalized, it was capable of serving as a countervailing 
force. Its success in countering the drastic revision of 
Brazil's traditional foreign policy and in countering exten­
sive social and political reforms was largely the result of 
the dominant position which the lina dura and the Sorbonne 
groups held among the military factions.
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future relations between Brazil and the United States.1
Although the traditional foreign policy had served 
Brazil for more than a century, the Brazilian populace had 
not always been entirely satisfied with it.^ Brazilian na­
tionalists had expressed their dissatisfaction with the poli- 
cy as early as the 19 30's. The nationalistic expressions
of dissatisfaction with the traditional foreign policy were 
minor aberrations in the line of continuous Brazilian support 
of close relations with the United States. The accommodation
^Thomas E. Weil and Jan Black, T^rea Handbook for Bra­
zil (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1971); Fontaine, 
Op. Cit.; E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Bra­
zil's Foreign Policy", Journal of Inter-American Studies and 
World Affairs, v. 9, April, 1957, pp. 195-207; At the begin- 
ning of tlie twentieth century the second Baron Rio Branco, 
the Brazilian diplomat, proclaimed close cooperation with the 
United States as one of the leading foreign policy goals of 
Brazil. Other policy goals were: to emphasize hemispheric 
cooperation; to expand diplomatic relations on a global scale; 
to establish diplomatic relations with other Latin American 
countries; and to increase Brazil's prestige in the world 
community of nations. This goal of close cooperation with the 
United States contrasted with the general ill-will toward the 
United States that prevailed in other Latin American countries 
at the turn of the century; See Pratt, Op. Cit., p. 9 8; See 
also Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations, Secre­
tary of State Elihu Root's efforts to temper Latin American 
suspicions of the growing United States imperialism at the 
Third International Conference of American States in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1906 had been successful only in Brazil.
2e . Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilfe 
Foreign Policy", Op. Cit., pp. 200-201; Acrimony over the tra­
ditional foreign policy began after the second Baron Rio Bran­
co's death and heightened in the 1930's. During the 1930's 
the nationalists were joined in their critique of the tradi­
tional foreign policy by the traditional left,
3jose Honorio Rodrigues et. al., "A Crise do Pan Ameri- 
Politica Externa. In.de_pendenj:e. (Rio De Janeiro,
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that prevailed between the two countries was originally based 
on commercial interests, but later the accommodation extended 
to cooperation in security matters as well.^
The appearance of nationalist opposition to the Bra­
zilian foreign policy in the 1930's appears to be ironical, 
for Latin American nations and the United States were in the 
midst of the Good Neighbor era. However, amid the general 
goodwill between the United States and Latin American coun­
tries, a series of economic and political factors had caused
relations between Brazil and the United States to become 
2strained. In the midst of the disharmony between the two 
nations the controversial issue that surfaced was, to what 
extent was Brazil to cooperate with the United States. This 
controversy of the 1930's dictated the need to reappraise 
Brazil's foreign policy. Brazilian nationalists, who opposed 
the continued close cooperation with the United States, chal-
Brazil, S.A.: Editera Civilizacao Brasileira, 1965), pp. 3-5,
The nationalists and traditional left stressed that political 
and cultural loyalty to the western democratic systems must 
be rejected since it was a counter theme to Brazil's policy 
imperative, socio-economic development.
^Pratt, Op. Cit.,pp. 199-200; The commercial interests 
of the two nations, which were based on mutual trade benefits 
originally, was extended to security matters during World War I
2Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations, Op. 
Cit., pp. 110-130, 448-449; Factors that caused relations 
between Brazil to be strained included: the United States
failure to join the League of Nations; the United States 
failure to purchase Brazilian goods at what Brazilians con-
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lenged the fundamental tenets of the prevailing foreign poli­
cy. They identified these fundamental tenets as;
(1) Brazil's identification with Western political systems; 
and
(2) the needs and demands of Western political system which 
served as the basic factor in defining Brazil's nation­
al interest.^
The identification of Brazil with Western political 
systems, and the consequential definition of the Brazilian 
national interest on the basis of the needs of Western poli­
tical systems was perceived by nationalists as an extension 
of the Brazilians failure to recognize the realities of their 
own conditions and needs. This failure was viewed as crucial, 
since the needs and conditions of Brazilians were very dif­
ferent from those of Western nations and often conflicted 
with them.2
Western nations were generally economically advanced 
and industrialized. Their economies were usually neither 
monocultural nor reflexive. Western nations were primarily
sidered to be a fair price; Getulio Vargas's establishment of 
0 Estado Novo (the New State); and the rise of fascism in 
Brazil; See also Pratt, Op. Cit.
Ijose Honorio Rodrigues et al., "A Crise do Pan Ameri- 
canismo", Op. Cit., pp. 3-5.
^E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Bra­
zil's Foreign Policy", Op. Cit., pp. 3-5.
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populated with the descendants of Europeans, and did not 
exude a culture that was based on African themes. Brazil 
has a history of dependence on primary exports, and was not 
economically advanced nor industrialized. The economy of 
Brazil was monocultural and reflexive. The population of 
Brazil was ethnically diverse, and while Brazil was populated 
by inhabitants of European descent, the descendants of Africa 
had dominant themes in the Brazilian culture.^ In as much 
as Brazil was an exporter of primary products, it was self 
destructive to identify with the interests of the industrial­
ized nations, who sought the purchase of inexpensive primary 
goods. In as much as Brazil was underdeveloped, her manda­
tory imperative was that of economic development, an impera­
tive that was meaningless to the Western industrial powers.
If Brazil were to attain her desired status and development, 
it must use these designated realities as the underpinnings 
of a more viable definition of its national interest and as 
the key factor dictating its foreign policy. According to 
these nationalistic arguments, the Brazilian interests could 
not be protected within the context of close relations and
Ijose Honorio Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa (Berkeley, 
California; University of California Press, 1965), pp. 207- 
208; Janio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy", Foreign 
Affairs, V. 40, No. 1, October, 1961, p. 25; Quadros empha­
sized the African themes in Brazil's culture.
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alignment with the United States.^
Despite the conflict between the United States and 
Brazil and the rising efforts of Brazilian nationalists to 
change the theme of close cooperation with the United States 
in the 19 30's, a series of actions forestalled serious ef­
forts to discontinue close alignment and cooperation with the 
United States as a part of Brazil's foreign policy. Among 
these actions were Export-Import Bank loans for Brazil and 
the United States-Brazilian Trade Agreement of 19 35. These 
modes of accommodation were enhanced by cooperation in securi­
ty matters. Brazil's cooperative effort during World War II 
was bold and effective, encompassing military collaboration 
and economic collaboration for defense. These activities en­
tailed: (1) the supply of essential materials to the United
States; (2) the establishment of a base in Brazil; (3) the 
organization of the joint Brazil-United States Defense Com­
mission; (4) the supply of strategic materials; (5) the Bra­
zilian navy's patrol of the South Atlantic; and (6) the de­
velopment of a Brazilian army, trained and eguipped by the 
United States, which fought in Italy.
^Jose Honorio Rodgrigues et. al, "A Crise do Pan Ameri- 
canismo". Op. Cit., pp. 3-5^6-15-
^Mecham, United States-Latin American Relations, Op. 
Cit., pp. 450-452; In addition to these factors Foreign Mini­
sters Oswaldo Aranha used his influence to moderate the con­
troversial issues. He engaged the Vargas regime's cooperation 
in the United States and Allies war effort during World War 
II, thus moderating the controversy.
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The postwar economic crisis in Brazil affected the
-ways-:-- (-1)— It-^avealed^^the—weakness-
and dependence of Brazil on the international financial 
scene, and thus, motivated Brazilians to seek self-sufficiency 
through industrialization and diversification of production; 
and (2) it caused increasing resentment of the United States. 
This resentment of the United States was based on the feeling 
that it had neglected Brazil.^ The Joint United States- 
Brazilian Technical Commission, in the Abbink Report of 1949, 
reiterated Brazil's concerns by stressing "the need for ba­
lanced development of the Brazilian economy and the need for 
American capital for development", and called for the estab­
lishment of the Joint Commission for Economic Development.
When the Joint Commission for Economic Development was estab- 
lished in 1950, it pointed out the capital needs of Brazil.
The resulting series of loans that were granted to Brazil 
through the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank were deemed 
inadequate by Brazilians.^ in 1953 the United States reacted 
to accusations of neglect by negotiating an additional loan 





with the United States wishes by ratifying the Military 
Assistance Agreement.^
Despite the growing hostilities in Brazil toward the 
United States, which stemmed from a feeling that the United 
States had neglected Brazil for more strategic arenas in the 
cold war, the nationalists could not initiate a revision of 
Brazil's foreign policy. Brazilian nationalists, in the 
1930's had opted for a foreign policy which would promote 
national development goals and allow Brazil to pursue its 
interests without the alleged obstacle of considering the 
national interest of the United States. The efforts of Bra­
zilian nationalists to change the basic orientation of Bra­
zil's foreign policy had been continuous throughout the 1930's 
and the 19 40's. Even during the late 1950's, Kubitschek was 
reluctant to support nationalist revision of Brazil's foreign 
policy. Although he promoted a highly nationalistic develop­
ment program, criticized the United States for neglect, and 
established trade contact with the communist countries, his 
developmental program was bolstered by private United States
3capital investments.
llbid.
2Rodrigues, "A Crise do Pan Americanismo, Op, Cit.
^Burns, Nationalism in Brazil; Mecham, United States- 
Latin American Relations.
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The rise of the reformist regime provided the nation­
alists their long sought opportunity to effect change in the 
Brazilian foreign policy. By the turn of the decade a sub­
stantial proportion of the Brazilian population, including 
the new chief executive Quadros and the Foreign Minister 
Afonso Arinos, sought the transformation of the traditional 
foreign policy.^
The efforts to revise the foreign policy resulted in 
a controversy that dichotomized the Brazilians. The salient 
issue in the controversy was:
Is a policy of close alignment with 
the United States in the national 
interest of Brazil?
In order to answer the above question, Brazilians tended to
draw upon their perceptions of two related features:
(1) To what extent is a policy of close alignment with the 
United States beneficial or detrimental to the economic 
interests of Brazil?
(2) To what extent is a policy of close alignment with the 
United States beneficial or detrimental to the national 
security of Brazil?
Among Brazilians there was a recognized necessity for 
economic development. If we assume that all Brazilians were 
committed to economic development, as they claimed to be.
^Rodrigues, -'A Crise do Pan Americanism", Op. Cit.
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we can in turn assume that the conflict that existed was 
rooted in contrasting conceptions of economic development, 
and consequential contrasting approaches to economic de­
velopment.
The opposing factions on the issue of foreign policy 
and economic development were as follows:
(1) the radical revisionists, the antecedents of the earlier 
nationalists and the proponents of Janio Quadros's in­
dependent foreign policy; and
(2) the pragmatic revisionists, who stressed a geopolitical 
basis for Brazil's foreign policy and sought continued 
close alignment with the United States.^
Radical revisionists tended to stress socio-economic 
development along with their preference for Quadros's inde­
pendent foreign policy and their skepticism of private foreign 
capital. Pragmatic revisionists tended to focus on techno- 
economic development along with their geopolitical strategy 
and included national security as a definite part of any 
strategy for economic development and foreign policy.
Quadros's independent foreign policy, announced during 
his inaugural address, rallied the radical revisionists and 
nationalists to the cause. He reiterated his nationalism and
^Roger Fontaine, Brazil and the United States: Toward 
a Maturing Relationship (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974).
2lbid.
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signaled a reversal from the earlier Kubitschek era.^ Al­
though Kubitschek had proposed Operation Pan America, his 
proposal had stopped short of suggesting a genuine revision
of Brazil's foreign policy and was restricted to the Western 
2Hemisphere.
The independent foreign policy included the following
themes :
(1) socio-economic development as the imperative for Brazil;
(2) the broadening of Brazil's relations with other nations,
including socialistic countries of Eastern Europe, the 
Western bloc countries, and the Afro-Asian bloc countries;
(3) the quest for world-wide commercial relations and the
acquisition of new markets;
(4) the elimination of colonialism and the support for in­
dependence for all people; and
(5) the quest for increased prestige and a leadership role
for Brazil in the Western Hemisphere and in the world
as a whole.^
Quadros expressed his desire to see colonialism elimi­
nated. He admonished Portugal as a colonial power and de-
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil; John W.F. Dulles, Un­
rest in Brazil: Political Military Crises, 1955-1968 (Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1970).
2Mario Victor, Cinco Anos que Abalaram O Brasil: de 
Janio Quadros ao Maréchal Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: 
Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1965).
3Janio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy", Op.
Cit., p. 19.
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scribed colonialism as a self-destructive and dying institu­
tion. He prescribed the appropriate Brazilian responses to 
colonialism. His prescription entailed the recognition of 
the excesses of colonialism, the assistance in its demise, 
and giving support to the emerging nations. This perspective 
of the Brazilian role in the demise of colonialism signaled 
tile beginning of a new policy of establishing diplomatic re­
lations with the countries of Africa, Asia, and Eastern 
Europe of every political persuasion.^
Aside from Janio Quadros and Afonso Arinos, authors 
of the independent foreign policy, radical revisionists in­
cluded J. Salgado Freire, Mario Neto, Dagoberto Salles, Gen­
erals Estillac Leal and Nelson Werneck Sodre, and Marshal 
Osvino Alves. Their opposition to the continuation of the 
traditional policy was based on the following arguments:
1 . .Victor, Op. Cit., pp. 83-95; The article in Foreign
Affairs was a sequel to Quadros's inaugural address of Janu- 
ary 31, 1961. In his inaugural address, he indicated his de­
sire to develop commercial relations with all nations and to 
secure a position of genuine sovereignty relative to the con­
cert of nations. He condemned colonialism, but expressed his 
desire for continued friendly relations with Western nations. 
Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos reaffirmed the policy of trade 
with all nations on January 2, 1961, and Quadros indicated 
that diplomatic relations were being established with Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Rumania. The Brazilian delegate to the United 
Nations had been advised to vote to affirm the admission of 
the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations. Quadros 
also indicated that Brazil would support the Algerian inde­
pendence movement; See also Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, 
Evolucao da Crise Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Com- 
panhia Editora Nacional, 1966), pp. 246-247; J. Hickey, "The 
Day Mr. Berle Talked to Mr. Quadros", Inter-American Economic 
Affairs, V. 15, Summer, 1961, pp. 58-72; Quadros also indi-
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1. The United States is using the cold war to gain economic 
advantages from the Third World.
2. The United States effort to include Brazil in its conflict 
with the Soviet Union could mean the annihilation of Bra­
zil if a nuclear war broke out,
3. Brazil's collaboration will ultimately lead to the satel- 
lization of Brazil,
4. United States private investment in Brazil results in 
highly exploitative profit remittances,
5. By accepting extensive economic assistance from the United 
States, Brazil risks the probability of becoming the 
United States "chief agent" in charge of preventing radi­
cal regimes in Latin America,
6. Brazil must guard against foreign exploitation of oil 
resources,^
cated that he would oppose any efforts to intervene in Cuba 
and stressed the cultural links between Brazil and Africa, 
Adolf Berle, Kennedy's special envoy to Brazil, had enraged 
Quadros by trying to engage his assistance in the American 
conflict with Cuba; See also Dulles, Op. Cit., pp. 120-123,
^Fontaine, Op. Cit., pp. 45-50, 75-79; See also Keith 
Larry Storrs, Brazil Vs Independent. Foreign Policy. (Ithaca,
New York; Cornell University Press, 1973); Storrs refers to 
those who supported the independent foreign policy as inde­
pendents. According to Storrs, the independents proposed 
autonomous development and were structuralists. As structural­
ists, they sought industrialization (based on natural re­
sources) as a means of ensuring the growth of Brazil's inter­
national power and national autonomy. According to the inde­
pendent's view,foreign capital had a colonizing effect on 
Brazil and exacerbated the balance of payments difficulties.
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The nationalistic officers had not been a part of the 
Brazilian Expeditionary Force that was attached to the Ameri­
can Fifth Army in Italy during World War II. Nor had they 
attended foreign military schools. Rather, their training 
had been limited to the basic course which the Institute 
Superior de Estudos Brasileiros offered. Their complaints 
focused on foreign exploitation of oil resources and they 
supported Quadros's independent foreign policy.^
The predominant alternative to the independent foreign 
policy was the geopolitical strategy, which emphasized con­
tinued close alignment with the United States and associated 
development. Its major proponents were members of the Sor- 
bonne military faction. However, the intellectuals who had 
supported selective alignment with the United States also 
ultimately threw their support behind the geopolitical school 
and its policy postures. This school of geopolitical thinkers 
and conservative economists (monetarists) comprised the prag- 
matic revisionists.
^Fontaine, Op. Cit.
^Ibid., pp. 33-45; See also Storrs, Op. Cit., pp. 205- 
212; Storrs refers to the policy which the pragmatic revision­
ists pursued as the Americanist policy and to the school of 
economic thought which embraced this policy as the monetarists, 
The pragmatic revisionists included such intellectuals as 
Roberto Campos, Henrique Valle, Adolpho Menezes, Eugenio 
Gudin, and Carlos Lacerda; See also Leff, Op. Cit.
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Andreas Dorpalen has defined geopolitics as the 
science of the earth relationships of political processes, 
the theory that the space and structure of nations is the 
foundation of their relationships and politics. Early geo­
political thought included the ideas of Frederick Ratzel,
Sir Halford Mackinder, and Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. Frederick 
Ratzel's bio-geography gave birth to the concept of the 
"organismic state". Sir Halford J. Mackinder emphasized 
buffer zones and huge land masses. His thesis concerning 
these geographic features led to the development of "heartland 
and World island" concepts. From Admiral Mahan, the geo­
political school developed theories about seapower.^ The 
ideas of Nicholas Spykman, however, relate more specifically 
to the Brazilian geopolitical theories.^
Spykman defined power as the ability to wage success­
ful war and considered military and political strategy to be 
directly related to geography. According to his theory, geo­
graphy is the key factor to be considered in analyzing the
James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 
Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania: J.P. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 50-63; Andreas 
Dorpalen, The World of General Haushoffer (New York: Farrar 
and Rinehart, 1942), pp. xi-xii; Frederick Ratzel, "The Sea 
as a Source of National Greatness", ed. Dorpalen, Op. Cit., 
pp. 50-56; Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of 
History", ed. Dorpalen, Op. Cit., pp. 185-201; Alfred T.
Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 
(Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, and Co., 1890), pp. 7-9
^Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 19 42).
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power positions of nation states. Although he stipulated that 
Brazil's power position was enhanced by its vast domain and 
its abundant resources, he did not fail to designate its limi­
tations. Brazil's major problems, according to his thesis, 
were the continuing quarrel with Argentina over the La Plata 
River, the inadequate infrastructure, the inadequate communi­
cation facilities, and the vast underdeveloped interior. With 
respect to the defense of Brazil, Spykman considered the 
military strength of Brazil to be inadequate for the protec­
tion of its vast domain. Accordingly, he concluded that the 
United States must inevitably be charged with the defense of 
the "buffer zone", and that to defend the Western Hemisphere 
the United States must be given access to the bases in Bra­
zil's "bulge".1
Carlos Meira Mattos, Brasil-Geopolitica and Destino 
(Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Olympic, 1975), p. 61; Gen. Carlos 
Meira Mattos, contemporary geopolitical military man in Bra­
zil, reflects the ideas of Spykman in his appeal to Brazil 
to permit the United States to utilize the strategic Northeast; 
Golbery do Couto e Silva, another contemporary and influential 
Brazilian geopolitical thinker, also reflected the ideas of 
Spykman by assigning an associative role to Brazil with re­
spect to the United States; See also Carlos P. Mastrorilli,
"An Updating of the Golbery Doctrine: The Geopolitics and 
Destiny of Brazil", Estrategia, March-April, 19 76, p. 38. The 
previous generation of Brazilian geopolitical theoreticians 
included Everardo .Backheuser and Mario Travasso. Everardo 
Backheuser stressed the theory of "living frontiers"; See 
Edverardo Beckheuser, A Geopolitica Geral do Brasil (Rio de 
Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exercito, 19520; See also Estrategia,
Op. Cit., p. 38; See Mario Travassos, Proiecao Continental 
do Erasil (Rio de Janeiro, Brasil: Editorial Brasiliane, 1938); 
See also Spykman, Op. Cit.; The '"bulge" of Brazil, the closest 
point to Africa, was considered by Spykman to be the strategic 
point, since it was an important point of control of both air 
and sea communications.
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Gen. Golbery do couto e Silva, drawing from the ideas 
of leading geopolitical theorists, put forth tenets that would 
ensure Brazil's success in attaining her goal of internation­
al prestige and national security. His tenets were published 
during the Kubitschek era.^ During that era the geopolitical 
theory of Gen. Golbery became a highly significant force in 
Brazilian politics. Gen. Golbery had served in the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force (FEB), and had been greatly influenced 
by the United States military officials. Gen. Golbery and the 
participants in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) formed 
the Sorbonne faction of the Brazilian military. Golbery and 
his Sorbonne members served on the faculty of the Escola Su­
perior de Guerra (ESG). The Escola Superior de Guerra, a 
repository of an all-embracing system of military education, 
had been founded by the officials of the Brazilian Expedition­
ary Force (FEB) with the assistance of a United States ad­
visory mission. Through Golbery and the Sorbonne group, who 
served on the faculty of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), 
a direct relationship was developed between geopolitical 
thought and military education in B r a z i l .2
^Golbery do Couto e Silva, Aspectos Geopoliticas do 
Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Brasil: Biblioteca do Exercito, 1957), 
pp. 63-64; The major tenets, which Golbery listed are: parti­
cipation in the defense of Western civilization; cooperation 
with the developing nations; containment along the frontier; 
and national strategy; See also Fontaine, Op. Cit.
^Ibid.
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Aside from serving as the key to the formulation of 
a doctrine of national security for the Superior War College, 
the Golbery theory of geopolitics served as the basis for 
selecting strategies for national development. Through Gol­
bery 's theory, national development strategies were linked 
to national security. Fundamental to this doctrine of na­
tional security through economic development was the assump­
tion that Brazil was defenseless as long as it remained under­
developed. ̂
The solution to Brazil's underdeveloped and vulnerable 
state was presumed to be two-fold; (1) development of a strong 
centralized nation state; and (2) maintenance of close alli­
ance with the United States, According to Golbery, Brazil's 
close collaboration with :the United States was mutually bene­
ficial to the West and Brazil.  ̂ The benefits that accrued 
to the West included: (1) Brazil's resources; (2) Brazil's
human resources potential; and (3) Brazil's geographic posi­
tion in the South Atlantic. Brazil, in turn, needed United 
States assistance. Golbery further states that it is in the 
interest of the United States to give assistance to Brazil 
since a "communist Brazil" would be a geopolitical disaster.
^Golbery, Op. Cit.
^Ibid.
3Ibid.; Fontaine, Op. Cit.
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During the Quadros-Goulart era, these tenets, and the
school of thought that embraced them, served as a formidable
opposition to the Quadros independent foreign policy alter­
native and to the administration that supported it. The idea
of close alignment with the United States for security reasons 
coincided with the idea of close alignment to receive the 
benefits of United States capital in developmental efforts. 
Hence, the geopolitical school of thought converged with the 
developmental-nationalists, and supported the traditional 
theme of techno-economic development, as opposed to socio­
economic development. Roberto Campos, the technico who pre­
ferred continued close alignment with the United States, and 
Gen. Golbery set up this basic theme for economic develop­
ment through national security schemes.^ This was the force 
that emerged victoriously through the Brazilian coup d'etat
of 1964 and dominated the Brazilian political and economic
2scene throughout the 1960's and the 19 70's.
1
Ibid.
^Ibid., Carlos P. Mastrorilli, Op. Cit., p. 32; Accord­
ing to Mastrorilli, Golbery's theory of geopolitics, announced 
in the 1950's, "systemized the concept of the associative role 
assigned to Brazil" with respect to the United States. The 
Brazilian model, initiated with the military coup d'etat of 
1964, was a direct result of that systemized concept. Mastroril­
li also noted Gen. Carlos Meira Mattos's argument for close 
alignment of Brazil with the United States. Carlos Meira 
Mattos's argument influenced developments from 196 4 through­
out the 1970's in Brazil, as did Golbery's theory. Mattos main­
tained that in order to fulfill Brazil's destiny as a con­
tinental and a global power, Brazil must carry out designated
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In essence, the geopolitical foreign policy adherents 
sought continued close relations with the United States for 
defense purposes. The tendency for the geopolitical school 
to stress national security and containment came into con­
flict with the goal of social, economic, and political de­
velopment. In contrast, the aims of Quadros, Goulart, and 
the radical nationalists were to guide Brazil in achieving 
independence from Europe and the United States, and increase 
its trade opportunities as an adjunct to socio-economic de­
velopment . ̂
The reformist regime of Quadros-Goulart, which spans 
the period from January of 1961 through March of 1964, was 
an era of intense political conflict. This conflict existed 
on two levels; (1) the domestic level; and (2) the inter­
national level. The domestic conflict followed logically 
from the existence of a regime that promised reform and thus 
alienated established elites. The reformist regime also ini­
tiated a revision of Brazil's foreign policy. The domestic 
conflict was extended to the international level as a result 
of this revision. Brazil's foreign policy had traditionally 
favored close alignment with the United States, and American
responsibilities. These responsibilities included: integrating
the Brazilian heartland; assisting in the defense of the West­
ern Hemisphere; making the strategic Northeast available to 
the United States; and assisting in the endeavor to maintain 
the security of the South Atlantic and West Africa. See Mattos, 




strategic actors became apprehensive over a threat to their 
favored position. America valued the continued alignment 
of Brazil, and sought to reinforce Brazil's traditional 
foreign policy by initiating the vast economic assistance 
program in Brazil (the Alliance for Progress). The program, 
however, was hypothetically intended to reinforce the aspira­
tions of the reformers and the have nots of Brazil.^
The prominent social forces sought reform, but they 
were countered by the conservative forces, which tended to 
be stronger. The conservative forces in Brazil, led by the 
military, were ushered into a coalition with American interests 
that feared a drastic revision in Brazil's foreign policy.
This Brazilian scenario of the early 1960's can roughly be 
divided into three stages;
(1) The first stage began with the inauguration of Quadros 
in January of 1961 and ended with his resignation in 
August of the same year.
(2) The second stage began with the controversial succession 
of Goulart to the presidency, and included the brief
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil; Included in the reform 
effort was the revision (drastic) of"Brazil's foreign policy. 
While it was not necessarily considered to be a vital factor 
for most Third World countries, the revision of the foreign 
policy had broad implications for indigenous developmental 
schemes and conflicting ideologies. In this respect, the 
revision of Brazil's foreign policy constituted the basis for 
considerable acrimony in Brazil and in the United States.
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period in which Goulart's powers as president were ex­
tremely circumscribed through the conversion of the 
Brazilian political system to a parliamentaly system.
(3) The third stage began when the plebiscite re-established 
a presidential system in Brazil in January of 196 3. The 
coup d'etat of 1964 ended tliis stage. In the following 
chapters, we shall see how i^imerican strategic actors 
responded to the prominent social forces and the con­
flict that resulted from the impetus to social change 
and reform.
PART Tt-JO
THE GAME: KENNEDY’S IDEALISM
ENCOUNTERS BOLD CHALLENGES
CHAPTER III 
WAVERING IDEALISM; THE KENNEDY PHASE
The election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy to the Ameri­
can presidency in 1960 meant the possible fulfillment of a 
seven year old promise. The promise was a reappraisal of the 
traditional United States policy toward Latin America, a 
necessity first designated by the Eisenhower Report of 1953.^ 
Despite the admonitions of the Eisenhower Report, the Latin 
American demonstrations against Vice President Nixon, and the 
Cuban Revolution, a genuine effort to reappraise United States 
policy toward Latin America had been forestalled throughout 
the Eisenhower Administration. Near the conclusion of the 
Eisenhower Administration in 1959, the United States decision 
to support the establishment of the Inter-American Develop-
Dreier, The Alliance for Progress; Milton S. Eisen­
hower, "United States-Latin American Relations(1953-1958): 
Report to the President, December 27, 1958" (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1959); Milton S. Eisenhower, 
Tne Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (Gar­
den City, New York: Doubleday, 1963); Mecham, United States 
and Latin American Relations; Federico Gil, Latin American- 




ment Bank and the Inter-American Social Development Fund 
signaled a modest change in the United States policy toward 
Latin America.^ However, the proposals for broader change 
would await the election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
The Launching of the Alliance for Progress
In 1961 the Mayobre Memorandum, the initial document 
devising the Alliance for Progress, had warned the Kennedy 
men that the Alliance for Progress was doomed if Latin Ameri­
ca perceived it as "an entering wedge for American private 
investments". Kennedy heeded the warning by excluding busi­
ness interests from his inner-circle that planned the Alli­
ance for Progress. With the exception of Douglas Dillon, who 
would later become Secretary of Treasury, the inclusion of 
those usually associated witJi the interests of big business 
and corporations was nil. Within the realm of economics, 
Kennedy relied heavily on the advice of Paul Samuelson, the 
MIT economist who headed the Kennedy task force on economics.
^Lieuwen, Op. Cit.; Dreier, Th-a Alliance for Progress; 
Mecham, The United States and Latin American Relations; Levin­
son and de Onis, Op. Cit.; "Request for Authorization of U.S. 
Memebership in the Inter-American Development Bank: Message 
From the President (Eisenhower) to the Congress"; American 
Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 19 59, May 11, 1959, pp. 
470-472; "The Inter-American Development Bank Act: Public 
Law 86-147", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, 
August 7, 1959, pp. 481-484; "Agreement Establishing the 
Inter-American Development Bank Signed at Washington", Ameri­
can Foreign Policy; Current Documents 1959, April 8, 1959, 
p. 469; "Recommendation of Congressional Approval of U.S. 
Participation in the Inter-American Development Bank: Report 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations", American
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Paul Samuelson placed heavy emphasis on public investment 
and public interests, as opposed to the traditionalists of 
the Eisenhower Administration who relied on private invest­
ment. This emphasis on public investment would become a 
pillar of the Alliance for Progress approach.^
Despite the exclusion of business interests from the 
Kennedy inner-circle that designed the Alliance for Progress 
program and the Samuelson emphasis on public investment, the 
Alliance for Progress would reflect the influence from the 
business community due to the balance of payments constraints. 
The balance of payments deficit had been extremely high during 
the Eisenhower Administration, a matter of great concern to 
key groups in the United States. Many Americans blamed foreign
■Foreign. Policy; Current. Documents. 1959 , July 8, 1959, pp. 
476-480; American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1959,
June 22, 1959, p. 928; American Foreign Policy; Current Docu­
ments , 1959, June 8, 1959; American Foreign Policy: Current 
Documents, 1960, February 15, 1960, p. 26 3; American Foreign 
Policy: Current Documents, 1960, February 22, 1960, pp. 285- 
290; R.R. Rubottom Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs discussed progress through cooperation in Latin Ameri­
ca and indicated that the Inter-American Development Bank is 
an example of multilateral cooperation. The bank was to of­
ficially go into business in February after the first meeting 
of the Board of Govenors to be held in March; "Department 
Supports U.S. Membership in International Development Associa­
tion", U.S. Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1960, 
p. 529.
^U.S. Congress, Senate. Hearings Before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962: To 
Amend the.Foreign Assistance_Act of 1961, 87 Congress, 2d 
Session. 1962; Also see W. Carl Bivens, Economics and Public 
Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill Books, Inc., 1966); 
Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
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economic assistance for the heightening deficit. In Novem­
ber of 1960, during the last days of his administration, 
President Eisenhower reacted to national concern by issuing 
a directive which stated that primary emphasis in the United 
States foreign assistance program should be placed on the 
tying of aid funds to the purchase of goods and services from 
the United States. Thus, when the Agency for International 
Development was established and the Alliance for Progress 
was launched, tying arrangements were already in effect.^
The nature of the American policy making process has 
been depicted as political. The ramifications of the politi­
cal nature of the policy making process are compromise, 
sabotage, and inaction. Roger Hilsman describes the esoteric 
nature of the foreign policy decision-making process in the 
United States as "congeries of separate or only vaguely re­
lated actions".
Rather than through grand decisions on grand al­
ternatives, policy changes seem to come through 
a series of slight modifications of existing policy, 
with the new policy emerging slowly and hauntingly 
by small and usually tentative steps, a process of 
trial and error in which policy zigs and zags, re­
verses itself, and then moves forward in a series 
of inremental steps.2
^Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; W. Carl Bivens, Econom­
ics and Public Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 
Inc., 1966); Bivens, Op. Cit.
^Hilsman, Op. Cit.
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The politicization that encompassed the foreign poli­
cy amalgam and caused a failure to implement the Alliance 
for Progress was centered in the struggle between Kennedy and 
the Kennedy men against Johnson and the career men. While 
Kennedy and the Kennedy men had initiated a revision of the 
traditional United States policy toward Latin America and 
put forth the Alliance for Progress as the alternative ap­
proach, the career men preferred the traditional approach 
and countered the Kennedy men's efforts to implement the Al­
liance for Progress.^
Jerome Levinson, General Counsel for the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and Robert Ballantyne, Deputy Director for
South American Affairs, both stress that there was a discern-
2ible dichotomy between the Kennedy men and the career men. 
Niles Bond, former Charge d'affaires of the American Embassy 
in Brazil, verified the division.  ̂ According to Levinson, the 
Kennedy men were idealistic, optimistic, reform-minded, and
^Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 19 79.
Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976; Levin­
son and de Onis, Op. Cit.
2Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979.
Interview with Robert Ballantyne, April 30, 19 76.
^Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.
Interview with Joseph Page, June, 19 79. Joseph Page 
also verified the dichotomy between the two groups.
Interview with Donor Lion, April, 1976. Donor Lion 
also verified the dichotomy.
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impatient with the seemingly intransigence of the entrenched 
elite groups in Latin America. The Kennedy men stressed 
public investment or public capital transfers for financial 
assistance in Latin America, and capital development rather 
than technical assistance. These strategic actors, who were 
involved in the Alliance for Progress program,focused their 
attention on the poverty strickened Northeast region of Bra­
zil. They sought to ensure Brazil's alignment with the United 
States by focusing on efforts to assist in the socio-economic 
development of the Northeast and by encouraging land reform. 
They were usually appointed to positions in the newly estab­
lished Agency for International Development.^
In contrast, Levinson identified the career men as those 
skeptical of the Alliance for Progress goals and as those who 
doubted that Latin American elites would be willing to under­
take the reforms that were essential for the attainment of the 
goals. The career men were opposed to public capital trans­
fers, as the form of capital assistance, and preferred Ameri­
can private investment. In this respect, the views of the 
career men converged with those of the business groups and 
corporate interests.
The career men, who were opposed to the nascent ideal-
^Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; 
Bivens, Op. Cit.
Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 19 79; 
Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
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ism of the Kennedy era, were primarily employed in the De­
partment of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. During 
the 1950's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Senator 
Joseph McCarthy had imbued the Department of State with a 
legacy of conservatism. Senator McCarthy's communist witch 
hunt had forced a substantial proportion of the most astute 
career diplomats to resign. Those career diplomats who re­
mained in the State Department tended to adopt a neo-Wilsonian 
perspective of the global scene and were impervious to the 
"New Frontier" philosophy.^
Amid the general conflict that ensued between the 
Kennedy men and the career men, several variables existed as 
determinants of power that accrued to either side. Among the 
variables (as mentioned before) were;
(1) the nature and missions of the key agencies involved in
implementing the Alliance for Progress;
(2) the action channels of the game;
(3) the parameters of the game ; and
(4) the change of administration.
The American foreign policy making amalgam has been 
characterized as a series of concentric circles. The inner­
most circle consists of the President and the president's 
men, the presidential appointees who represent the administra-
Ijohn Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge 
Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971) , p. 61.
Kegley, Op. Cit.
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tion and are expected to shape the bureaucracy according to 
the President's wishes. Among the president's men are the 
secretaries of State and other participating departments, 
the undersecretaries of these departments, assistant secre­
taries of the departments, the directors of the Agency for 
International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the National Security Council, and the President's National 
Security Advisor. The president's men are labelled as Kennedy 
men in this inquiry. They have been enumerated previously.
As strategic actors, they were lodged in official positions, 
which granted them extensive power.^
Adolf Berle headed the Kennedy Task Force on Latin 
America, the group that authored the Alliance for Progress. 
Berle, lawyer and former Professor of International Law at 
Columbia University, had been Ambassador to Brazil. During 
the early part of the Kennedy Administration he was a Special 
Envoy to Brazil. His mission was to build a common inter- 
American front against Cuba. Quadros's response to his sug­
gestion was negative.2
Academicians Robert Alexander and Arthur Whitaker also 
served on the Kennedy Latin American Task Force. Robert
^Hilsman, Op. Cit.; Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign 
Policy; Assumptions, Processes, and Projections (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1Ô76) .
^Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
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Alexander, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, was 
a Brazilian expert. Arthur Whitaker, Professor of History 
at the University of Pennsylvania, was a specialist in United 
States diplomatic relations with Latin American nations.
Other members of the Kennedy Latin American Task Force were 
Richard Goodwin, Theodore Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, and 
Teodoro Moscoso. Richard Goodwin was John Fitzgerald Kennedy's 
speech writer. His positions in the Kennedy Administration 
included Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, Special Assistant in the White House, and Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. 
Theodore Sorensen was the President's Special Assistant at the 
White House. Robert Kennedy was the United States Attorney 
General. Teodoro Moscoso was Assistant Administrator for the 
Latin American Regional Bureau of the Agency for International 
Development and the United States Coordinator for the Alliance 
for Progress.!
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, a key figure in the Kennedy 
Administration, was recruited from his position as William 
Ziegler Professor of International Economic Relations at the 
Harvard University School of Business. As a professor at 
Harvard, he had stressed the virtues of public investment in 
a series of articles in the Harvard Business Review. He had
^Ibid.
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979. 
Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976.
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also served as an official of the Marshall Plan, and had 
experience and interest in Brazil which antedated the Alli­
ance for Progress. Ambassador Gordon, having been a member 
of Kennedy's Latin American Task Force, was involved in the 
Alliance for Progress from its inception. He perceived a 
significant stake in the success of the Kennedy program. 
Fundamental to his acceptance of the Ambassadorship to Brazil 
was his view that the success of the Alliance was dependent 
upon the Brazilian experience.^
Jerome I. Levinson, Harvard Law graduate who was Deputy 
Director for the Office of Capital Development of the Agency 
for International Development, entered the agency as a Finan­
cial Officer and later served as Capital Development Officer 
in Rio de Janeiro, Donor Lion, a Harvard graduate and Ph.D. 
economist, was recruited from his position in the Trade Pay­
ments Office by Lincoln Gordon. Under Lincoln Gordon, he 
held the.position Assistant Director of Planning and Evalua­
tion in Rio. He was also Associate Director of the United 
States Agency for International Development in Recife. William 
T. Dentzer, Jr. was Special Assistant for the Agency for Inter­
national Development. Ralph Anthony Dungan was Special Assist­
ant to President Kennedy.^
^Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979; Also 
Biographic Register; Lincoln Gordon, 'Private Enterprise and 
International Development", Harvard Business Review, v. 38,
No. 4, July/August, 1960, p. 134.
^Biographic Register.
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Prominent among the career men were Dean Rusk and 
Thomas C. Mann. Rusk, Secretary of State, had been Presi­
dent of the Rockefeller Foundation. Before his presidency 
at the Rockefeller Foundation, he held key positions at the 
Department of State. Among them were; Director of the De­
partment of State's Office of Special Political Affairs;
Deputy Under Secretary of State; and Director of the Far 
Eastern Affairs Division. The record of Rusk indicates he 
was a hard liner. It was Rusk that announced the United 
States policy for recognizing the Chiang Kai-Shek government 
as the legitimate government of China.^ Thomas C, Mann was 
also a hard liner. He had become a foreign service officer
during the late 1940's, and had made his stand against communism
2and the rise of leftist forces in Cuba.
In so far as the institutional apparatus that was de­
vised to administer the Alliance for Progress program was 
concerned, two key agencies were involved, the United States 
Department of State and the Agency for International Develop­
ment. At the apex of this institutional apparatus were the 
positions. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress and 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. The Coordina-
^Congress and the Nation, v. II, 1965-1968, Op. Cit., 
US. Department of State, Biographic Register, 1960-1968.
^Current Biography 1964,U.S. Department of State, 
Biographic Register, 1960-1968, p. 273.
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tor was connected with both the Department of State and the 
Agency for International Development. Since the lines of 
authority between the Coordinator and the Assistant Secre­
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs were blurred, some 
confusion arose over these positions.^
In addition to these key positions and the Agency for 
International Development and the United States Department 
of State (their Latin American Bureaus), a Committee of Nine 
served as a multilateral agency through which the Alliance 
for Progress was to be coordinated. The Committee of Nine, 
weak and inept, failed, since the United States chose to deal 
bilaterally with Latin American countries. Loans from the 
United States government were initially reviewed through the 
Developmental Loan Committee, which coordinated United States 
Latin American policy for a brief duration. This committee 
was soon dissolved. According to Levinson the strategic 
actors in the Latin American Bureau of the Agency for Inter­
national Development and the Latin American Bureau of the 
Department of State, maneuvered to implement decisions in 
line with or contrary to the Alliance for Progress proclama­
tion.^
^Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
Interview with Jerome I. Levinson, September, 1979; 
Harvey S. Perloff, The Alliance for Progress: A Social Inven­
tion in the Making (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1969).
^Levinson and de Onis, Ibid.
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979; 
Perloff, Op. Cit.
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The major responsibility for administering the Alli­
ance for Progress was shared by two agencies, the Department 
of State and the Agency for International Development. Jerome 
Levinson describes the situation that resulted from this ar­
rangement by referring to the Alliance for Progress as a 'here 
pawn in the interdepartmental competition for power and favor 
within the United States".
The United States government (under the Alliance 
for Progress) divided among bureaucratic and 
political fiefdoms, each pursuing its own special 
interests. Congress was at war with the execu­
tive... Kennedy was under pressure at home and 
abroad to show speedy results. This pressure 
inevitably led to shortcuts.
The Agency for International Development was created 
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which replaced the 
Mutual Security Act and revised the United States foreign as­
sistance program. The mission of the Agency for International 
Development was to provide assistance for designated develop­
ing countries in their developmental efforts. The establish­
ment of the Agency for International Development coincided, 
in time parameters, with the launching of the Alliance for 
Progress program. The quest for socio-economic development 
was germane to both the Agency for International Development
and the Alliance for Progress goals, a convergence that would
2seem to enhance the possibilities for a successful program.
^Levinson and de Onis, Ibid.
2Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and 
Objectives", ed. Gustav Ranis, The United States and the
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The Department of State, a mainstay of conservatism, 
is the agency that has traditionally been charged with the 
responsibility of conducting America's foreign relations. 
During the early 1960's the agency was imbued with a neo- 
Wilsonian perspective, that had persisted since the late 
1940's. The neo-Wilsonian perspective considers the struggle 
against the ideological force of communism as the major issue 
for American foreign policy, as opposed to competition with 
the Soviet Union as a powerful nation state. The neo- 
Wilsonian perspective has been promoted by military-ideologi­
cal theorists and has led to a prime focus on stability in 
Third World countries and the preservation of the status quo.^ 
Given the conflicting missions of the two agencies that 
were charged with the responsibility of implementing the Alli­
ance for Progress, a clash in interdepartmental competition 
was inevitable. In as much as the Agency for International 
Development's mission coincided with the goals of the Alli­
ance for Progress, the strategic actors within the hierarchy 
of the newly established Agency for International Development 
tended to be Kennedy men. According to Levinson the career
Developing Economies (New York: W.W. Norton Inc., 1964), 
ppT "2T-JB; ■'Joah-"KrêIs“on, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1^68j i
Ijohn Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affair Fudge 
Factory (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971), pp. 23-25.
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men who were strategic actors within the State Department 
reflected the traditional tenets of protection of tlie status 
quo and the ensuring of stability and,therefore,conflicted 
with the goals of the Alliance for Progress.^
The American ideology, the composite of capitalism, 
liberalism, and pragmatism, provides the ideological under­
pinnings for the traditional United States foreign policy 
toward Latin America. Selected tenets from these philosophi­
cal bases have combined with the American democratic tradi­
tion and the concept of manifest destiny to provide the formu­
la for economic assistance programs and the justification for 
these formulas and their accompanying activities.
The Lockean philosophy, an integral part of liberalism, 
promoted natural law, individualism, property rights, competi­
tion, and the concept of the limited state as the essential 
principles for providing society with the good life. Through 
the concept of the limited state, John Locke specified that 
the main purpose of government is to protect private property. 
The ramifications of the Lockean theory of individualism and 
property rights were dualistic. The attributes of his poli­
tical philosophy can be seen through his arguments for the
^Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 1979.
^Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbèare, The Ameri­
can Ideologies: The Competing Political Beliefs of the 1970's 
(Chicago, Illinois : Markham Publishing Company, 19 71) , p. 13.
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rights of individuals against arbitrary acts of government, 
equality among men, the sanctification of iJie legislature 
as a democratic institution, and his opposition to absolute 
monarchy. On the other hand, Locke's glorification of the 
individual and emphasis on the protection of the entrepre­
neur from repressive government gave credence to the argu­
ments of the classical economists. The classical economists, 
Adam Smith and John McVicker, proponents of capitalism, 
argued for the freedom of market forces as a means of regu­
lating theeconomy and promoted the institution of private 
enterprise. The Lockean philosophy came to be used to justi­
fy the excesses of capitalism, to bolter the rich against the 
demands of the poor, and to fortify the rising bourgeoisie.^
Herbert Spencer, in line with the liberalism of John 
Locke, stressed individualism, natural law, and the limited 
state, Spencer's self-adjusting principle, through which the 
weak would be eliminated to resolve the problems of society, 
was intended to replace the possibility of state action on 
behalf of the have nots. State intervention on behalf of the 
poor was opposed on the grounds that it would distort the 
operation of social laws. This Spencerian prohibition against
^William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers; Plato 
to tlie Present (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1969),
"ppT S9U-42j; Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the 
Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and 
Social Science (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1973); George Cabot Lodge, The New American Ideology 
(New York: Knopf, Î975).
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state interference included the instituting of social re­
forms and the welfare state.^
As the American nation grew, the corporation became 
the prominent and preferred symbol of private enterprise, 
and it became the responsibility of the state to protect 
and promote it. The quest for lands and markets through 
continental and international expansion was an American 
phenomenon which accompanied the rise of corporations and 
big business. The original justification for this physical 
and commercial expansion, which displaced some people and 
destroyed social institutions, was manifest destiny, the 
white man's burden which entailed the mission of civilizing 
the non-Europeans. However, as the scope of commercial ex­
pansion broadened to include other nations, the philosophy 
of manifest destiny was broadened to include the mission of 
keeping the world safe for democracy and the self-assigned 
role of the United States was that of the international 
policeman.^
During the interim between the World Wars, the economic 
theories of John Maynard Keynes combined with democratic 
themes in the American tradition to counter the theories of 
Spencer and Darwin and to encourage the state to relieve the
^Ebenstein, Op. Cit.; Lodge, Op. Cit.
2pratt, Op. cit.; Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History 
of American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall, 1980) .
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suffering of the poor through social and economic reforms. 
This stemmed the rise of the new liberalism, an era in which 
government intervention was sought due to the failure of the 
market forces, "the invisible hand", and the self-adjusting 
principle. American conservatism emerged as the embodiment 
of orthodox liberalism, that force that had originally en­
shrined the individual, private enterprise, and the limited 
state. The conservatives used this combination of ideas to 
justify the excesses of American capitalism.^
As the twentieth century progressed, fascism, then 
communism became a prominent contender for adherence on the 
international scene. As America, the mainstay of capitalism, 
clashed with the proponents of communism in the global arena 
and conservatives took on the battle of protecting private 
enterprise, the prescribed mission of the United States was 
utilized on an increasing scale to justify United States 
intervention in other countries. The interventions were 
justified as actions necessary for the maintenance of stable 
political entities in the face of the threat of international 
communism. Endemic to the interventions, however, was the 
fact that, in many instances, American corporate interests 
desired the expansion or protection of their markets, their 
properties, and their investments. American economic motiva­
tions were cloaked under the guise of exporting democracy and
^Ebenstein, Op. Cit.
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ènsuring stability and world peace.^
Through the organization of economic assistance pro­
grams for developing nations, the American foreign policy 
often combined the more altruistic motivations of the pre­
scribed mission with those of economic motivations. More­
over, pragmatism combined with capitalism and American con­
servatism to promote an American ethos that was technologically 
oriented. Pragmatism, promoted by John Dewey, had specified 
the desireability of justifying actions on the basis of 
expediency and had taught the American public to circumvent 
the traditi hal guests for valid phil feophical solutions by 
accepting specific answers for immediate application. The 
technological orientation of the American ethos is revealed
in the tendency for Americans to stress the application of
2technology to human and social problems.
The traditional approach to United States policy 
toward Latin America was imbued with the conservatism that 
glorified private enterprise, pragmatism, and the resulting techno­
logical orientatibn of the American ethos. The progenitor of 
this traditional approach was the special relationship which 
had existed between the United States business interests and
^Frank Coffin, Witness for AID (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964),“ Nelson, op. cit.
2Alan Westin et. al.. Politics and Government in the 
United States (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).
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Latin America since the earlier part of the twentieth cen­
tury, The historical origins of this special relationship 
emanated from Secretary of State Elihu Root's address in 
Kansas City, Missouri following his return from Brazil in 
1906. Secretary Root indicated that the prospects for United 
States investment were very good in Latin American countries 
and th.at Latin Americans could also serve as a profitable 
market for United States goods. This policy theme has been 
a most persistent and significant political and economic 
factor in our relations with Latin American nations.^
The basic permanent objectives of the United States 
toward Latin America include;
(1) political stability in order to ensure equal treatment 
of foreigners and nationals, protection of rights of 
property and respect for international agreements; and
(2) economic growth, leading to expanded commercial relations 
and attractive investment opportunities for United States 
capital, primarily in natural resources of strategic 
value such as petroleum and non-ferrous metals, but with 
increasing emphasis of manufactures.
Throughout the twentieth century this special rela­
tionship persisted. When the United States established pro­
grams to assist the Latin American countries in their develop-
^Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
2lbid.
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mental efforts, the promotion of private enterprise was in­
cluded. American private investment was utilized as the 
means of providing the necessary capital for development.
The technological orientation of the American ethos was also 
included in the American foreign assistance programs. This 
technological orientation was written into the Mutual Securi­
ty Act and was institutionalized in the International De­
velopment Cooperation. Latin Americans objected to this 
techno-economic approach to development and expressed prefer­
ence for socio-economic development. The major rationale for 
change in the traditional American approach to Latin American 
policy hinged around this prime focus on private investment 
as the form of American assistance and the failure to apply 
social and humanistic solutions to the problems that bedevil­
ed Latin American countries. Hopefully, under the new ap­
proach, the concept of economic development would mean more 
than the application of technical expertise and the building 
of physical infrastructure through the hydraulic method.^
The traditional approach to United States policy toward 
Latin America was preferred by career men, as aforementioned. 
As proponents of the traditional approach, they were support­
ed by the complex of ideas in the American ideology which we
^Stefan Robock, Brazil's Developing Northeast; A Study 
in Regional Planning and Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 19 63); Robock notes the earlier method 
of approaching the problems of the Northeast was the hydraulic 
method.
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have alluded to as orthodox liberalism and contemporary 
American conservatism. The traditional approach promoted 
the interests of the corporate world in Latin America and 
utlized these compelling forces in the American ideology as 
justification.
Although the struggle over approaches to foreign 
policy toward the Latin American countries had the under­
pinnings of conflicting values, the Kennedy men and the 
career men shared certain values and images. These shared 
values caused tiie Kennedy men and the career men to conform 
in many decisions and actions, despite their fundamental 
opposition on foreign policy approaches. These shared values 
and images determined the boundaries within which all stra­
tegic actors were forced to make decisions. They are, there­
fore, called the parameters in this study. The parameters 
of the game, as aforementioned, were derived from the Ameri­
can ideology. They included:
(1) belief in the sanctity of private enterprise;
(2) aversion to radicalism and revolution;
(3) aversion to communism;
(4) belief in the overwhelming importance of national securi­
ty, relegated in the final analysis to national defense.^
^Packenham, Op. Cit.; Lodge, Op. Cit.; Ebenstein, Op.
Cit.; Dolbeare, Op. Cit.
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The sanctity of private enterprise pervades American 
society and serves as the foundation for a complex network 
of American institutions. The American corporation, the 
leading economic institution in this network, is supported 
by related political and social institutions. During the 
early post World War II era, international communism appeared 
on the global scene. As a global force it sought the destruc­
tion of capitalism, the mainstay of American society and the 
progenitor of many American institutions. The method of 
destruction was to be violent revolution. The American re­
sponse to this threat was logically to hate and fear communism, 
and to be suspicious of all forces that resemble it. Nation­
alism and populism were progenitors of change and were there­
fore held in contempt. The American aversion to radicalism 
dispelled any distinction between the nature of change which 
communists sought and which other forces proposed. All pro­
posals for change were perceived as radical and revolutionary. 
All forces for social change were associated with communism 
and a threat to American institutions.
The tendency to associate world stability with the 
preservation of American institutions and the tendency to 
associate change witli the destruction of those institutions 
led to the demand for national security to defend American 
institutions (private enterprise) against the radical and 
revolutionary forces. In essence, the growing network of 
United States investments and security interests, which con-
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verged during the cold war gave rise to the view that revo­
lution, specifically the overthrow of a government adhering 
to the United States rules for amity by political forces 
committed to radical social change, was inherently dangerous 
to United States interests and challenged the United States 
leadership of the inter-American system".^
Through the prescribed mission of keeping the world 
stable, Americans have demanded a military establishment and 
justified it. The rhetoric that results from such justifi­
cation has been utilized to effectively mobilize popular 
support for the military establishment. The rhetoric em­
braces the concept of national security, which it associates 
with monolithic communist conspiracy. The result has been 
the rise of "the hyperlegitimacy of security", which means 
a capacity to justify most decisions and actions in the name 
of defense. The hyperlegitimacy of security has resulted in 
an expansion of military functions that generate a narrower 
set of interests that are engulfed in the ideology. These 
narrow interests become legitimized as parts of the national 
interest.2 Douglas Rosenberg contends that a series of in­
terests can be served through the neo-Wilsonian perspective.
^Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.
nDouglas Rosenberg, "Arms and the American Way", eds. 
Stephen Ambrose and James Barber, The Military and American 
Society, (New York; Free Press, 1972).
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Anti-communism might serve the economic interests 
of an overseas investor, the career interests of a 
military officer, and the very survival of the elite.
It integrates class interests into a more generalized 
pattern of ethical beliefs and social norms, which 
is why it is so hard to pin down the motivation be­
hind the so-called military-industrial complex. If 
a dominant social myth favors high spending, on what 
basis can we separate out the narrow interest of the 
weapons contractor, the military officer, or the 
international businessman. The myth could also favor 
the interests of the nonelite and the masses.1
Those who oppose the establishment are ultimately con­
sidered as the enemy. The creation of the enemy is illusory 
and deceptive, for the enemy is distorted in the vision of 
the establishment. The distortion of tlie enemy's image allows 
the establishment to utilize him as a tool. By the early 
1960's the monolithic spirit and the neo-Wilsonian perspective 
persisted, despite the fact that the belief in the monolithic 
structure had become less tenable. The cold warriors refused 
to recognize that communism was polycentric in nature.^
The United States pursued her ideological imperative 
of keeping the world under control through the means of the 
military (inclusive of counter guerilla warfare, military 
training, advice and aid) and through economic and technical 
assistance. In this manner the United States opposed any 
revolution or movement that had probable effects of upsetting 




posed economic threats against the United States. The se­
curity function is all-pervasive, reaching beyond the pure 
military realm into the economic realm.
The security function was broadened to include the 
responsibility of protecting the lives and property of 
Americans abroad. The responsibility of protecting the lives 
and property of Americans abroad is the rationale through 
which security becomes linked with the economic interests 
of Americans. This all-encompassing concept of the national 
security becomes an acceptable and pervasive feature within 
the public mind.^
Senator Edward M. Kennedy noted that the identity of
the threat to national security always takes the form of
political left movements.
An important first step is to put the communist 
manace into its proper perspective. A legislator 
can win headlines by pointing to an active, radical 
left-wing movement in most South American nations.
In this way, all movements of social change may be 
labeled pro-communist.„. But an example of left-wing 
movements in Latin America will reveal that most of 
them have no interest in advancing the aims of 
Soviet or Chinese policy, and that those that do are 
not doing very well.2
Kennedy's perception of the global scene was multi­
dimensional, as opposed to the traditional perception of a 
monolithic communist conspiracy that permeated all restless
^Ibid.
2Edward M. Kennedy, Decisions for a Decade; Policies 
and Programs for the 1970's (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
1968).
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developing countries. The consequence of this multi-dimen­
sional perception was a foreign policy characterized as 
liberal anti-communism, a tendency to recognize the forces 
of diversity and neutralism and to be cautious about label­
ing indigenous movements as communist movements.^ In Janu­
ary of 1962 President Kennedy underscored this perception 
in his Second Annual State of the Union Message;
Some may choose forms and ways that we would 
not choose for ourselves but it is not for us 
that they are choosing. We can welcome diversi­
ty.2
This multidimensional perception of the global scene 
led Kennedy to recognize that nationalism was a stronger 
force than communism in shaping the destinies of developing 
countries. Kennedy was thus capable of understanding that 
all forces that proposed social reform were not communist; 
all forces that proposed change were not the enemy; social 
change was essential for development; and social change and 
development were not antithetical to American interests. 
Rather, social reform and development could be used as posi­
tive forces to head off the threat of a violent revolution.^ 
Kennedy's perceptions of the international social
Martin C. Needier, The United States and the Latin 
American Revolution (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 
inc. , IF72TT
2pred Israel, ed., State of the Union Messages of the 
Presidents, 1960-1966, v. Ill, (New York; Chelsea House, 1966),
3ponald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy: Assumpjhions., 
Processes and Projections (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
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forces and the forces of Brazil conflicted with the perspec­
tive that the parameters of the game dictated. The para­
meters dictated the wisdom of promoting American private in­
vestment through the exigencies of the foreign assistance 
program and the wisdom of protecting these investments from 
destabilizing forces, which were presumed to be the products 
of international communism. This perspective, which follow­
ed from the parameters of the game, would result in techno- 
economic development or modernization, as opposed to socio­
economic development.
Within the context of the bureaucratic politics model, 
the president is viewed as the super power among the strategic 
actors in the foreign policy-making amalgam. His pre-eminence 
is derived from formal legal authority established by the 
Constitution, from judicial interpretations, and from customs 
and tradition. These formal and informal powers may be con­
sidered the president's bargaining tools.^
Although the president is the super power among the 
strategic actors, his power is relative and potential. The 
real power of the president depends upon his capacity to 
utilize his bargaining tools to influence the other strategic 
actors within the foreign policy-making amalgam.% A major
Allison, Op. Cit.; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene 
R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy; Pattern and Process 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 237-241.
2ibid.; Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York; 
Wiley, 1976).
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requisite for the successful initiation and conduct of the 
Alliance for Progress program was John Fitzgerald Kennedy's 
capacity to influence or control the action channels of the 
game. The Kennedy effort to influence the appropriations 
process, an action channel within the congressional system, 
was significantly difficult, given the parameters of the game 
and the composition and the mood of the Congress during the 
early 1960's.
Congressional influence in the process of foreign 
policy decision-making can be largely seen through the appro­
priations process, a field in which the House of Representa­
tives has traditionally been considered as being substantial­
ly more powerful than the Senate. Congressional influence, 
with respect to appropriations, is characteristically applied 
with the intention of reducing foreign aid. In as much as 
the power of Congress is crucial in the foreign assistance 
program, the relationship between President Kennedy (who 
sought extensive appropriations to finance the Alliance for 
Progress) and the Congress was highly significant to the im­
plementation and making of Latin American policy.^
President Kennedy was by no means a novice on the 
Washington scene. He had served in the Congress for almost 
fifteen years, as a representative for six years and as a
^James Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-making 
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967).
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senator for eight years. The extent of John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy's experience in Congress, however, was not indicative 
of positive rapport in his relationship with the law-making 
institution. By the time of the Kennedy Administration, 
leadership in both houses of Congress had changed and was 
accompanied by a Congressional apprehensiveness toward the 
use of political power by the new president.^
The tendency to guard against the rise in executive 
power joined with the force of a continuing conservative 
coalition between Southern Democrats and Republicans served 
to deadlock important aspects of the Kennedy program. Legis­
lative hostility toward foreign aid caused Kennedy to approach 
the Alliance for Progress program's implementation with prag­
matism, seeking short-cuts and putting forth justifications 
for foreign aid that would seem to contradict its purposes 
as stated in the original proclamation.^
David A. Baldwin, recognizing the reality of legisla­
tive hostility to foreign aid, specified several strategies 
that recent presidents have used to overcome the Congression­
al obstacle in seeking foreign aid appropriations. They in­
cluded:
^Congress and the Nation, 19 45-19 64: A Review of 
Government and Politics in the Postwar Years, v. 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 41.
^Ibid.
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(1) discovering forms of aid that would benefit domestic 
groups in very obvious ways;
(2) presenting the annual aid request as a minimum request;
(3) requiring studies of the problem and appointing as members
of the commission persons who would usually not be con­
sidered as friends of aid;
(4) militarizing aid;
(5) emphasizing the temporary aspects of aid;
(6) requesting multiyear appropriations; and
(7) sharing the burden with other nations.1
During the administration of Kennedy, several of these 
methods of "getting-by"Congress were tried and only one appears 
to have been successful. The device of finding forms of aid 
tb.at would benefit domestic groups in obvious ways had already 
crystallized in the form of tying aid to American exports, 
and by the requirement that goods financed by aid be shipped 
in American bottoms. In an effort to use the device of a 
commission's study as a basis for the foreign aid request, 
the Kennedy Administration failed, for the Clay Report of 
196 3 served to lessen the significance of increased foreign 
aid, which was at cross purposes with the Kennedy thrust. With 
respect to the device of making multiyear appropriations re- 
quests, the Kennedy Administration also failed.
^David A. Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign. 
Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966).
2lbid.
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The direct militarization of aid was a device not 
sought by Kennedy, for Kennedy, in line with the J. William 
Fulbright forces, sought successfully to separate military 
from economic aid. Yet, indirectly linking security with 
aid was used as a device. The indirect means through which 
aid was sought on this basis, during the Kennedy Administra­
tion, was to emphasize that national security depended on 
foreign aid. The Kennedy Administration constantly justified 
its requests for foreign aid on the basis of the threat of 
communism.^
The planning aspect of the Alliance for Progress pro­
gram came into conflict with the procedure through which the 
Congress makes its appropriations on an annual basis,, The 
Alliance for Progress's long-range planning effort would re­
quire that the Latin American governments know in advance the 
extent of external resources that might be anticipated. Con­
sequently, in order to coordinate the demands of planning 
with Congressional approval, Kennedy requested a three year 
authorization of three billion dollars for the initial stage 
of the Alliance for Progress program.^
Congress and the Nation, Op. Cit.; Levinson, Op. Cit.; 
May,1977 Interview with Riordan Roett. Roett indicated that 
the Kennedy Administration justified its requests for foreign 
aid on the basis of the threat of communism.
^Congress and the Nation, 19 45-196 4: A Review of Govern­
ment and Politics in the Postwar Years, v. I (Washington, B.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965); See also Levinson,
Ibid.
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Congress cut the request by six million dollars with 
the stipulation that the administration would have to make 
annual requests for appropriations. Consequently, the Latin 
American countries weie unable to design long-range programs 
based on the promise of specific amounts of external resources 
from the United States. In addition, there was constant 
pressure for the administrators of the program to have com­
pletely utilized the appropriations by the end of the fiscal 
year.^
Given the president's power to appoint policy officials 
to executive agencies, Kennedy's capacity to influence the 
action channels within the Agency for International Develop­
ment was substantially greater than his capacity to influence 
the action channels within the congressional system. The 
Agency for International Development, organized during the 
Kennedy Administration, was composed of a larger ratio of 
presidential appointees than the Department of State.^ This
^Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, v . I .
2John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge 
Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 61; Some of the 
personnel in the Agency for International Development had 
held positions within the International Cooperation Admini­
stration, the forerunner of the Agency for International De­
velopment which had preceded the Kennedy Administration. As 
career officers they were prone to disregard the New Frontier 
philosophy and to impede the efforts to apply it to the econom­
ic assistance program in Brazil. However, Kennedy men pre­
vailed in the Agency for International Development during its 
early years; See also Joseph Page, Op. Cit. Page refers to 
these career men as the old technicians of the International 
Cooperation Administration and chronicles the problems in the
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meant that Kennedy had the opportunity to staff the Agency 
for International Development missions with Kennedy men, men 
of his persuasion. Although Kennedy men prevailed in the 
Agency for International Development, Kennedy's power to 
staff the missions with his men was not absolute.^
In Brazil, the mainstay of the Alliance for Progress 
program, Kennedy's liberal anti-communism and multidimension­
al perspective met with an immediate and impending challenge. 
His claim to recognize nationalism as a distinct force was 
tested by the convergence of nationalism with populism and 
communism in the demand for social change. These social 
forces coincided with the idealistic goals of the Alliance 
for Progress in their quest for social change for socio­
economic development and the development of democratic poli­
tical processes and reform. While the pursuit of the Alliance 
for Progress goals required extensive change in Brazil and 
while the social forces sought extensive change in pursuit of 
these goals, extensive change was deemed a counter theme in 
the context of the American ideology and the derived para-




John Franklin Campbell describes the dilemma that 
decision makers faced in their attempt to pursue the idea­
listic goals of the Alliance for Progress in Brazil and 
maintain political stability.
To preach a doctrine of minimum conflict and 
constant political stability on the one hand 
and fast economic growth and social change on 
the other is to insist on the most jumbled self- 
contradiction. .. The doctrine was very dangerous 
since it assumed that American effort is the 
key to Latino-Afro-Asian progress, and that 
failure of such programs or political instability 
in achieving it constitutes a grave rebuff and 
even a security threat to the United States.^
Brazilian nationalists, populists, and communists, 
imbued with an inçetus to effect change, engaged in activi­
ties that annoyed Americans in Brazil and in the United 
States. Americans tended to be outraged by their actions, 
since these acts conflicted with the American ideology (para­
meters of the game), and undermined the economic motives of 
special interests. Included among these activities were:
(1) the mini-mobilization of the have nots under Francisco 
Juliao, Marxist leader of the Peasant Leagues and Miguel 
Arraes, the populist governor of Pernambuco; (2) Quadros's 
independent foreign policy; (3) the Profit Remittance Law;
(4) the expropriation of the ITT subsidiary by Leonel Brizola,
^John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge 
Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 183.
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the self-avowed communist governor of Rio Grande do Sul; and
(5) Celso Furtado's determination to utilize the essential 
expertise of Brazilians of every persuasion, even communist 
talent, in the SUDENE drive to develop the Northeast.
In as much as these activities clashed with the Ameri­
can ideology and the parameters of the game, Americans tend­
ed to see the complex of actions and forces in terms of the 
neo-Wilsonian perspective. In that context, the network of 
actions and forces were perceived, by the Congress and by 
some strategic actors as radicalization, revolution, and a 
communist threat. Donor Lion, Administrator of the United 
States Assistant Program in Brazil during the 1960's, de­
scribes the reality of the network of Brazil's social forces 
and their quest for social reform and justice below. His 
description rejects the prevailing neo-Wilsonian perception 
as erroneous in the case of Brazil.
Radicalization in Brazil did not occur. Only 30,000 
of the Brazilians were radicalized out of the entire 
Brazilian population. There was a minor marriage 
between Pernambuco peasants and the urban proletar­
iat. But, there was no organized radicalization.1
The Congress and the American businessmen, guided by 
the parameters that assist in molding public opinion, focused 
upon the expropriation as radicalism, revolution, and communism.
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 19 77.
Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics. Stepan dis­
cusses the alleged radicalization and concludes that no radi­
calization occurred.
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as well as a threat to private enterprise. The Hickenlooper 
Amendment^ was the product of Congressional support for 
American corporate interests.
Given the impending parameters of aversion to radi­
calism, revolution, and communism and the existence of these 
forces for social change in Brazil, the degree to which 
Kennedy and Kennedy men gave support to the goals of social 
reform, economic development, and democratic processes varied. 
The Brazilian forces for social change tended to clash with 
these parameters. The tendency to clash was sometimes temper­
ed by the multidimensional perception of the Kennedy person­
ality. However, the congressional system, as an action chan­
nel, tended to reinforce the parameters. Ultimately the con­
gressional system and the parameters, which dictated the 
wisdom of fear of social change, were transformed into a net­
work of opposition to the Alliance for Progress goals of 
socio-economic development- Tne result was the failure of 
Kennedy and Kennedy men to make decisions that consistently 
conformed to their designated ends.
Although the extent to which Kennedy and Kennedy men 
made decisions that supported the desired ends varied, the 
Kennedy multidimensional perception did reinforce the resolve
^The provisions of the Hickenlooper Amendment are given 
on page 182 of this chapter.
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to use American public capital transfers as the dynamo for 
improved conditions in Brazil. The initial support for the 
Quadros-Goulart reformist government, the mission to the 
Northeast, the signing of the Northeast Agreement, the estab­
lishment of the two Agency for International Development 
missions in Brazil, and the resistance to the Hickenlooper 
proposals are evidence of the positive actions taken in 
support of social change and development.^
John Fitzgerald Kennedy's tendency to recognize di­
versity in developing countries was evident in his relations 
with Brazil. Although Janio Quadros had announced his in­
dependent foreign policy and had been viewed as a threat by 
John Moors Cabot, the American Ambassador to Brazil during 
the Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy did not hesitate to 
enter into negotiations with him. Upon the resignation of 
Quadros, acrimony and apprehensiveness surrounded the possible 
succession of Joao Goulart to the presidency in both the 
United States and Brazil. The United States Embassy staff 
was skeptical of the trend in Brazil. By the time of Goulart's 
inauguration on September 7, 1961, John Moors Cabot had been 
recalled from his post and Lincoln Gordon, the newly appointed 
Ambassador had not yet arrived. Considerable pressure was 
placed on the Charge d'affaires to intervene in the contro-
Ipeter Bell, "United States and Brazilian Relations", 
ed. Riordan Roett, Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, Tennessee: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).
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versy over the Goulart succession. Niles Bond, Charge 
d'affaires, reported that both the proponents of the succes­
sion and the opponents of Goulart attempted to obtain Ameri­
can support. The American Embassy was initially indecisive 
and cautious. Ultimately, their decision was to maintain 
cordial relations with the Goulart regime.^
During the initial phase of Goulart's Administration,
the Kennedy Administration was successful in maintaining a 
relationship of close cooperation with Brazil. This coopera­
tion was maintained, despite the acts of Brazilian nationalists 
that symbolized hostilities toward Americans. Ambassador 
Gordon enjoyed considerable access to the President of Brazil. 
The American Ambassador was often called on to assist in eval­
uating the capabilities of key Brazilian officials. Goulart 
was invited to address a joint session of the United States 
Congress in April of 1962. There he complied with idie basic 
concerns of the American decision-makers by announcing that 
Brazil was "an independent but not neutral nation" and that
Brazil was opposed to Castro.^
Although the alleged threat of revolution in the North­
east and the issue of foreign capital threatened the continu­
ation of cooperation between the two countries, the Kennedy
llbid.
Interview with Niles Bond, December 30, 1976. 
Interview with Archie Lang, December, 1976. 
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil.
^Bell, Op. Cit.; Skidmore, Op. Cit.
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personality and the Kennedy men sought to support the reform­
ist regime. With respect to the allegation of incipient revo­
lution in the Northeast, the Kennedy Administration displayed 
its liberal anti-communism and welcomed an opportunity to 
apply its new formula to the developmental efforts in the 
region. Kennedy hoped to use the Northeast to demonstrate 
the utility of the new approach. This perspective was unlike 
that of his predecessor who viewed Celso Furtado, Superin­
tendent of SUDENE, and Juliao Francisco, leader of the Peasant 
Leagues, as dangerous Marxists.^
Tad Szulc, the New York Times columnist, had warned 
his readers that the conditions of poverty and social in­
justices in the Northeast had sparked a rising political con­
sciousness in the masses. According to Szulc, this rising 
political consciousness signaled the possibility of a violent 
revolution (communist). He emphasized the strategic value 
of Eecife to the United States. Szulc's articles generated 
considerable American interest in the Northeast. George 
McGovern, Director of Food for Peace, was one of several of­
ficials that responded to Szulc's expose by visiting the 
Northeast. McGovern's observations from his visit in Febru­
ary of 1961 were as follows:
(1) The Brazilian Northeast is an ideal area for social
^Bell, Op. Cit., "U.S. to Help Develop Economy of the 
Northeast Area", United States Department of State Bulletin, 
July 31, 1961.
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change in Latin America*
(2) Celso Furtado and Juliao Francisco are positive forces 
for initiating social change.
(3) Furtado and Juliao Francisco offer an alternative to 
violent revolution.^
President Kennedy followed the lead of the McGovern 
observation and began to initiate steps to investigate the 
situation in the Northeast for possible developmental programs. 
In the view of President Kennedy, the Northeast might serve 
as a bulwark against communism, if developed properly. In 
July of 1961, shortly after Quadros had come into office and 
SUDENE had begun operations in the Northeast, the United 
States initiated talks which related to the possibility of 
American participation in the developmental efforts there.
When Kennedy met Celso Furtado, he demonstrated his willing­
ness to work with Furtado for the goal of socio-economic de­
velopment, affirmed the American interest in the plight of 
the Northeast, and promised to send a mission to analyze the 
area for the development of an aid program.
The Kennedy promise to send a mission to survey the 
Northeast was fulfilled in October of 1961 when Ambassador
^Bell, Op. Cit.; Joseph Page, The Revolution That Never 
Was; Northeast Brazil, 1955-1964 (New York: Grossman, 196 4).
^Bell, Op. Cit.
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Merwin Bohan and his colleagues arrived in Brazil. The study 
that Bohan conducted was an analysis for the Agency for Inter­
national Development. The Bohan Report, completed by Febru­
ary of 1962, constituted the basis for the proposed United 
States assistance to Northeast Brazil under the Alliance for 
Progress. Fundamental to the proposed program was the team's 
view that the problems of the Northeast are basically rele­
vant for the economic progress and social well-being of Bra­
zil and the Western Hemisphere.^
The program which the team proposed comprised two 
major parts:
(1) a short-term program intended to further the economic 
and social development of the region, including immediate 
implementation to make possible prompt results. Hope­
fully these results could be reported as evidence of the 
viability of the program; and
(2) a five-year program that was intended to provide con­
siderable assistance in the efforts of the Brazilian 
government to improve the capacity of the Northeast to 
provide a better standard of living for its population.
The short-term program (immediate impact program) was 
intended to quickly affect those sectors of the population
^Merwin Bohan et. al., "Northeast Survey Team Report", 
February,1962 (Mimeographed copy in possession of the author).
^"Northeast Brazil Survey Team Report", Ibid.
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that were most in urgent need of assistance, and was also
intended to greatly improve the day-to-day conditions under
which the people in the Northeast lived. In reality, it was
also intended to fight the "drift toward communism".^
In describing the conditions of the Northeast and
their implications for the United States, Kennedy stated:
No area in this hemisphere is in greater or more 
urgent need of attention than Brazil's vast North­
east.... This area, with its poverty, hunger, and 
consequent discontent is a crucible of social 
economic, and political problems-problems which 
have unmistakable implications for the future de­
velopment of Brazil and the security of the entire 
hemisphere.... And the United States intends to 
play a continuing role in helping our sister Re­
public of Brazil meet this urgent challenge.2
On April 13, 1962 the Northeast Agreement was signed.
The Northeast Agreement, through which the United States and
Brazil agreed to work jointly for the development of the
^Ibid.; Impact aid was for immediate political concerns- 
to demonstrate the utility of democratic governments utilizing 
U.S. aid in order to thwart the drift toward communism. De­
velopmental aid was aid applied to long-range projects with 
considerable planning. For further discussion see Riordan 
Roett. The Politics of Foreign Aid i n t h p 1 i an .N n rth e a s jL
(Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972).
2"tj.s. to Help Develop the Economy of the Northeast 
Area", U.S. Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1961; See 
also Alex J. Goldman, John Fitzgerald Kennedy-The World Re- 
members (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1976). The North­
east was to become a major thrust of the United States efforts 
to extend economic assistance under the Alliance for Progress 
during the administration of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
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poverty strickened Northeast region, was one of the initial 
undertakings under the Alliance for Progress. The Northeast
- Âgreemeni—provided.;___________________________________________________
(1) that under the Alliance for Progress, 131 million dollars 
would be allocated for the Northeast region of Brazil 
over a period of two years; and
(2) that the United States Agency for International Develop­
ment and SUDENE would jointly administer the application 
of these funds in the Northeast.^
The Northeast foreign assistance program was of highest 
priority under the Alliance for Progress. A United States 
Agency for International Development mission was established 
in Recife to administer the program in the Northeast. In as 
much as the United States had established a mission in Rio 
de Janeiro, the organization of the mission at Recife was un­
usual. There was no precedent for the establishment of a 
regional mission in Recife, and in most countries the United 
States had adhered to the single mission principle. However, 
the high priority status that was attached to the developmental
^"Brazil-U.S. Joint Program for the Development of 
Northeast Brazil: Letter from President Kennedy to President 
Goulart", American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1962, 
April 13, 1962; "President Kennedy Hails Agreement for North­
east Brazil Development", U.S. Department of State Bulletin. 
May 7, 1962; "The History of the United States Aid Program in 
Brazil Since World War II", Unpublished Paper of the Agency 
for International Development (Mimeographed Copy); Page, Op. 
Cit.
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program in the Northeast made the mission in Recife the ex­
ception. ̂
Aside from the specified Quadros independent foreign 
policy and the allegations of incipient revolution in the 
Northeast, overt acts of Brazilian nationalists against the 
existence of American corporations in Brazil were also treat­
ed with caution by the Kennedy Administration. The expropri­
ation of the IT and T subsidiary in Rio Grande do Sul by 
Leonel Brizola constitutes a notable example of the overt 
actions which Brazilian nationalists took against American 
investments. Leonel Brizola expropriated the subsidiary during 
Goulart's visit to the United States. Given the general at­
titudes that Goulart displayed during his visit and his pro­
nouncements against Castro, it was obvious that Goulart was 
opposed to this type of activity. Nevertheless, a flurry of 
activity within the United States Congress attended the ex­
propriation. This reaction is the logical consequence of the 
belief in the sanctity of private enterprise and aversion to 
radicalism, which permeate society and are, therefore, key 
issues among congressmen.
^Ibid.; Riordan Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in 
the Brazilian Northeast (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 19 72), pp. 105-10 7, (Hereafter referred to 
as The Brazilian Northeast) .
^Bell, Op. Cit.; Page, Op. Cit.; U.S. Congress, Senate 
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1952. To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961. 87th Congress 2d Session, 196 2; Council on Foreign
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Upon Brizola's expropriation, Senator Bourke B. 
Hickenlooper (urged by Harold Geneen, President of IT and T) 
introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
19 62. The amendment, labeled the Hickenlooper Amendment, 
included the following provisions;
(1) required the President of the United States to suspend 
all economic assistance to those countries that expro­
priate the property of a U.S. company, or those countries 
that make a U.S. company subject to discriminatory taxa­
tion or administration;
(2) included in the economic assistance to be suspended,
foreign aid and laws that alotted sugar quotas to favor­
ed nations ;
(3) allowed a country six months to take effective steps to
provide compensation for expropriated property in "con­
vertible foreign exchange"; and
(4) provided that after the six months the President would 
have to enforce the amendment.^
Relations,Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1962, p. 513; 
"Brizola Scores United States Stand on Alliance and Expropria­
tion Issues", New York Times, February 27, 1962; Levinson, Op. 
Cit.
^U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962: To Amend 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 87th Congress. 2d Session, 
1962; Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American 
Foreign Policy, 1962, p. 513; Levinson and de Onis, Op. Cit.; 
"Brizola Scores United States Stand on Alliance and Expropri­
ation Issues", New York Times, February 27, 1962.
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President Kennedy objected to the amendment, claiming that 
it tied the assistance program to protection of United States
overseas investments. He also found the amendment objection­
able on the following points:
(1) It was an invasion of his right to make foreign policy.
(2) It embroiled the United States government in quarrels 
between the United States companies and foreign govern­
ments . ̂
Francis Tully, speaking for the Department of State,
assailed the expropriation as a blow to Kennedy's Alliance
for Progress. Tully stated:
We acknowledge the right of a government to expro­
priate property belonging to nationals of other 
countries for public purposes if provision is made 
for the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation. However, when a government expro­
priates existing resources and uses its own funds 
to buy out existing operations rather than using 
those funds to create new wealth, new jobs, and new 
taxpayers, and to increase productivity, this action 
appears to be a step backward in the mobilization 
of available resources for the success of the Al­
liance for Progress— the amount offered (as com­
pensation) obviously is so far below book value 
that the evaluation appears to have been made uni­
laterally.%
Even though the spokesman for the State Department as­
sailed the expropriation, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk,
^Levinson and de Onis, Ibid.; Kennedy Opposes Any Cut 
in United States Aid to Retaliate Expropriation of United 
States Property and Congress Moves for Such Cuts", New York 
Times, March 8, 1962; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Op. Cit.
2jack Raymond, "United States Scores Expropriation of
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a career man, gave support to the Kennedy forces against the 
proposed Hickenlooper ?jnendment. When Congress began to con­
sider tlie Hickenlooper proposal, Senator Frank Lanusche, 
Democrat from Ohio and member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, stated his preference for cutting off aid to those 
nations which "violate the rights of our citizens".^ Secre­
tary of State Rusk indicated that he was not in favor of link­
ing aid to investments. He further stated that it is the 
right of a sovereign nation to expropriate property with ade­
quate compensation and he noted that in Brazil there was a 
special case. In Brazil, a state has taken action without 
the approval of the Brazilian federal govenment. The Brazil­
ian government was seeking to resolve the problem. According 
to Rusk, the problem could be dealt with in ways other than 
cutting aid. One suggested alternative was "working out 
guarantees against expropriation without compensation". Also 
Rusk stressed that the problem of utilities is special. The 
following statement summarizes his views on the issue:
If we are going to tie American policy by law to 
the private investor overseas to the extent that 
is suggested, we must reassure ourselves as to 
the operations, the conduct, the financial struc-  ̂
tures and other aspects of those private investors.
Phone Companies in Brazil", New York Times, February 18, 1962.
 ̂U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations 
Hearings Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Assist­
ance Act of 196 2, Op. Cit.
Zibid.
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Throughout the Kennedy Administration Brazil experi­
enced tremendous political ferment. The political ferment 
was a product of pressures for social change and reform. 
Kennedy and his men had resolved to support the demands for 
social change and reform as a part of the larger package of 
socio-economic development. During the first two stages of 
the Goulart regime (which correspond to the Kennedy phase) , 
Kennedy and his men appeared capable of resisting the para­
meters which came into play. We have noted that the impetus 
to social change was symbolized by the mini-mobilization in 
the Northeast and by the expropriation of the ITT subsidiary. 
These demands for change clashed with the parameters.
The symbol of mini-mobilization in the Northeast 
clashed with the American fear of radicalism, revolution, and 
communism. The symbol of expropriation collided with the 
American belief in the sanctity of private enterprise and the 
American belief in the right of private enterprise to protec­
tion by the state. The Kennedy Administration, we have noted, 
resisted these parameters. Evidence of their resistance in­
cludes the intense struggle against the Hickenlooper Amendment 
proposal and the Northeast Agreement.
As the Kennedy phase continued, however, the challenge 
to the Kennedy resolve became more forceful. Although the 
Goulart Administration had a relatively positive beginning 
under the parliamentary system, it soon became an era of in­
creasing social and political unrest. This political and
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social unrest was accompanied by an economic decline. The 
hope of the Brazilian populace was that the plebiscite, which 
restored the presidential system in January of 19 63, would 
bring some stability to the Brazilian political and economic 
system. Unfortunately, the situation became even more criti­
cal during the third stage of the reformist rule (the presi­
dential phase of Goulart's era).^
In mid-1962, the political elite,, of which the Brazil­
ian military was a significant and powerful component, view­
ed the following conditions as evidence of an incipient 
structural crisis in Brazil:
(1) the increasing rate of political and economic demands 
made on the government;
(2) the decreasing political capacity to convert demands 
into concrete policy because of the fragmentation of 
support; and
(3) the increasing withdrawal of commitment to the political 
regime.^
Skidmore depicts the middle of 1962 through the pleb­
iscite and the end of 196 3 as the point of definite decline
"The Question of Foreign Capital", A Economie Bra- 
sileira e Suas Perspectives, v. Ill; Maio, 1964; Skidmore, 
Op. Cit.
2Stepan, Op. Cit.; "The Question of Foreign Capital", 
A Economie Brasileira e Sues Perspectivas, Op. Cit.
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in the Brazilian polity and economy. He refers to this stage 
as the negative phase of the parliametary era, in contrast 
to the positive phase of the first six months in 1962, during 
the parliamentary phase.^ By the end of 1962 an economic de­
cline was apparent. The rate of growth of the gross product 
had fallen from 10.3 percent in 1961 to 5.3 percent by the 
conclusion of the parliamentary stage. The production of the 
industrial sector's rate of growth declined from 10<.6 percent 
in 1961 to 7.8 percent by the end of 1962.^
Washington officials, in general, looked upon the 
Brazilian decline with disgust and pessimism. Lincoln Gordon 
and the strategic actors in the State Department, however, 
resisted the parameters and continued to cooperate with the 
reformist regime. In March of 196 3, San Tiago Dantas, Bra­
zil's Foreign Minister, journeyed to Washington, hoping to 
gain additional economic assistance from the United States. 
Dantas's request for American capital assistance was based 
on the Three Year Plan, a comprehensive economic development 
plan which he had written in collaboration with Celso Furtado,
^Skidmore, Op. Cit.
^"Retrospectus," Conjuntura Economica, February, 196 3; 
"Retrospectus", Conjuntura Economica, February, 1964, p. 3; 
See also Rosenblum and Tyler, Op. Cit.; See also A Economia 
Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas, Op. Cit.
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the Minister of Planning and Director of SUDENE. The plan, 
a statement of government policy, combined the programs of 
Kubitschek and Quadros and put forth the following initia­
tives:
(1) increased foreign investment;




(5) tax reforms; and
(6) agrarian reforms.^
Lincoln Gordon and the strategic actors in the State 
Department met Dantas and his Three Year Plan with consider­
able agreement and enthusiasm. They considered it to be a 
sound foundation for joint cooperation, provided that Goulart 
would support the Dantas initiative. Based on these negotia­
tions, the Bell-Dantas Agreement was signed. The Bell-Dantas 
Agreement had the following provisions:
(1) The United States agreed to extend immediate capital
assistance to Brazil in the amount of 84 million dollars;
(2) The United States agreed to extend the capital assistance
^Phyllis Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention 
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 19 79), p. 36; 
PlanoTrienal Do Desen Volvimento Economico e Social., 1963- 
1965, (196 2) , Mimeographed copy (translated).
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to an additional 314.5 million for the 1964 fiscal year, 
provided that Brazil could meet the condition of success­
fully negotiating with international financial agencies 
(IMF,World Bank) and other nations for long term finan­
cial assistance.^
Also in the agreement, San Tiago Dantas committed Brazil to 
the purchase of ten subsidiaries of the American and Foreign 
Power Company (which Brazil had seized earlier) for 135 mil­
lion dollars. Twenty-five percent of the purchase was to be
submitted in cash and the balance was to be invested in vari-
2ous local enterprises.
For those who had considered the Bell-Dantas Agreement 
as the beginning of even greater cooperation between the two 
nations; subsequent events disspelled the agreement as a mere 
mirage. The purchase of the American and Foreign Power Com­
pany was assailed by both conservatives and leftists. Their 
reaction to the AMFORP arrangement changed the scene of good 
rapport with the United States to one of strained relations.^
"Brazil-U.S. Understanding Concerning Economic and 
Financial Collaboration: Letter from Administrator of AID
(Bell) to the Minister of Finance of Brazil (Dantas", Ameri­
can Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, March 25, 1963;
See also "Brazil-U.S. Understanding Concerning Economic and 
Financial Collaboration", United States Department of State 
Bulletin, April 15, 1963, pp. 560-561; skidmore. Op. Cit.; 
Parker, Cp.Cit., pp.38-42; George A. Fiechter, Brazil Since 
1964: Modernization Under a Military Regime (London, England;
Macmillan Co., 1975).
nIbid, (all sources); The American and Foreign Power 




When Lincoln Gordon met with Goulart, he was highly 
critical of the political and economic trends in Brazil. He 
registered complaints about the rising left wing and commu­
nist groups in Brazil, Brizola's agitation, Almino Afonso's 
(Labor Minister) failure to cooperate in the field of wage 
policy, and the legalization of the pro-communist General 
Workers Command (CGT) . He called upon Goulart to control the 
leftist drift and to support the Three Year Plan.
Even before the AMFORP negotiations, there had been 
increasing political unrest in Brazil. As propertyless masses 
demanded land, higher wages, and better health facilities, the 
powerful elites were able to use the constitution as a means 
of denying social justice. Center and rightist factiomcon­
trolled the legislature. They utilized the Constitution to 
block tax reform, land reform, and social welfare programs 
that were designed to alleviate the miseries of the lower in­
come groups. Their inclusion of a law that prohibited illiter­
ates from voting was an exceptionally effective device for 
maintaining the status quo, and through it more than half of 
the population was disenfranchised.
Goulart's efforts to seek reform tended to coincide 
with the proposals of the populist governors, Miguel Arraes
^Edwin Lieuwen, Generals Vs. Presidents (New York: 
Praeger, 1964); See Skidmore, Op. Cit.; See Stepan, Op. Cit.; 
The amendment that he demanded was intended to change the pro­
vision that required the owners of expropriated land must be 
paid in cash; Marta Cehelsky, "Redistribution Policy and 
Agrarian Reform", eds. Rosenbaum and Tyler, Op. Cit.
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of Pernambuco, Cid Sampaio of Goias, and Leonel Brizola of 
Rio Grande do Sul. In as much as these governors were con­
sidered leftist, the Goulart effort to seek reforms which 
these governors supported was viewed by the conservatives as 
a symbol of Goulart's own leftist leanings.^ Goulart's re­
form program included the following basic proposals;
(1) expropriation of all lands within six miles of important
communication arteries and highways;
(2) government enforcement of price controls on business;
(3) legalization of the Communist Party; and
(4) neutralism in the cold war.^
Aside from the political unrest that attended Goulart's 
efforts to initiate reform and the AMFORP settlement, Goulart 
reshuffled his cabinet. Additional reports of dissident acti­
vity reached Washington. These reports of growth in communism 
among student groups, of communist victories in Sao Paulo, and 
of radical nationalists among the military caused Lincoln 
Gordon to have second thoughts about the Bell-Dantas Agreement. 
In August of 1963, Gordon met with his staff to assess Brazil's 
compliance with the Bell-Dantas Agreement. They decided that 
Brazil had failed to comply with the terms of the agreement,
^Cehelsky, Op. Cit.
^Lieuwen, Generals Vs. Presidents, Op. Cit.; Vladimir 
Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Washington, D.C.: 
Public Affairs Press, 1968).
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and that the agreement should be dissolved. With that de­
cision Lincoln Gordon shifted his approach and his policy.^
The "Islands of Sanity" policy, established in August 
of 196 3, was the end product of Lincoln Gordon's revision. 
Through this policy the following approaches were pursued:
(1) the Brazilian government (federal) was to be bypassed;
(2) the emphasis of American economic assistance was to be 
placed on project loans, as opposed to program loans;
(3) economic assistance was to be extended to individual 
states in Brazil, as opposed to the usual federal admini­
stration of economic assistance;
(4) the economic assistance was to be extended to those
2governors that were friendly to the United States.
The Isles of Sanity policy, initiated by Gordon, was 
an affront to the Alliance for Progress. It was based on the 
utilization of impact aid, a form of aid which the Kennedy 
Administration had supposedly ruled out. Rather than encourage 
political development along democratic lines and the develop­
ment of viable political institutions, it was to weaken Brazil 
as a national entity. Impact aid was applied to prevent the 
election of governors who were perceived as leftists and radi-
Iparker, Op. Cit.
2lbid.; Roett, The Brazilian Northeast; Page, Op. Cit.
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cals by the American officials. The policy was applied in
Pernambuco, in order to bolster Cleofas (UDN landowner) as a
candidate for governor against Miguel Arraes. It was also
used to support Alusio Aives of Rio Grande do Sul. The Kennedy
men, in this instance, had been unsuccessful in resisting the
parameters of the game. In the face of growing efforts for
social reform and political mobilization of the masses,
Lincoln Gordon reverted to the neo-Wilsonian perspective of
the traditional policy approach-perceiving the efforts to
improve conditions as radicalism, revolution, anti-America,
and the acts of irresponsible people.^
The Isles of Sanity policy was the exception in the
long line of activities that were initiated by Kennedy and
his men to support the. Alliance for Progress. Kennedy men's
reactions to Congressional efforts to associate the problems
of expropriation and foreign capital with a security threat
exemplify resistance and pragmatism. When a congressman
assailed the expropriation in the following statement, Kennedy
men retorted.
It is the policy of the United States to strengthen 
friendly foreign countries by minimizing or elimi­
nating barriers to the flow of private investment
^Parker, Ibid.; Roett, The Brazilian Northeast, Op. Cit.;
Page, Op. Cit.; Campbell, Op. Cit.; According to Roett impact
aid is used to contain political unrest and social change. The 
proponents of impact aid consider the United States main re­
sponsibility to be that of assisting in the global battle 
against a monolithic communist movement. Impact aid is used 
to support the status quo against social forces that are de­
manding social reform and political change toward democracy.
194
capital... Can anyone believe that Castroism 
can be a spur to private investment in Latin 
America? ...It is the communists who work to 
bring about the seizure of American owned prop­
erty. 1
The Kennedy men, although resisting the parameters in
their general perspectives of the Brazilian scene, used the
argument of neo-Wilsonian Congressmen, to press for additional
appropriations. They stressed the need for aid to protect
the security interest (the battle against communism). In this
respect, Teodoro Moscoso noted:
The United States is confronted with powerful 
enemies in the hemisphere-enemies who still con­
stitute a threat to the national security of our 
country. The campaigns led— by well organized 
communist groups— are clear and present dangers.
The goals of the Alliance are to eliminate danger, 
disease— in achieving these significant goals, we 
are furthering the security and the economic 
growth of the United States— I am convinced that 
the Alliance for Progress in Latin America will 
have a positive impact on our balance of payments.^
Rusk, a career man in the Kennedy Administration,
stressed using aid as a tool to prevent the security threat.
We don't minimize the burden. We don't minimize 
the stakes. And I am one of those who think that 
we must not abandon the field to the enemy. We 
must continue this effort in many ways. Aid is 
one of them. And the burdens to us are burdens 
which we not only can afford, but burdens which we 
cannot dare not bear.3
U.S. Congress, House, "On the Expropriation of Ameri­
can Property in Brazil", Congressional Record, v. 108, Part 3, 
87th Congress 2d Session, March 5, 1962.
^U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Hearings to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 87th 
Congress, 19 62.
^U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
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The Kennedy Administration, in most instances, was 
insistent.
Nothing could be worse than a series of anti- 
Brazilian resolutions at a time when the dia­
logue is more important than ever.l
The reference here was toward the rise of leftist forces. It
was deemed necessary to grant impact aid to quickly head off
the forces of communism and revolution.
In essence, there was increasing tension between the 
United States and Brazil due to issues of foreign capital and 
the alleged radicalization of the Northeast. Aside from the 
application of impact aid through the Islands of Sanity poli­
cy, the Kennedy Administration insisted on the continued 
support of the reformist regime. Although extension of eco­
nomic assistance was justified on the basis of a politico- 
security motive (the threat of communism), the Kennedy Admini­
stration focused its attention on the Northeast. The develop­
ment of the Northeast was crucial to the attempt to alleviate 
the social and economic dualism that characterized the coun-
on Appropriations. Foreign Operations Appropriations for 
196 3, 87th Congress, July, 1962.
^Irving Horowitz, Op. Cit.; "Kennedy Opposes Any Cut 
in U.S. Aid to Retaliate for Expropriation of U.S. Property", 
New York Times, February 18, 1962.
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try of Brazil.^
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977. Lion discussed 
the significance of the Northeast Agreement and the Northeast 
to the development of Brazil; Riordan Roett, in interview, 
Roett discussed the politco-security justification of United 
States assistance to the Northeast. Lion stressed that du dng 
the Kennedy Administration, while the Northeast Agreement was 
in effect,some progress was being made in the Northeast, the 
region which needed the assistance most.
CHAPTER IV
ACQUIESCENT IDEALISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
ALLIAIOCE FOR PROGRESS; THE JOHNSON
PHASE
During the Johnson Administration, domestic social
programs appeared to flourish, while the Alliance for Progress
program collapsed. Johnson's performance in the domestic and
international arenas has been assessed by John Spanier.
President Johnson's fate tragically symbolized 
the plight of a President whose principal experi­
ence was domestic and whose fundamental wish to 
enact a social reform program to rival that of 
his mentor, Franklin Roosevelt. Unfortunately, 
the world would not go away. Thus, Johnson, upon 
succeeding President Kennedy... pushed more liberal 
social legislation through Congress than any Presi­
dent in the twentieth century, including Franklin 
Roosevelt. But foreign policy proved his undoing.^
The collapse of the Alliance for Progress, during the 
Johnson Administration, was a function of the following 
factors :
(1) a President who possessed a neo-Wilsonian and unidimen­
sional perspective of the global scene;
(2) action channels that were staffed by neo-Wilsonian and 




no interest in the specific development of the Northeast;
(3) career men, who had been released from the Kennedy per­
sonality, and were given considerable leverage in the 
new administration;
(4) the collision of Brazilian social forces with the para­
meters of the game;
(5) the collision of Brazilian social forces v/ith Brazilian 
militarism;
(6) the convergence of Brazilian militarism with the American 
parameters and with the men who occupied the action-chan­
nels.
During the Johnson Administration there was a decisive 
shift in the American policy of supporting the reformist 
government of Brazil in its effort to attain socio-economic 
development. This shift can be seen by reviewing three de­
cisions :
(1) the official pronouncement of the "Islands of Sanity" 
policy;
(2) the announcement of the Mann Doctrine in March of 196 4; 
and
(3) the United States recognition of the Brazilian military 
government in April of 196 4.
Martin C. Needier has described the foreign policy of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson as conservative anti-communism.
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Under Johnson, the range of Latin Americans who 
could sympathize with the policies of the United 
States was reduced to those on the right and ex­
treme right... The Kennedy limited and reluctant 
anti-communism became (under Johnson) a generalized 
counter-revolutionary tendency that operated against 
moderates as much as the extreme left.^
As a senator, Johnson's main concerns had been mili­
tary preparedness and appropriations. With regard to appro­
priations, his view was generally that foreign aid costs too 
much money. Geyelin specifies that Johnson was not entirely 
against foreign aid. What he objected to was the extending 
of foreign aid "without a clear-cut return, either in terms 
of demonstrable economic improvement or political factors.^
The Johnson Administration kept several officials from 
the Kennedy Administration, and retained two of them in stra­
tegic posts. These men were Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 
and Thomas C. Mann, Ambassador to Mexico. Both were career 
men, rather than Kennedy men who were originally committed to 
the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress. Rusk, 
although serving under Kennedy, was more inclined to view any 
kind of uprising as more dangerous to the American national 
interest than Kennedy. Also Rusk viewed "national wars of 
liberation" as more capable of immediate communist domination 
than did Kennedy.3 Rusk's concern over the problem of commu­
^Needler, Op. Cit.
^Philip Geyelin, Lvndon B. Johnson and the World (New 
York: Praeger, 1966) .
^Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy: Assumptions,
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nism in Latin America was expressed in his statement at
Barnard College in January of 196 4.
Habana continues to encourage and engage in sub­
versive activities in the Western Hem i s p h e r e . A  
few weeks ago the government of Venezuela uncovered 
a cache of arms from Cuba intended for terrorists 
whose objective is the destruction of the demo­
cratic government of Venezuela. The recent un­
fortunate disturbances in Panama were immediately 
exploited by terrorists trained in Cuba. In several 
other Latin American countries, Castro-trained 
agents are actively promoting violence and terror­
ism. 1
Kennedy had originally approached Thomas C. Mann with
the Alliance for Progress idea, and Mann failed to comment.
Obviously, he was not enthusiastic about it. Thomas C. Mann
was actually a carry-over from the Eisenhower Administration,
having held the position of Assistant Secretary of State for
2Inter-American Affairs.
Under Johnson's Administration, the attitudes of the
two career men which differed from Kennedy's began to prevail.
As Ronald Stupak notes;
The rhetoric of anti-communism and the fear of 
ideological wars of national liberation began 
to dominate the personalized policy framework 
of Lyndon Johnson.3
Processes, and Projections (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
l"The First Purpose of Our Foreign Policy... Is to De­
fend Freedom". Address by Secretary of State Rusk at the 
Barnard College 75th Anniversary Dinner, New York, American 




Philip Geyelin notes that the general view within the
Hemisphere by 1965 was;
The Alliance for Progress... had died with John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy; Lyndon Johnson didn't really 
care; there was no incentive for the Latin Ameri­
cans to do the hard things that were absolutely 
vital if the Alliance for Progress was to make 
progress.1
Along with the views of the career men who became 
Johnson's key decision-makers, Congress reinforced the ideas 
of intransigent opposition to social reform and reformist 
governments. In December of 196 3, President Lyndon B. John­
son announced that he intended to appoint Thomas C. Mann to 
the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs. Mann was to become the key voice on United States 
policy toward Latin America. Johnson's announcement was met 
with considerable acclaim in Congress by the cold warrior 
legislators.2
Representative Carl Albert from Oklahoma, commenting 
on President Johnson's announcement, stated that by appoint­
ing Mann to the post, Johnson had placed the question of 
United States relations with Latin America among his highest 
priorities. He stressed that the President intended to place 
under Mann's jurisdiction "all policies and programs of the 
United States government, economic, social, and cultural".
^Geyelin, Op. Cit.
2u.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. , 
1963, V. 109, 24761.
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which relate to Latin America. Albert continued:
No better man could have been found to assume the 
responsibility. Under Presidents of both parties,
Thomas Mann has demonstrated the qualities that 
are vital to succeed in this field. His is an 
attitude of firmness toward communism in every 
form... For the programs and policies, what is 
needed is not so much a change in direction as a 
shift in emphasis.^
Senator Ralph Yarborough also commented favorably on 
the appointment of Thomas C. Mann. In his commentary he 
stressed the necessity of strengthening the anti-communist 
trade unions in Latin America as bulwarks of democracy.
The New York Times, reporting on the possible appoint­
ment of Mann, stated:
Thomas C. Mann is probably the best equipped State 
Department career officer in the Latin Am.erican field.
No one will be able to accuse him of being soft on
communism, for his sentiments on the subject are
fierce. As Assistant Secretary under Eisenhower, 
he showed flexibility combined with firmness.2
During the Johnson Administration, the precarious posj
tion of the Goulart regime continued without relief despite
the sincere efforts to enforce the stabilization plan during
the early months of 1964. In general, the decline from 1961
to 196 4 was reflected through:
(1) a decline in the growth rate of the industrial sector
from 10.6 percent to 5.2 percent; and




1961 to 87.8 percent in 1964.^
The prominent social forces continued to clash with 
the parameters of the game and with tlie growing force of 
Brazilian militarism.^ Brazilian militarism converged with 
and supported the parameters of the Am.erican game. 3 The 
parameters of the game coincided with the perspective of the 
career men, who now held the reins of power.^ Therefore, 
the career men and the Brazilian military constituted a cross­
national categoric group.^ The underlying interest of this 
cross-national categoric group was a product of the Brazilian 
military's desire to preserve unity within the organization 
and preserve the geopolitical strategy for national economic
Icentro de Contras Nacionais, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, 
"Retrospect.us ", Coniuntura Economie. 1961-196 4. Rosenbaum,On.Cit,
^Brazilian militarism opposed the rapid changes that 
were occuring on two rationales: (1) Goulart's efforts to
include the.military in his radical reform movement was di­
visive for tlie military; and (2) the drastic changes that 
were proposed signified radicalism and a drift toward com­
munism which was a target for FEB opposition and for the 
Sorbonne group's opposition.
^The Brazilian military's hostility toward the force 
of communism and apprehensiveness toward left wing and radical 
movements coincided with the aversion to communism (parameter 
in the American game).
^The career men were guided by their neo-Wilsonian per­
spective of the global scene, which accepted the concept of a 
monolithic communist conspiracy and feared the rise of radi­
calism, revolution, and communism, and stressed the sanctity 
of private investment.
^Categoric group is used here because there is no evi­
dence to clarify the organization of these forces of conser­
vatism.
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development and national security.^ These motivations coin­
cided with the motives of the career men, which were support­
ed by the parameters of the American game. American corporate 
interests were a part of this categoric group also.^
The increasing intensity of the social forces that 
pursued social reform was displayed by increasing hostility 
toward foreign capital, the threat of radical reforms, and 
the outbreak of strikes.- There was a heightening of labor 
unrest. Rio de Janeiro was helplessly paralyzed by the 
numerous strikes that occurred. Goulart, as a last resort, 
attempted to appease labor, by invoking an executive decree 
that increased minimum wage levels by as much as 100 percent. 
Goulart further alienated the more conservative forces by 
stating that Brazil should establish diplomatic relations 
with Communist China.^
The Brazilian military was becoming increasingly polar­
ized due to: (1) the economic decline; and (2) the attempt
of Goulart to include the military hierarchy in his mission 
of reform. General Osvino Alves and Jair Dantas Ribeiro 
became Goulart's chief advisors, while Generals Nelson de
^Fontaine, Op. Cit.
^Interview with Niles Bond, December 1976 
^A Economie Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas. Op. Cit. 
^Hispanic American Report. April, 1964.
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Melo, Odilio Denys and Admiral Silvio Heck began to plot 
against Goulart. These polarized positions and the struc­
tural crisis caused the military to become more insecure 
and authoritarian in its approach. The great majority of 
the military hierarchy sought to maintain the constitutional 
government as long as it remained nonradical and stable. How­
ever, the reformist movement grew increasingly radical and 
unstable.^
The following features indicated the growing radical­
ism in the reformist regime of Goulart;
(1) the aforementioned proposed reforms ;
(2) Goulart's public signing of two radical decrees at a
May 13 rally in Rio de Janeiro;
(3) Goulart's dismissal of the Navy Minister who sought to
discipline a sailor for actively organizing à labor 
union of enlisted men in March of 196 4 and inciting re­
bellion; and
(4) Goulart's bellicose address to the dissident sergeants
in Rio de Janeiro on March 30, 1964.^
The two decrees which Goulart signed at the public
iRoett, Patrimonial Society. Op. Cit.; Although Jair 
Dantas Ribeiro was appointed as Goulart's War Minister, he 
failed to support Goulart in the final analysis.
^Stepan, Op. Cit.; The decrees specifically national­
ized all private oil refineries and declared subject to ex­
propriation all underutilized properties of over 1200 acres 
within 6 miles of federal highways, railways, or dams; Economist 
Intelligence Unit. Three Monthly Economic Review Nq 45 February, 
1963, pp. 4-5.
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rally in Rio nationalized all private oil refineries.^ These 
acts accentuated the radical trend of the reformist govern­
ment. Riordan Roett reiterates;
The radicals had won control of presidential 
policy-making. The themes of the May 13 rally 
were repeated in Goulart's annual presidential 
message to Congress on March 15. While the 
left had won the president's ear, it was a di­
vided left, ranging from the fiery Leonel Bri­
zola..., the negative left, to San Tiago Dantas, 
the positive left's leader.2
On March 20, 196 4 General Gastello Branco distributed 
to the Military a memorandum which confirmed the historic 
role of the military as the defender of the constitution. The 
military officers were now convinced that the political system 
was incapable of meeting the rising demands, and that the 
legitimacy of the constitutional regime was now being under­
mined by the reformist government of Goulart. Goulart's 
threat to legalize the communist party and the infiltration 
of communists and leftists into Goulart's Administration 
seemed to substantiate these claims. Given these conditions 
and the Gastello Branco memorandum, the military claimed that 
they had no alternative but to depose Goulart.^
As Johnson took office, rampant militarism had begun 
to become a rising threat to progressive economic and social 
development. Goulart's efforts to step-up social reform in





Brazil and the decree of December 196 3 (which concerned the 
mining interests and the Profit Remittance Law) were met with 
tremendous resistance by the Brazilian military, the United 
States business community, and the American Embassy.^
Ambassador Gordon, a Kennedy man, had begun to per­
ceive a security threat in the Brazilian structural crisis. 
Lincoln Gordon, during the month that Johnson took office, 
made his "islands of sanity policy" official. The "islands 
of sanity policy", which had been adopted in mid-1963, was a 
strategy of United States cooperation with some individual 
state governments, thus by-passing SUDENE. It was an effort 
to identify entities where ability and stability presented 
sufficient possibilities for the utilization of United States 
economic assistance. As a strategy, the "islands of sanity 
policy" prevailed by the Summer of 1963, following the failure 
of the stabilization experiment and the resignation of Dantas. 
SUDENE officials considered this policy, which was announced 
officially in Novenber of 1963, an attempt to undermine the 
authority of the Superintendency.
Just as the American Embassy became concerned over a 
security threat in the Brazilian situation, the American busi­
ness men in Brazil also began to express their concern. The
^Ibid.
2Agency for International Development Paper. "The History 
of United States Aid Program in Brazil Since World War II", 
August, 1972; See also Bell'^s article in Roett, Brazil in the 
Sixties, Op. Cit.
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Institute of Economic and Social Studies (IPES), founded by 
businessmen from Rio and Sao Paulo in conjunction with the 
geopolitical military hierarchy, lent support to the anti­
communist workers and student groups. Under the direction of 
Golbery, the Institute of Economic and Social Studies (IPES) 
was joined by the urban middle class of Brazil and United 
States businessmen. Such organizations as the Women's Cam­
paign for Democracy (CAMDE) and the Feminine Civic Union (UCF) 
gave financial assistance. American businessmen were with 
the conservative Brazilians in the "Family March With God for 
Liberty", which had been organized by the Feminine Civic 
Union with the assistance of Sao Paulo Governor Adhemar de 
Barros. It was organized to express the views (of the parti­
cipants) that Brazil had moved too far to the left.^
In the March of 195 4 Thomas C. Mann spoke to United 
States ambassadors and the chiefs of Agency for International 
Development missions in Latin America. His speech signaled 
a major change in policy, and signaled Johnson's return to a 
fragmented and conservative policy. The following objectives 
were set forth in the speech and comprised the Mann Doctrine:
(1) to foster economic growth and be neutral on internal 
social reform;
Interview with Miles Bond, December 1976. Miles Bond dis­
cussed the pressures that American businessmen were placing on 
the Embassv and Consulate and the participation of American busi­
nessmen in the "Family March with God for Liberty". Also see 
Schneider, Op.Cit,See also interview with Donor Lion, July 1977,
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(2) to protect United States private investments in the 
hemisphere ;
(3) to show no preference, through aid or otherwise, for 
representative democratic institutions; and
(4) to oppose communism.^
The day following Mann's speech, the United States
Department of State issued the following statement:
The United States devotion to the principles of 
democracy is historic fact... On the other hand, 
the United States policy toward unconstitutional 
governments will be guided by the national interest 
and the circumstances peculiar to each situation 
as it arises.2
On March 31, 196 4 tlie reformist government of Joao 
Goulart was deposed in a coup d'etat, and a military govern­
ment came to power in Brazil. The military government that
^Tad Szulc's article in the New York Times, March 19, 
1964; Also see Packenham, Op. Cit. and Levinson, Op. Cit. 
Levinson states that although the statement was off-the-record 
and there is no transcript of it, some of the participants in 
the meeting corraborated Szulc's report.
^American Foreign Policv: Current Documents., 1964,
March 19, 1964. Alfred Stepan, Op. Cit.; Stepan indicates that 
the coup d'etat of 196 4 ushered in the second of two models 
for the Brazilian military. The two models are the moderator 
model, (the traditional model), and the director model (the 
current model which the coup d'etat of 1964 brought into ex­
istence. In the moderator model (which persisted from 1946 to 
1964), the military was not isolated from the political system. 
Instead, the military was inextricably "bound up" with poli­
tics and was sensitive to civilian opinion. The significant 
element of this moderator model was the understanding between 
the civilians and the military that a permanent restriction 
was placed on the extent of military incursions into politics. 
This restriction established a constraint for military inter­
vention upon the removal of a president, by specifying that 
the military officers involved in the coup d'etat would not
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came to power following the coup d'etat was unique, for 
Brazilian military had never, during the twentieth century, 
assumed the highest office of the nation.
With reference to the military's rationale for inter­
vening in 196 4, Riordan Roett reiterates:
In the opinion of a majority of the officer corps,
Joao Goulart no longer exercised legitimate author­
ity in 196 4. He had begun to act extraconstitution- 
ally, to threaten reform witliout congressional parti­
cipation, to erode military discipline without ade­
quate explanation, and to mobilize students and 
laborers for direct action political action. All of 
this threatened to undermine the fragile institutional 
structure of the 1946 Republic.^
Thus, the military coup which deposed Goulart on March 31,
19 6 4 was considered as an act that was necessary to preserve
the patrimonial state society and the cartorialstate in Brazil.
The Mann Doctrine and the State Department's supporting 
statement apparently gave direction to the American official 
responses to the overthrow of constitutional government of 
Goulart in Brazil, for on April 2, 1964 (as previously noted) 
President Lyndon B. Johnson sent the following message to
assume governmental power. The director model of the Brazilian 
military has extended from 196 4 to today. Under the director 
model, the Brazilian military usurped the power of the presi­
dent in 1964 and have been the effective rulers of Brazil 
since that time. The military, with its basic geopolitical 
orientation, has had as its major objectives economic develop­
ment and a general higher level of power in the international 
community.
^Ibid.
^Ibid. The cartorial and the patrimonial society are 
described in Chapter II.
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Raneiri Mazzilli:
The American people have watched with anxiety 
the political and economic difficulties tin rough 
which your great nation has been passing, and 
have admired the resolute will of the Brazilian 
community to resolve their difficulties within 
the framework of constitutional democracy and 
without civil strife.^
At a news conference on April 3, 1964, Secretary Rusk 
gave the following responses to questions concerning the 
United States views on the Brazilian military coup d'etat of 
1964:
It has been demonstrated over the last several 
years that the Armed Forces of Brazil basically 
are committed to constitutional government... 
and this action did not occur until there were 
many signs that President Goulart seemed to be 
moving to change the constitutional arrangements 
and to move toward some sort of authoritarian regime... 2
In contrast with the rationale with which the American 
officials recognized the new Brazilian government, it was 
obvious that the new government was not a constitutional 
government. It was a military government, which from its 
very beginning was itself authoritarian and suppressive. It 
ended all pretension of social reform, socio-economic develop­
ment, and constitutional democracy in Brazil. Its trend was 
immediately visible to both Brazilians and Americans.^
^''Message from the President of the United States (John­
son) to Acting President of Brazil", American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents, April 2, 1964. ' " '
1"U.S. Views on the Brazilian Coup", Secretary of State 
Rusk, Ibid.
^Roett, Brazil: Patrimonial Society. Op. Cit.? Schneider,
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The Authoritarian Trend of the Brazilian Military Government
At the time of the United States recognition of the 
new Brazilian government, Raneiri Mazzilli was president, 
having succeeded to the office from his post as President 
of the Chamber of Deputies. Although Rareiri Mazzilli was the 
provisional President of Brazil, his position was nominal.
The military ruled, in fact, through the Revolutionary Supreme 
Command.^
The Revolutionary Supreme Command was a committee of 
the military hierarchy which Costa e Silva had organized. It 
consisted of Costa e Silva, Navy Admiral Rademaker Grünewald  ̂
and Airforce Chief of Staff Brigadier Francisco de Assis 
Correia de Melo. Before Mazzilli's succession to the presi­
dency, Costa e Silva informed him that the Supreme Command 
would be the chief decision-maker. Mazzilli then, accepted 
the nominal role, and appointed the three military men as 
his service ministers.^
Almost immediately the Revolutionary Supreme Command 
demonstrated the suppressive and undemocratic nature of the 
new military regime by initiating a series of purges. In as
Op. Cit.
^Schneider, Ibid.
^J.F.W. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil; Political-Military 
Crises, 1955-1964, Austin, Texas; University of Texas Press,
19 70, pp. 341-54; See also Schneider, Op. Cit.
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much as Costa e Silva, Commander-in-chief of tlie revolutionary 
forces, was determined to carry out purges before elections 
were to be held, a committee composed of the leadership of 
all major parties (except the Brazilian Labor Party) drafted 
a constitutional act which delegated to the Revolutionary 
Supreme Command the power to purge.^
Jurists Francisco Campos and Mederinos de Silva were 
recruited by the military to write an Institutional Act. Thus, 
on April 9, 1964, the First Institutional Act was decreed.
It clarified the military's disdain for Congress by putting 
forth the tenet that Congress received its legitimacy from the 
Institutional Act which the revolutionary government decreed.
In this way, the military held that it possessed the legitimate 
authority to decree a new constitutional order.^
The First Institutional Act greatly modified the 19 46 
Constitution and enhanced the powers of the chief executive. 
According to Schneider the act stated that:
(1) Congress v;as required to elect a president and a vice- 
president within two days after the publication of the 
act, and the provision that military chiefs-of-staff and 
other officials were ineligible for election to the 
presidency was to be suspended;
^Victor, Op. Cit; Schneider, Op.Cit 
2George W. Bemis, From Crisis to Revolution, Los Angeles, 
California: University of Southern California Press, 196 4;
Also see Victor, Ibid; and Schneider, Op. Cit.
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(2) the president was authorized to initiate constitutional 
amendments and Congress was required to act on them with­
in thirty days, and the amendments could be passed only 
by absolute majority rather than by two-thirds vote;
(3) the Supreme Command was given the right to suspend poli­
tical rights of citizens for ten years, and to cancel 
the mandates of Congressmen, state assemblymen, and 
municipal counselors, and the president was to possess 
the same power for sixty days after taking office;
(4) Congress was required to act within thirty days on ordin­
ary bills;
(5) the president possessed exclusive authority to initiate 
financial bills and Congress was forbidden to appropriate 
more funds than the president requested;
(6) the president was given increased power to declare a 
state of seige;
(7) the constitutional and legal rights of job tenure were 
suspended for six months, thus allowing the president and 
governors to dismiss public employees for threatening 
national security, "the democratic regime", or public 
order; and
(8) a day in October of 1965 was designated for the election 




General Humberto Gastello Branco became President of 
Brazil on April 15, 196 4. By that time, Brazilian "dem.ocracy" 
had already become severely restricted. Gastello Branco's 
cabinet was centrist-conservative and technocratic. At the 
inception of his administration, he appealed to the nonsub­
versive left to support a reformist program. He declared his 
intentions to install a new order that would have as its 
mission structural reform, the modernization of Brazil, and 
the elimination of communism. Despite this declaration, the 
only goals which Gastello Branco actually pursued were:
(1) the elimination of communism; and
(2) the modernization of Brazil.^
Under Gastello Branco, rule was authoritarian there
was no effort made to decree essential reforms. The initial 
period of his rule was characterized by a continuation of the 
purges which had begun under the Revolutionary Supreme Com­
mand. As the military hard-liners renewed their attacks on 
the left in August of 1964, Gastello Branco began to be ac­
quiescent to their demands. The Military-Police Inquires 
(IPM's), which began as quasi-judicial proceedings by the 
military in order to deal harshly with leftist and ultra­
nationalist officers during the early 1950's, were again 
launched during the brief rule of the Supreme Command. They
^See Schneider's discussion of PAEG and Roberto Campos' 
economic plan; Op. Cit.
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extended their activities to encompass thousands of people 
during Gastello Branco's rule.^
In addition to these maneuverings, Gastello Branco 
decreed federal control of the state government of Goias.
This action was taken due to Governor Mauro Borges Teixera's 
protests against the Military Police Inquiries in Goias, his 
state. Due to his protests, the governor was labeled as 
subversive. The military government also demonstrated its 
authoritarian nature by announcing the following new laws, 
which were intended to prevent the rise of populist leaders 
in Sao Paulo;
(1) the Ineligibilities Act;
(2) the Electoral Gode; and
(3) the Party Statute.^
The Ineligibilities Act was unilaterally passed by the 
president, as provided by the First Institutional Act. It 
was issued in 1965 due to the pressure of the anti-communist 
military hierarchy. The act extended the range of officials 
who were required to resign six months before presidential 
elections in order to be eligible to run. Through this act 
most of the officials who had served in Goulart's cabinet
llbid., Schneider.
^Revista de Direito Publico e Giencas Politicas, VIII 
No. 1, January-April, 1965, pp. 91-124 and 125-145; Also see 
Schneider, Op. Git.; Also Revista de Direito Publico e Giencas 
Politicas, VIII, No. 3, September-December, 196 5, pp. 217-226; 
Also see Schneider, Ibid.
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were declared ineligible for election. The act also barred 
from eligibility "those who had compromised, for themselves 
or others, the adequacy and normalcy of an election through 
abuse of economic power, act of corruption, or improper use 
of the powers of public office".^
The Electoral Code of July 1965:
(1) reduced the number of political parties;
(2) required that candidates reside in the area they seek to 
to represent;
(3) required that voters choose legislators from the same 
party; and
(4) designated that the running mates of successful guberna­
torial and presidential candidates were automatically
elected.2
In order to limit the establishment of new political 
parties, the Political Party Statute instituted new procedures, 
The statute prohibited individuals from running for more than 
one office in any election, and specified residence and party 
membership requirements for candidates. The Armed Force 
hard-liners, fearful of the resurgence of populist elements, 
warned Gastello Branco against holding open, competitive .. 





defied the hard-liners. When two candidates that the regime 
considered as adversaries were victorious in Minas Gerais 
and Buanbara, the military hard-liners began to press for the 
annulment of the elections. In the midst of the controversy 
which surrounded the October 1965 elections, Gastello Branco 
and his moderate supporters began to choose the unity of the 
military as their priority item for the future development of 
Brazil in contradistinction to the constitutional principle 
of direct elections. Evidence of this choice of the unity 
of the military as the priority item was the promulgation of 
the Second Institutional Act (on October 27, 1965).^
The Second Institutional Act provided:
(1) that the president had the sole right to create new posi­
tions in the civil service;
(2) for further restrictions on the time allowed for Congress 
to consider legislation before the legislation would 
automatically become law;
(3) for an increase in the number of members of the Supreme 
Court;
(4) for reserving the right of nomination of all federal 
judges to the president of the Republic;
(5) for civilians accused of crimes against national security 
to be submitted to military justice;
Revista de Direito Publico e Giencas Politicas. IX, 
No. 2 (April-June, 1966, pp. 168-179); Also see Schneider, 
Op. Git.
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(6) reorganization of the Supreme Military Tribunal;
(7) a decree for tlie indirect election of the president and 
the vice-president by an absolute majority of the federal 
Congress; and
(8) empowered the President with the right to suspend Congress 
and govern by decree.^
Additional provisions of the Second Institutional Act 
were: the permission for the president to declare a state of
siege for 180 days to prevent "the subversion of internal 
order"; the extension of the power of the revolutionary govern­
ment; the establishment of restrictions on the activities of 
those whose political rights were removed; and the extension 
of the right of intervention in states for the president^ in 
order to assure the execution of a federal law and to prevent 
or punish the subversion of order. It also abolished the 
existing political parties. The provisions of the Second 
Institutional Act were to continue until March 15, 196 7, the 
date on which the successor of Castello Branco was to be 
inaugurated.
On November 20, 1965, the party system went through 
further modifications under Complementary Act No. 4, which 




izations sponsored by at least 120 federal deputies and 
twenty senators. As a replacement of the fourteen party 
system of the 19 46 Republic, two political parties were 
established. The political parties established were:
(1) the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) , a government- 
sponsored party which was basically composed of former 
members of the National Democratic Union (UDN) and some 
members of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) ; and
(2) the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the oppositional 
party which was composed of the additional elements from 
the PSD and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB).l
In early 1966 an additional act, the Third Institution­
al Act, accentuated the trend toward authoritarian government. 
Through the Third Institutional Act, Castello Branco launched 
the development of a system which would assure victory for 
the revolutionary candidates for president and governors. 
Specifically the act provided for:
(1) the annulment of direct election of governors and their 
replacement by selection by state legislators;
(2) elections for federal senators and deputies to be held 
on November 15, 1966; and
(3) the abolition of the election of mayors of chief capital 
cities.
^Revista de Direito Publico e Giencas Politicas IX,
No. 2, April-June, 1966, pp. 180-199; See also Schneider, Op. 
Cit.
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The mayors of chief capital cities were to be selected by 
the governors of the states.^
Between 196 5 and 1966 the Brazilian government announced 
a series of Complementary Acts which were intended to implement 
the Institutional Acts. They included:
(1) Complementary Act No. 2 3 of October 20, 196 5, which con­
firmed the increasing centralization of power within the 
military and made the government more adamant in its 
efforts to restrict organized opposition; and
(2) Complementary Act No. 20 of July 19, 1966, which allowed
legislators of the ARENA party to vote for the Brazilian
Democratic Movement's candidates in gubernatorial or 
presidential elections. In this way, the series of 
Complementary Acts also increased the government's posi­
tion of power with respect to political parties.^
A Fourth Institutional Ant, which was issued in Decem­
ber of 1966 summoned Congress to meet in special session in
order to discuss, vote on, and promulgate the draft Constitu­
tion which Castello Branco had decided on in April. The Con­
stitution of 1967 provided a very broad basis for future na-
Ipevista de Direito Publico e Ciencas Politicas. IX,




During the Castello Branco Administration tliere had 
been a voluminous record of purges. The majority of purges 
had occurred under the first Institutional Act of 1964. Under 
it and the earlier rule of the Supreme Command, 116 elected 
mandates were cancelled, and in over 370 cases political rights 
were suspended. There were 1,52 8 firings, 555 forced military 
retirements, 544 compulsory retirements for political reasons, 
and 165 involuntary transfers to the reserves. By the time 
his administration was ending, the Armed Forces had become 
entrenched in the direct and indirect exercise of power.
With respect to the problems of socio-economic and 
political development and reform in the poverty strickened 
Northeast, the record of the military government was extremely 
poor. In 196 4, SUDENE lost its autonomy and became a part of 
the planning effort of the federal government.3 There was no 
longer any special concern registered for the region that 
needed economic development most.^ Rather, the economic de­
velopment of the country, now entrusted to the military, be­
came focused on country programs as opposed to regional de-
Ischneider, Op. Cit.
^Ibid.
^Roett, Patrimonial Society, Op. Cit.
4Ibid. 7 Interview with Donor Lion, July 1977.
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velopment.^
Military rule served to eliminate the political left 
that had served as the protector of the interests of the 
poverty strickened population in the Northeast during the 
early 1960's. Political power in Pernambuco was returned to 
the families that controlled the state before the rise of 
Miguel Arraes, as he found asylum in Algeria. And Francisco 
Juliao was imprisoned* Aside from the university students, 
who were violently suppressed, Dom Helder Camara, Recife's 
Archbishop, constituted the single voice of dissent in the 
Northeast.^
Dom Helder Camara stressed the development of a new 
mentality as a lever that could elevate urban and rural work­
ers and nonviolent principles. By protesting the plight of 
the sugar workers, he became known as a subversive personali­
ty. Some conservatives labeled him as a communist.^
Thus, Castello Branco had instituted an authoritarian 
regime by 196 7. However, considerable progress had been made 
in certain economic areas. By the time his administration 
was ending, inflation was coming under control and the process 
of accelerating growth had been set in motion. This had oc­





Minister of Planning and Economie Coordination. Under Roberto 
Campos, however, no progress was made in socio-economic de­
velopment.^
In March of 196 7, Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva 
became president of Brazil. Although Costa e Silva had pro­
mised to "humanize the Revolution", the military dictatorship 
which Castello Branco had installed during the period 196 4 
to 1967 intensified under his regime. The resurgence of the 
hard-liners, the heightening of unrest in Brazil, and the 
196 8 political crisis joined forces to motivate the Costa e 
Silva government to reach an all time high in suppressive 
government during the period of the 1960's. Also the lack 
of Congressional power added to the intensification of the 
military dictatorship.^
Immediately, the Costa e Silva government began to 
crack down on any semblance of dissent. In March of 1967 
General Mainz de Aragao’s anti-communist speech, which was 
published in 0 Globo, attacked the Church for assisting sub­
versives, and thus ushered in a new era of the war against 
communism. With these attacks, communist forces began to 
reorganize, and the military government began to launch an 





As Student uprisings, organized under the National 
Union of Students (UNE), were quelled and Cardinal Archbishop 
Rossi began to protest the government's brutality against 
students, the friction between the regime and the Catholic 
Church and dissension within the Church itself began to esca­
late. Events pertinent to this conflict that would occur 
during the Costa e Silva government contrasted greatly with 
the Castello Branco government. The Castello Branco govern­
ment had been unwilling to accept the unquestioned leadership 
of the conservative Cardinal Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro,
Dom Jaime de Barros Camara. In 1966 the Workers Catholic 
Action, Rural Catholic Action, and Catholic Agrarian Youth, 
under the leadership of Dom Helder Camara, spoke out against 
the injustices toward labor. In 196 7 the National Conference 
of Bishops of Brazil called for redistribution of landhold­
ings, and the Catholic Workers Action initiated its critique 
against established institutions.^
The renewed unrest caused an intensification of the 
authoritarian trend. Specifically the Fifth Institutional 
Act was decreed. Under its provision:
(1) the President was granted the power to recess the National 




(2) the President was given the sole power to reconvene such 
bodies;
(3) the President was granted power to decree intervention 
in the states when in the national interest, disregard­
ing the constitutional restrictions on intervention;
(4) the President was empowered to suspend the political 
rights of any citizen for a period of ten years and to 
cancel elected mandates, disregarding constitutional 
limitations ;
(5) personal goods could be confiscated that were gained 
illegally;
(6) the right of habeas corpus could be suspended in instances 
of crimes against national security, against the social 
and economic order, and in cases of political crimes; and
(7) the restrictions on those who had lost their political 
rights were increased.^
Complementary Act No. 38 was decreed on December 13,
196 8. Through the decreeing of this act Congress was recessed, 
clamping on a period of "outright military rule without the 
facade of elective offices". The prospects for humanizing the 
Revolution had been relinquished for the requisite of internal 
security, and the leaderhship of the president within the mili­
tary regime had been secured.^




In essence, the military, supported by the United 
States, headed a highly suppressive regime. Aside from the 
continuation of dualism, there was an all out effort to erode 
and eliminate institutions that could relate the demands of 
the masses to political power. Through the Institutional 
Acts, the Congressional power was seriously restricted. And 
following the Fifth Institutional Act, which gave the Presi­
dent the power to recess Congress , Congress was recessed.
The United States and the Brazilian Coup D'Etat of 196 4
We have noted that the authoritarian trend which cry­
stallized in the military regime had already been set into 
motion at the time that the United States extended recognition 
to the Brazilian government in April of 196 4 as a Constitution­
al democracy. This paradox signaled a continuing duplicity 
in American foreign policy. Considerable acrimony was evoked 
within the United States Department of State regarding the 
propriety of recognizing the new regime so quickly. However, 
the recognition was extended upon the advice of Lincoln Gordon's 
country team. The team based its decision for immediate recog­
nition upon the premise that immediate recognition would rein­
force the strength of the moderates against those who desired 
a military dictatorship, thus preserving at least the appearance 
of a constitutional order. The effect of immediate recognition 
might have been to strengthen the determination of the military 
to retain power. However, in the midst of charges that the
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United States had a direct role in the Brazilian military 
coup d'etat of 1964, both ambassador Gordon and Secretary of 
State Rusk stressed that "the Brazilian Revolution of 196 4 
was a purely 100 percent Brazilian product, not a hidden 
United States product". Thomas Skidmore investigated allega­
tions that there was direct United States complicity in the 
coup, and reported that there was no direct complicity.^
While direct complicity of the United States in the 
coup d'etat is denied by most scholars, indirect United States 
involvement is implied by several factors. The factors which 
imply indirect United States involvement consist of:
(1) evidence that the United States was aware of the coup 
d'etat preparations;
(2) evidence of personal ties linking Military Attache Gen. 
Vernon A. Walters with key Brazilian military officers 
(especially, Castello Branco); and
(3) a similarity of United States and Brazilian views on anti­
communist counter-insurgency doctrine and a special re­
lationship between the United States military and the 
Brazilian military which stems from their collaboration
U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations (Senate), Nomination of Lincoln Gordon to be Assist­
ant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 89th Congress, 
2d Session, 1966, pp. 34, 41-44; Also see Helio Jaguaribe, 
Economic and Political Development, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1968; Keith Larry Storrs, Brazil's 
Independent Foreign Policy, Ithica, New York: Cornell Univer­
sity Press, 1973; Stepan, The Military in Politics, Op, Cit.; 
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, Op. Cit.
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during World War II. These factors are depicted by Alfred 
Stepan, who concluded that the United States policy played 
a supportive role in the coup d'etat, but one that was 
successful because it was congruent with domestic trends.^
In addition to the above factors which imply that the
United States had, at least, an indirect role in the Brazilian
military coup d'etat of 1964, there is the more recently
divulged fact that the United States forces stood ready to
aid in the coup d'etat. Lewis H. Diuguid, Washington Post
Staff Writer, reported on December 29,1976, that the United
States was prepared, if needed, to support militarily in the
ouster of Brazil's "last civilian government". He based his
statement on United States official documents that were
2recently declassified.
According to Diuguid, the documents show that a United 
States naval task force complete with an airforce carrier, 
a helicopter carrier, six destroyers and oil tankers had 
orders to take positions off the coast of Brazil during the 
1964 coup d'etat against the government of Joa Goulart. Re­
portedly, the ships were to await the orders of Ambassador 
Lincoln Gordon. Diuguid reported that in a telephone inter-
Stepan, Ibid. ; Storrs, Ibid.; Bell's Article in Roett, 
Brazil in the Sixties discusses the extent to which both 
Walters and Gordon were informed of the coup d'etat; Interview 
with Archie Lang, October 1976. Interview discussed the 
relationship of Castello Branco and Vernon Walters as being 
like that of father and son.
2Lewis H. Diuguid, "United States Forces Ready to Aid
230
view Gordon again denied that the United States played any
role in the coup. Gordon stated;
It was a contingency plan, never put into 
effect. We feared the possibility of a civil 
war... and one side might need some outside 
help.1
Based on this rationale, Gordon stated that he had 
recommended creation of the logistical force which was called 
"Operation Brother Sam" in the declassified military cables.^
According to the declassified documents, on March 27, 
1964, Gordon had cabled Secretary of State Rusk that Gen. 
Humberto Castello Branco would probably be the leader of the 
military taking power. This communique was conveyed five 
days before the culmination of the coup. Diuguid also reports 
that the morning after the coup d'etat Gen. Vernon A. Walters, 
military attache and close friend of Castello Branco was break­
fasting with Castello Branco in an effort to urge him to assume 
the presidency. In the declassified documents Gordon mentions 
that Walters was very well-informed.^
United States-Brazil Relations Following the Coup D'Etat of 1964
While the American strategic actors and special interests 
had found the Goulart constitutional government objectionable,
'64 Coup", Washington Post, December 29, 1976; Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, "Ammunition for USCINSCO Contingency Plan 2-61", March 
31, 1964. Xeroxed Copy of Document from Lyndon B. Johnson 
Library, declassified June 17, 19 75.
^Ibid.; Diuguid and Document.
2lbid.; Hhid.
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the policies that Castello Branco and the military regime 
initiated were found to be favorable with the strategic actors 
and the special interests. Upon its ascent to a position of 
power, the Castello Branco Administration instituted an economic 
policy that was liberal toward U.S. investments and was decided­
ly pro-American. A close complementary relation evolved be­
tween those goals which the dominant coalition's internal 
forces sought and the interests of the United States. Con- 
commitants included the Brazilian government's unquestioned 
acceptance of United States hegemony in the political and 
economic spheres. Within this context the Brazilian govern­
ment adopted an economic policy that was capable of creating 
a safe and healthy climate for the expansion of United States 
investments in the Brazilian economy.^
The Revolution encouraged and abetted a view of inter­
national relations that was in line with the doctrine of the 
Higher War College, a doctrine which identified Brazilian 
potential development with the ideology and technology which 
they believed characterized the power of the United States.
The collaboration of the United States military had been sought 
for the development of the Superior War College, and the doc­
trines of the United States military (which had been inculcated 
in the higher military and civilians trained in the Superior
^Carlos Estevan Martin's Article in Cotier and Pagen, 
Op. Cit.; Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties. Op. 
Cit.
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War College) were permeated by the cold war views. Thus, 
Brazilians who came to power after the Revolution of 1964 
believed an external alignment with the United States in the 
cold war was a requisite in the internal struggle against com­
munist subversion. This group, which we have previously re­
ferred to as the pragmatic revisionists, were decidedly against 
the radical revisionists and the radical nationalists who had 
aligned with Goulart.^
Under Castello Branco (as previously noted), an austeri­
ty program was launched in order to contain the inflation. The 
credit restrictions and wage ceilings, that were a part of the 
austerity package, proved to be unpopular with labor, However, 
the predominant theme of implementing technically sound solu­
tions for Brazil's problems dictated a course for the regime 
of ignoring public opinion. Thus, the economic policies of 
the new regime were reinforced by the authoritarian trend in 
governing. The priority given to economic productivity meant 
that "democracy would have to wait".
If the rate of development is rapid, inequality 
can be tolerated and corrected with time. If the 
rate of development falls because of inadequate 
incentives, the practice of distributive justice 
becomes a sharing of po v erty.2
In line with its policy of close association with the 
United States, the military regime of Castello Branco moved
^Bell's Article in Roett, y.i i in the ..Rlxties, Op. Cit.
^Carlos Estevan Martin's Article in Cotier and Fagen,
Op. Cit.; Storrs, Op. Cit.
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immediately to severe diplomatic relations with Cuba and re­
iterated its concern over the communistic nature of the Cuban 
regime. On July 31, 1964, Castello Branco addressed the new 
diplomats of Brazil, formally repudiating the independent 
policy and affirming solidarity with the United States. In 
decrying autonomous development as false nationalism, he 
announced that Brazil would attempt to attract foreign invest­
ment and financing in order to strengthen the national economy. 
In September of 196 4 he spoke at the Foreign Service and de­
clared that "Brazil seeks to follow a policy of free enter­
prise and orderly receipt of foreign capital".^
August of 196 4 saw two events reinforcing the trend 
toward close association with the United States. First,
Vasco Leitao da Cunha, upon his appointment as Foreign Mini­
ster, publicly announced that Brazil's position vis-a-vis 
the Southeast Asia conflict was identical with that of the 
United States, and indicated that Brazil would be prepared to 
go to war if the conflict escalated. This announcement was 
reinforced with actual shipments of medical supplies to South 
Vietnam. Secondly, the government repealed the Profit Remit­
tance Law of 1962 and made new concessions to foreign companies.^ 
With respect to the repeal of the controversial features
^Bell, Op. Cit.; Martin's Article, Cotier and Fagen, Op.Cit 
2Martin, Op. Cit.; Also see Bell, Op. Cit.
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in the Profit Remittance Law the following provisions were 
made:
(1) remittances would be restricted to ten percent per year 
only in the case of balance of payments difficulties; and
(2) reinvestments were permitted to be considered as part of 
the capital base.^
In October of 196 4 an additional event demonstrated 
the new Brazilian hierarchy's increasing receptiveness to 
United States capital. This event saw the Brazilian govern­
ment's purchase of the ten subsidiaries of American and 
Foreign Power. As mentioned previously, an earlier agreement 
made on April 22, 1963 had provided that:
(1) purchase was to be made at $135 million; and
(2) three-fourths of the proceeds were to be reinvested in 
Brazil.
The final formalities of Congressional approval had been de­
layed for one year due to considerable nationalistic opposi­
tion. The purchase of 196 4 was made under temms which were 
more generous than the memorandum of 196 3. This time it 
passed despite the opposition of Carlos Lacerda, Governor of 
Guanabara and leader of the National Democratic Union, and 
the Congressional Leftists.^
llbid.; Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, 
Op. Cit.
^Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties. Op. 
Cit.; Martin, Op. Cit.; Storrs, Op. Cit.
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In his 1965 message to the National Congress, Castello 
Branco focused on the achievements of the Revolution of 196 4. 
Among the achievements, he listed the elimination of points 
of friction between the United States and Brazil and the 
general improvement of Brazilian-American relations, which 
had earlier been on the brink of a crisis. During the same 
year the United States and Brazil signed an investment 
Guarantee agreement which renewed nationalist opposition.^
An additional feature, related to United States-Brazilian 
relations during 1965 was the presidential decree which opened 
Brazil's iron reserves, to private development. This decree 
of February 2 3 was a reversal of the monopolistic policy which 
the decree of December 196 3 had established. Also in 1965, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the official Bra­
zilian position toward United States capital by announcing 
that :
From the operational standpoint of foreign policy, 
independence and nationalism must give way to in­
ternational interdependence... Political isolation 
and economic autarkies have been buried.2
The foregoing developments contrasted greatly with 
those which preceded the Revolution of 196 4, and may be viewed 
as evidence that the post 196 4 Brazilian military regime con-
1Agency for International Development Paper, Op. Cit.
^Martin, Op. Cit.; Bell, Op. Cit.; Storrs, Op. Cit.
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stituted a government in which the American national interest 
defined in terms of the American ideology could and did find 
protection. The Quadros-Goulart era, in contrast, encompass­
ed a government in which the American national interest (de­
fined in the context of the American ideology) could not and 
did not find protection.^
Not only did this constitute a reversal of policy that 
was inimical to the United States interests as defined in the 
American ideology. It contradicted the very basis of the 
Alliance for Progress social revolution concept, thus demon­
strating the continuing duplicity in the American foreign 
policy. Specifically, the new Brazilian regime and the Ameri­
can strategic actors had looked with suspicion upon the pre- 
196 4 developments which included:
(1) a general unfavorable climate for foreign investments ;
(2) Brazil's criticism of the Bay of Pigs invasion;
(3) Brazil's abstension on the vote to expel Cuba from the 
OAS;
(4) the passage of the Profit Remittance Law of 1962;
(5) the effort to mediate the Cuban Missile Crisis;
(6) the failure to complete the AMFORP deal;
(7) efforts at social reform, perceived by the United States 
press as a commmiist threat; and
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(8) galloping inflation.^
Thus, the choice was between social reform and economic 
nationalism, on the one hand, and economic modernization and 
authoritarianism, on the other hand. American officials and 
the Brazilian military chose to support authoritarianism. The 
rationale on which the United States officials made this 
choice was that of a security threat that had been associated 
with social reform and economic nationalism.^
Despite the growing authoritarianism and the suppres­
sive trend of the military government, the American officials 
were steadfast in their support of the new regime. In August 
of 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote to Brazilian Presi­
dent Castello Branco:
Brazil and the United States, I believe, have 
entered a new era of understanding and compre­
hension... You spoke of Brazil's commitment to 
the Western democratic system, its support of 
free enterprise and the orderly encouragement 
of private capital.3
This statement followed the First Institutional Act and a 
series of purges.
In June of 196 4 Thomas C. Mann stated:
In each case where a government is overthrown 
by force there should be a careful dispassionate
^Ibid.
^Interview with Archie Lang, October, 1976.
^"Letter from President of the U.S. (Johnson) to Presi­
dent of Brazil (Castello Branco)", American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents, April 2, 1964.
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assessment of each situation in the light of all 
the surrounding facts and circumstances so that 
decisions concerning recognition, trade, aid... 
can be made which are consistent with our ideals 
and with our overall national interests.1
Thomas C. Mann gave impetus to the increasing authoritarianism 
by sanctifying the military movements in Latin America as 
protectors of American investments and a bulwark against com­
munism.
Although the Assistant Secretary ordered the suspen­
sion of negotiations for a new loan program after the Second 
Institutional Act was decreed in October of 1965, Lincoln 
Gordon argued successfully the necessity of continuing to 
support the Castello Branco regime in its struggle against 
the hard liners who overtly sought to install a more authori­
tarian military dictatorship. Lincoln Gordon had justified 
his immediate recognition of the military government to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate in February 
by describing the military regime of Castello Branco as a 
transitional regime which was moving rapidly in the direction 
of full constitutional normality.^
An additional upsurge of political repression occurred 
in 1966 in connection with the Third Institutional Act. This
^Thomas C. Mann, Address by Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs in American Foreign Policy; Current 
Documents, June 7, 1964, p. 388; Packenham, Op. Cit.
^U.S. Congress, Hearings for Nomination for Lincoln 
Gordon to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs  ̂ dp. Cit.; See also Simon G. Hanson, Op. Cit. ~
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upsurge of political repression caused Lincoln Gordon (then 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) to 
review the situation. His review of conditions in Brazil 
rendered the conclusion that social programs and political 
development toward a democratic order would 6 Ilow once in- 
fl&ion had been contained.^
The amount of economic assistance in program loans, 
accorded by the United States to Brazil, increased enormously 
during the post-1964 era. Whereas Brazil had received a 
maximum of $100 million in AID program loans during the period 
May 1961 to April 1964, the post revolutionary era was 
characterized by the following features:
(1) the signing 1 nd release of a 50 million dollar 
program loan on June 24, 1964;
(2) the signing and release of a 150 million dollar
program loan on December 14, 1964;
(3) the signing and release of a 150 million dollar
program loan on February 10, 1966; and
(4) another for 100 million dollars on March 11, 1967.'
Also during the post 1964 coup d'etat era, Brazil received 
almost fifty percent of the funds disbursed to Latin America
3in contrast with 18.3 percent in 1962 through 1963. In addi-
^Bell, Op. Cit.
2U.S. Congress,Senate, Committee of Foreign Relations, 
U.S. Policies and Programs in Brazil,Hearings Before the Com­
mittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 92nd Congress, May 1971.
^Ibid.
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tion to these developments the Northeast Agreement was termi­
nated in 196 4.^
This trend of placating the Brazilian military dicta­
torship continued until Costa e Silva's inauguration as Presi­
dent in March of 196 7. Upon the inauguration of Costa e Silva, 
John C. Tuthill (then Ambassador to Brazil) reviewed the situ­
ation and decided that the United States had become overcom­
mitted in Brazil as a result of United States discomfort with 
the deteriorating political situation and of Brazil's resent­
ment of United States intervention. The tightening of the 
military dictatorship, with its political coercion, served 
to motivate liberals in the United States Congress and in the 
State Department to criticize the United States identifica­
tion with the 1964 Revolution.2
An additional factor which demonstrates the failure 
of the United States officials to pursue the idealistic goals 
of the Alliance for Progress after the coup d'etat of 196 4 
is the termination of the Northeast Agreement. By 196 4 the 
specified duration of the Northeast Agreement had ended. No 
effort was made to extend the agreement beyond the specified 
period. An immediate result of the coup d'etat was the cea= 
sation of political and social unrest in the Northeast. The
^Bell's Article in Roett, Brazil in the Sixties, Op.
Cit.; Ibid. Aid to the Northeast was crucial for socio-economic 
development.
2Ibid., (Bell); Niles Bond in an interview indicated 
Tuthill's decision. Interview with Niles Bond, December 1976.
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decline in the United States effort in the Northeast accom­
panied the cessation of political and social unrest and the 
termination of the Northeast Agreement. With the military 
government in charge, American strategic actors were no longer 
apprehensive about the possible radicalization of the North­
east. The prerogatives of the State Department and the career 
men now took precedence in the form of Brazilian-United States 
cooperation in ensuring the political stabilization of Brazil 
under military rule.
Donor Lion has referred to the termination of the
Northeast Agreement as a definite downturn in United States
support of development in Brazil. Riordan Roett concurs with
the following statement.
From 196 4 forward, there was a marginalization of 
the USAID effort in the Northeast once the apparent 
threat of social and political disorder disappeared 
with the March 31, 1964 military take over. Little 
new money appeared. The political commitment for 
1962-6 4 had been fulfilled and the money promised 
had been obligated, if not released. Now the focus 
shifted to the central-south region and to the efforts 
of the federal government to control inflation. Few 
new funds were obligated by USAID. Funds previously 
committed were released, and projects were pushed 
to completion. The keynote of Brazilian-United 
States relations in this era was cooperation in the 
effort to stabilize and solidify the regime that 
began with the military coup.^
There was originally considerable controversy concern­
ing the relationship of the two USAID Missions in Brazil. Wash-
^Riordan Roett, The Brazilian Northeast, Op. Cit. , pp. 
162-163.
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 19 77. According to 
Lion, the termination of the Northeast Agreement meant the end 
of tfie Alliance for Progress.
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ington officials, however, in time, indicated that the Rio 
Mission was to have the greater role in administering the 
foreign assistance program. After the coup d'etat in 196 4, 
there was a general reduction of power in the Recife Mission, 
which meant that the Northeast development program was prone 
to become the low priority item in the Brazilian development 
effort. The post coup of 196 4 trend was toward national 
concern. This emphasis on the Brazilian nation, rather than 
the Northeast region, became the great focus for the United 
States Department of State and for the federal government of 
Brazil. While the Agency for International Development had 
originally adhered to its mission of development and to the 
Alliance for Progress prerogatives, it began to follow the 
lead of the Department of State.^ In 196 7 and 196 8, there 
were only a few grants extended for the Northeast and there 
were no new loans.^ The United States effort to assist in 
the socio-economic development of Brazil, inclusive of elimi­
nating economic and social dualism, had obviously ended.3
Thus, dualism, socio-economic stagnation, and the lack 
of social mobility persisted in the Northeast region. There
^Interview with Jerome Levinson, September 1979. 
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 19 77.
Roett, The Brazilian Northeast, Op. Cit.
^Roett, Ibid.
^Roett, Ibid.;
Interview with Jerome Levinson, September, 19 79 
Interview with Donor Lion, July, 1977.
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was a dearth of representation for the poor of the Northeast.
Harold T. Jorgenson, an economist who had worked as a Rural
Affairs Advisor to AID in the Northeast region reported that:
The Decade of Development once promised for the 
1960's under the Alliance for Progress has become 
a Decade for Disaster for most peasants in the 
Northeast.1
Jorgenson reported, in 196 8, that the struggle for a 
decent standard of living was greater than before the coup 
d'etat because the peasants were caught in the effort for 
economic stabilization. According to Jorgenson the Northeast 
had remained underdeveloped and traditional. The Northeast 
was composed largely of poor small peasant cultivators and 
salaried workers. Although some progress had been made in 
the coastal cities, slums still prevailed there. The inten­
sification of poverty in the Northeast was caused by unemploy­
ment, which had increased since 196 4 within the rural sector, 
and underemployment, which had become widespread. Landowners 
and landlords that suffered decline through diversification, 
had dispossessed many tenants and sharecroppers of their small 
holdings. There had been a temporary shutdown of large mis­
managed sugar plantations. In the Northeast region's sugar 
industry, minimum wages were not being paid. The Alliance 
for Progress had made no visible positive impact on the con-
%arold T. Jorgenson, "Impending Disaster in Northeast 
Brazil", Inter-American Economic Affairs. Vol. No. 2 ,  Summer, 
1968, p. 2.
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During the 1960's American foreign policy toward Latin 
America reflected a continuing trend of duplicity. The Alli­
ance for Progress, which was intended to intercept a social 
revolution that had been set in motion and enable the United 
States to channel the revolution toward peaceful change, pro­
moted authoritarian and suppressive regimes instead. The 
idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress were to assist 
the Latin American nations in achieving economic development, 
social reform, and political development along democratic 
lines. In essence, these goals were to assist Latin American 
countries in achieving socio-economic development.
This dissertation has focused on United States policy 
toward Brazil during the 1960’s, a country and an era in which 
the goals of the Alliance for Progress were flagrantly thwart­
ed. The actions and decisions of American actors which con­
flicted with the goals of the Alliance for Progress were:
1. the decision to apply impact aid in the Northeast, as
opposed to developmental aid;
2. the decision to initiate the Isles of Sanity policy;
3. the decision to develop a military contingency plan to
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intervene, if necessary, in the Brazilian military coup 
d'etat against the reformist government;
4. the decision to grant immediate recognition to the Bra­
zilian military government;
5. the announcement of the Mann Doctrine; and
6. the decision to increase American economic assistance to 
Brazil, after the military government had been installed.
The crucial question for this inquiry has been what 
has caused this marked variance between the idealistic goals 
of the Alliance for Progress and the decisions that were made 
toward Brazil in the 1360's. The bureaucratic politics 
paradigm has been utilized to analyze the United States policy 
toward Brazil during the era under scrutiny. The utilization 
of the bureaucratic politics paradigm in this analysis re­
vealed the following variables as casual, directly or indirect­
ly, in the failure of the Alliance for Progress:
1. the political nature of the policy-making process in Ameri­
ca, which allowed a game of competition to thwart the 
Kennedy men's efforts to win their preferred approach for 
maintaining Brazil's alignment with the United States;
2. the career men, strategic actors who opposed the Alliance 
for Progress;
3. the parameters of the game;
4. the action-channels of the game ; and
5. a coalescence of variables that were negatively related 
to the efforts to achieve the idealistic goals of the
247
Alliance for Progress.
Throughout this inquiry our fundamental assumption has 
been that strategic actors in American foreign policy possess 
diverse and often opposing goals and values. The prerequisites 
for reaching decisions in the American foreign policy-making 
process is the reconciliation of these diverse goals and 
values that exist within the policy-making amalgam. The 
Kennedy men (John Fitzgerald Kennedy, William T. Dentzer, Jr., 
Jerome Levinson, Lincoln Gordon, and Donor Lion) possessed 
goals, values, and prerogatives that conflicted with those 
of the career men (Lyndon B. Johnson, Dean Rusk, and Thomas C. 
Mann). Within the framework of this dichotomy, a political 
struggle ensued. In the struggle that ensued, the diverse 
goals and values of the competing groups were indeed recon­
ciled for decision-making. However, in the reconciliation 
process, the positions of the Kennedy men were compromised.
The parameters have been identified as variables that 
caused the marked variance between the Alliance for Progress 
goals in Brazil and the decisions and actions that were taken. 
The parameters, couched in the American ideology, were the 
aversion to communism, aversion to radicalism, belief in the 
sanctity of private enterprise, and belief in the ovewhelming 
importance of national security. The action-channels of the 
game have also been identified as factors that caused tlae 
variance. The action-channels were the congressional system 
of the United States and the autonomous nature of the United
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States Agency for International Development Mission in Rio 
de Janeiro over the United States Agency for International 
Development Mission at Recife.
Although the bureaucratic politics model has been the 
fundamental methodological tool for this dissertation, Joseph 
Frankel's theory which holds that a characterization of the 
operative situation is necessary in a decision-making study 
was an important premise of this inquiry. Hence, our initial 
task, aside from the incipient paradigm building and conceptu­
alization, was to depict the objective environment at the 
inception of the Alliance for Progress. The characterization 
of the operative situation clarified the motivations of the 
strategic actors, magnified the misperceptions of the stra­
tegic actors, and indicated the premises which underlined their 
actions.
The objective environment of Brazil has been described 
in terms of economic, political, and social conditions. In our 
examination of the Brazilian economy we assessed the economic 
development of Brazil. Economic development was viewed as 
encompassing structural changes that are required to bring 
about social and political development. These structural 
changes include increasing rates of gross national product, in­
creasing rates of per capita income, abundance of natural re­
sources, extent of social mobility, declining dualism, rising 
standards of living for the population as a whole, and in­
creasing accessibility of. the entire population to the power
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structure. In this sense, we made the distinction between 
economic development and economic modernization, which focuses 
more on industry as the lead sector.
Based on this distinction, an analysis was made of 
sectoral development in the Brazilian economy, with the bench­
mark years of 1950 and 1960. Agriculture, mining, industry, 
construction, public utilities, transportation and communica­
tions were the key sectors included. This analysis, in 
Chapter II, revealed a definite trend toward industrialization 
in Brazil, for by 1960 industry's contribution to Brazil's 
gross domestic product constituted more than 2 3 percent as 
compared with a contribution of 16.5 percent in 1950. Agri­
culture had remained the leading growth sector but the margin 
was decreasing between it and industry. We noted that this 
stage of industrialization was attained through the import 
substitution process, through an increase in the Brazilian 
government's participation in basic investment, and through 
a considerable inflow of foreign capital (in the form of 
direct investment).
A further assessment of the Brazilian economy, in which 
the micro-variables of Adelman and Morris were utilized, re­
vealed the intensification of economic and social dualism, ex­
tremely low educational levels and high population growth, 
which had aggravated the problem of unemployment. The inten­
sification of economic and social dualism was exemplified by 
regional disparities between the Northeast and the Central-
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South. In assessing the macro-performance of the Brazilian 
economy, we discovered instability and a lack of sustained 
growth. Thus, the Brazilian economy was characterized as 
becoming increasingly industrialized, as experiencing unsus­
tained growth and continued dualism and regional disparities. 
Such factors indicated a lack of economic development and a 
trend toward economic modernization.
An examination was made of the Brazilian political 
system. Through our examination we came to understand that 
elite rule was pervasive in Brazil and that elite rule was 
maintained through the patrimonial character of the society. 
Aspirants for membership in the elite circles were required 
to defend the basic rules and prerogatives of the patrimonial 
state. These rules include the avoidance of political mobili­
zation of the masses; forbidding the illiterates from voting; 
subordinating overall economic development programs to the 
needs of national security; stressing industrialization through 
import substitution; and opposing land reform.
We then related the Quadros-Goulart regime to this 
tradition of elite rule and the patrimonial society. Their 
regime was a reformist regime, "outside of the Brazilian 
elite", neither emulating the elite nor supporting the patri­
monial state. They sought to politicize the masses, to en­
franchise the illiterates, to initiate land reform, to achieve 
socio-economic development (as opposed to stressing industrial­
ization) , and to change the foreign policy of Brazil. In as
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much as these prerogatives of the reformist regime conflicted 
with those of the traditional ruling elite and the patrimonial 
character of Brazilian society, the constraints on the Quadros- 
Goulart regime were excessive and formidable.
Adelman and Morris have posited political aspects as 
correlative with the process of economic development. Their 
micro-variables, which are deemed as essential for political 
development along democratic lines, were utilized in conjunc­
tion with the Almond and Powell model to analyze the political 
system. The Adelman and Morris micro-variables (character 
and orientation of political administration and leadership, 
stable and sensitive political mechanisms for relating the 
interests and demands of society to political power, and 
political stability) were used to determine that the Quadros- 
Goulart regime was efficient and capable and was committed 
to economic development, but was beset with constraints of 
legitimate and constitutional power.
With Quadros as Chief Executive of Brazil, the executive 
branch as a political mechanism was sensitive to the needs of 
the masses, but was incapable of translating these needs into 
viable programs. Moreover, the support for popular demands 
was extremely limited among the interest articulating struc­
tures in Brazil. The political parties were nonprogrammatic 
and populistic. The military, the key institutional group 
in 1960-61, was opposed to the Quadros reform program. The 
military joined the civilian bureaucracy and the urban middle
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class in forming a conservative coalition. The military 
dominated the coalition.
An examination of the cultural and social milieu of 
Brazil during the early 1960's showed that Brazil was an 
arena for the interplay of multiple forces. The prominent 
social forces included nationalism, populism, and communism. 
Brazilian nationalism was in its third stage, "twentieth 
century nationalism", an era in which intellectuals became 
critical of the nation. They concentrated on liberating 
Brazil from foreign control, insulating the Brazilian national 
culture, and eliminating economic problems. Leading intel­
lectuals viewed nationalism as a means of change and develop­
ment. While nationalists were of varying persuasions, they 
had agreed on the necessity for changing Brazil's foreign 
policy and on planned action toward a highly productive econo­
my of sustained growth, under the control of Brazilians. 
Nationalists of different persuasions argued that; the 
state must repossess the political functions which the power­
ful private corporations claimed; and foreign private enter­
prise is incapable of devising and financing a well coordinated 
plan for development.
Radical nationalism, the prevailing variant within the 
reformist regime, was based on the assumptions that the exist­
ing economic and social structures were exploitative and re­
quired radical change, and that private investors and capital­
ist governments are aligned in the attempt to limit Brazil 
to exporting low priced primary products. Radical nationalists
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and radical revisionists were proponents of an independent 
foreign policy, in line with Quadros's prerogatives. They 
claimed that close alignment with the United States would 
ultimately lead to the satellisation of Brazil, and stressed 
that profit remittances should be restricted. Developmental 
nationalists and pragmatic revisionists, on the other hand, 
were proponents of moderate change. Pragmatic revisionists, 
led by Roberto Campos and General Golbery Couto e Silva, 
stressed that Brazil must reject neutrality for a policy of 
nonalignment on selective issues; that Brazil needs foreign 
capital; and that profit remittances were not highly exploita­
tive. Their strategy was geopolitics and continued alignment 
with the United States, a strategic position espoused by the 
Sorbonne military faction.
Populism, a prominent social force in Brazil, appeared 
as the vanguard of the indigents, and was the vehicle used 
to mobilize the urban population for demanding wider partici­
pation. The new populist groups, led by Janio Quadros and 
Miguel Arraes, were nationalistic and of the left. Communism 
in Brazil was national, as opposed to international, and frag­
mented. Many of the communists' demands converged with those 
of the nationalists.
An examination was made of the American political scene. 
We noted that John Fitzgerald Kennedy, liberal anti-communist, 
was elected as president of the United States in 1960. Although 
he recognized that the developing nations were involved in the
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struggle against communism, he tended to support reformist 
regimes. He acted upon the assumption that nationalism was a 
stronger force than communism in shaping the destinies of the 
developing nations. In line with the assumption, Kennedy, 
through the Alliance for Progress, proclaimed that the United 
States would support the idealistic goals of development in 
Latin American countries, and recognized the need for a social 
revolution. This proclamation called for a change in United 
States policy toward Latin American nations, a change which 
many leading officials opposed.
We observed that a balance of payments deficit was 
running extremely high during the Eisenhower Administration.
The reduction of the balance of payments deficit was a priority 
for many American groups. Many people in the United States 
had blammed foreign assistance and military expenditures for 
the heightening deficit. President Eisenhower, in November 
of 1960, issued a directive which officially tied the United 
States foreign assistance to the purchase of goods and services 
from the United States. Tying arrangements were, therefore, 
already in force when the Alliance for Progress was initiated.
The Mayobre Memorandum of 1961 warned the Kennedy men 
not to link foreign assistance, under the Alliance for Progress, 
to American private capital in Latin America. This memorandum 
was in direct conflict with the Eisenhower directive. Kennedy, 
however, heeded the warning by excluding business interests 
from his inner circle that planned the Alliance for Progress.
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Brazil was selected for the major initiatives under the Alli­
ance for Progress, and the Northeast was to have prior con­
sideration.
A set of hypotheses was initially postulated as a 
means of integrating the causal variables, and as a means 
of structuring this analysis. The hypothses relate the 
variables to the conflict that ensued, and demonstrate the 
manner in which the variables enhanced the power of the op­
posing groups in the dichotomized cast. The hypotheses are 
now related directly to the historical evidence that has been 
included in the text of this dissertation.
Hypothesis I.
The mission of the United States 
Agency for International Development was 
positively related to the idealistic goals 
of the Alliance for Progress.
The Agency for International Development was establish­
ed in 1951. The mission of the newly established Agency for 
International Development was to assist recipient countries 
in economic development. Hopefully, through the United States 
economic assistance, the development programs that were manned 
by the Agency for International Development would cause the 
recipient countries to experience increasing economic and social 




The mission of the United States 
Department of State was negatively re­
lated to the goals of the Alliance for 
Progress.
The State Department's mission of ensuring stability 
was in line with the career men's political interests and 
assumptions, but conflicted with the concept of social change 
which was germane to the Alliance for Progress proclamation.
Hypothesis III.
The Organization of the Agency 
for International Development Mission 
at Recife was positively related to the 
Alliance for Progress.
The Brazilian Northeast was an area that urgently need­
ed economic assistance, and was, therefore, the high priority 
area for the application of American aid to Latin America un­
der the Kennedy Administration. This high priority status 
for the Northeast was in line with the Alliance for Progress 
proclamation, which had as its basic goal, economic develop­
ment. The alleviation of dualism was a prerequisite for the 
achievement of economic development. The program was intended 
to further the economic and social development of the region, 
and to assist the Brazilian government in improving the capa­
city of the Northeast to provide economic and social benefits 
for its people.
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To assist in administering this program, a United 
States Agency for International Development Mission was es­
tablished at Recife. The establishment of the Recife Mission 
was unique, since a United States Agency for International 
Development Mission already existed in Rio de Janeiro, and 
there was only one mission established in countries involved 
in the United States economic assistance program. However, 
the establishment of the Recife Mission could be justified 
on the basis of the high priority status awarded to the North­
east Development program. The establishment of the Mission 
at Recife was positively related to the Alliance for Progress's 
emphasis on economic development.
Hypothesis IV.
The parameters of the game were 
negatively related to the Alliance for 
Progress.
The parameters were fundamental tenets in the American 
political ethos and ideology. As fundamental tenets, they 
permeated American society. They served as the basis for 
the traditional American foreign policy, and continued to 
dictate the choices among alternatives in American foreign 
policy for Kennedy men as well as career men.
The Alliance for Progress was a major affront to these 
pervasive tenets of the American ideology. The pursuit of 
Alliance for Progress goals required the application of public 
capital inflows from the United States, as opposed to American
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private investment. Yet, the American ideology dictated the 
sanctity of American private investment as a tool in American 
foreign policy. The pursuit of Alliance for Progress goals 
required extensive change in Brazil. But, extensive change 
was perceived as radicalism, a phenomenon that was deemed 
antagonistic to the American ideology and enimical to American 
interests. The Alliance for Progress required an understand­
ing of nationalism as a discrete and acceptable force for 
change in Brazil. Yet, the American strategic actors deemed 
nationalism as radicalism and associated the two with com­
munism. Thus, the American aversion to radicalism and com­
munism dispelled nationalism as antagonistic to the American 
ideology.
We have indicated that the Alliance for Progress re­
quired the application of American public inflows, as opposed 
to the traditional investment of private American capital in 
Latin American countries. The Mayobre Memorandum of 1961, 
which initiated the Alliance for Progress concept, repudiated 
the use of private investment in the foreign assistance pro­
gram. This requirement of American public capital inflows 
and repudiation of the use of private investment was in direct 
conflict with the traditional tenet of the sanctity of private 
enterprise.
Although the Kennedy reappraisal sought to eject Ameri­
can private investment from the policy initiatives in Latin 
America, the issue of private capital was an institutionalized
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feature in the f> feign assistance program. The American 
balance of payments deficit in the late 1950's had dictated 
the necessity of promoting United States exports abroad. 
President Eisenhower had responded by issuing a directive 
that tied American foreign assistance to the purchase of 
American goods. When the Alliance for Progress was initiated, 
the tying arrangements were already in effect. Hence, the 
parameter of the sanctity of private enterprise came into 
conflict with the implementation of the Alliance for Progress.
Upon the expropriation of the International Telephone 
and Telegraph subsidiary at Ri)  ̂Grande do Sul, Ambassador 
Lincoln Gordon threatened to invoke the Hiekenlooper Amend­
ment. His threat to invoke the Hiekenlooper Amendment, as 
well as the congressional passage of the Hiekenlooper Amend­
ment, reaffirmed the sanctity of private enterprise as a fun­
damental tenet dictating American foreign policy.
We have indicated that the Alliance for Progress was 
also an affront to the American tenet of aversion to radical­
ism. The goal of development required fundamental transforma­
tion of the Brazilian economy,society, and political system. 
The Kennedy men, while promoting the goal of development, 
reflected their own predilection to the parameter of aversion 
to radicalism. The first reflection was not as intense as 
later reflections. When early allegations of radicalization 
in the Northeast reached President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 
he sought to apply impact aid in the Northeast, as 
opposed to developmental aid. Aside from
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this deviation from the resolve to opt for economic develop­
ment, President Kennedy was steadfast in his support for 
Alliance for Progress initiatives in Brazil and for the re­
formist regime under which these initiatives were instituted.
The second reflection of the Kennedy men’s predilec­
tion to the factor of aversion to radicalism was maximum. 
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, in response to the alleged radi­
calization in the Northeast, initiated the Isles of Sanity 
policy. Through the Isles of Sanity policy, the United States 
economic assistance went directly to selected states, bypass­
ing the federal government. This was in direct conflict with 
the goal of development, particularly the goal of political 
development. The decision to deal directly with the states 
undermined the authority of the federal government, which 
traditionally is responsible for foreign policy and adjunct 
activities.
The third reflection was also maximum. After the 
assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the rate 
of change in Brazil appeared to quicken. The reformist regime, 
in line with the Alliance for Progress goals, pushed structural 
reforms. Such reforms included the redistribution of property 
and tax reform. American strategic actors perceived these 
changes as radical. Ambassador Gordon and Col. Vernon Walters 
Military Attache, responded to this radicalization by initiating 
a military contingency plan by which the United States military 
installations would stand ready to assist the Brazilian military
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in the overthrow of the reformist regime.
Radicalism became associated with communism because 
the demands of the radical nationalists converged with the 
populists and the communists. Radical nationalists and popu­
lists were often perceived as communists by the strategic 
actors. Both radicalism and communism were decidedly anta­
gonistic to American tenets. Communism, however, constituted 
the greater threat. Due to the perceptions of radicalism and 
a communist threat, fear of a security threat entered into 
the struggle. Hence the parameter of the overwhelming import­
ance of security prevailed and guided the actions of American 
strategic actors. The immediate recognition of the Brazilian 
military regime in 196 4 and the announcement and application 
of the Mann Doctrine attest to this.
Hypothesis V.
The action-channels of the game 
were negatively related to the implementa­
tion of the Alliance for Progress.
The congressional system, an action-channel in the game, 
was negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance 
for Progress. The congressional role in appropriating funds 
for the foreign assistance program was a negative feature in 
the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Since the 
House of Representatives had traditionally had the role of 
appropriating funds, it is substantially more powerful than
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the Senate in the process of policy-making toward Latin 
American countries. As we noted, in Chapter III the congres­
sional influence through the appropriation role is usually 
applied with the intention of reducing foreign aid.
The relationship of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
and Congress was of utmost importance in the implementation 
and making of United States Latin American policy during the 
early 1960's, because President Kennedy sought extensive 
appropriations to finance the Alliance for Progress. We have 
noted that Kennedy was bedeviled with considerable opposition, 
since the Congress was largely composed of southern Democrats 
and northern Republicans, and since there was a general con­
gressional apprehensiveness toward the use of political power 
by the president. Kennedy, in order to gain congressional 
appropriations for the Alliance for Progress, indirectly 
linked security with foreign aid. As we indicated in Chapter 
III he constantly justified his requests for foreign aid on 
the basis of the threat of communism. By linking security 
with foreign aid, Kennedy deviated from the pursuit of socio­
economic development and pursued politico-security goals with 
American foreign aid. He did so through the application of 
impact aid in Northeast Brazil, rather than developmental aid.
Congressional influence was also negatively related to 
the implementation of the Alliance for Progress through its 
passage of the Hiekenlooper Amendment. Although the Hicken- 
lopper Amendment was never applied to Brazil, it was a state-
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ment of congressional policy toward all Latin American nations. 
By passing the amendment, Congress embroiled the United States 
government in quarrels between United States companies and 
Latin American nations (including Brazil), and tied the foreign 
assistance program in Latin America to the protection of 
United States investments.
This tendency to link foreign assistance to the pro­
tection of United States investments was in direct conflict 
with the Mayobre Memorandum of 1961, the initial document 
that devised the Alliance for Progress. The Mayobre Memoran­
dum had included a warning that the Alliance for Progress 
would be doomed to failure if Latin Americans perceived it as 
an "entering wedge for United States private capital invest­
ments . "
Under the Johnson Administration, congressional in­
fluence became an increasingly negative feature relative to 
the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Congression­
al skepticism of the reformist government in Brazil and other 
Latin American countries (where nationalism was on the rise), 
reinforced President Johnson and the career men's intransigent 
opposition to social reform. The Congress met President John­
son's announcement of Thomas C. Mann's appointment to the post 
of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
with considerable acclaim. As we noted in Chapter IV, this 
appointment was acclaimed by cold warrior congressmen largely 
due to Mann's record of "firmness toward communism in every
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form". Congress perceived nationalists as communists. This 
congressional approval of Mann's appointment was a premature 
acceptance of the policies that Mann pursued, i.e. promotion 
of military regimes to ensure stability in Latin American 
countries, and containment of the prominent forces of nation­
alism and populism which pushed for social change and social 
reform. Such policies were in direct conflict with the Alli­
ance for Progress.
The autonomous nature of the Agency for International 
Development Mission at Rio de Janeiro relative to the Mission 
at Recife has also been considered as an action-channel for 
the game. As an action-channel, it too was negatively related 
to the implementation of the goals of the Alliance for Progress. 
When the Northeast Agreement was signed, it was understood 
that the United States Agency for International Development 
and SUDENE would jointly administer the application of the 
131 million dollars in the Northeast. We have noted that a 
United States Agency for International Development Mission 
was organized in Recife to administer the Northeast foreign 
assistance program. This meant that two United States Agency 
for International Development missions were operating in Bra­
zil, an arrangement which would lead to confusion.
The Rio Mission began to find the routine administrative 
responsibilities and control over the Recife Mission very dif­
ficult. The Recife Mission tried to assume complete independ­
ence from the Rio JMission, and began to try bypassing the Rio
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Mission by consulting directly with the Washington office.
The officials in the Washington office verified the autono­
mous position of the Rio Mission relative to the Recife Mis­
sion.
The establishment of the Recife Mission, as we pre­
viously noted, had originally demonstrated the United States 
commitment to assist in the development of the Northeast, a 
region in dire need of assistance. However, after the auto­
nomous nature of the Rio Mission had been designated and the 
military had come to power in 1964, the trend was toward 
concentration on Brazil's development in general with a de­
clining focus on the Northeast. During the earlier period 
of the military government's rule (post 196 4 phase), the 
officials of the Recife Mission became resigned to the trend 
of declining funds for the Northeast program. As the decade 
drew to an end, the officials of the Recife Mission began to 
realize that a new policy position had been adopted toward the 
Northeast region and its developmental problems. Following 
the adoption of this new policy position, the budgets of the 
two missions were merged. The predominance of the Rio Mission 
proved to be more convenient. The officials could justify 
the assistance program for Brazil, in general, to the Congress 
easier than it could justify allocations for the regional 
program.
Although the autonomous status of the Rio Mission was 
convenient, the declining significance of the Recife Mission
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and the Northeast foreign assistance program meant a gradual 
erosion of initiatives for the development of the Northeast.
The termination of initiatives to develop the Northeast meant 
the end of the Alliance for Progress in Brazil, for the main 
target of the initial developmental program in Brazil was the 
Northeast. The main purpose was to alleviate conditions of 
poverty and extensive dualism.
Hypothesis VI.
The prominent social forces were 
positively related to the stated goals of 
the Alliance for Progress.
The idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress were 
to assist Latin American countries in achieving socio-economic 
and political development along democratic lines. These goals 
required extensive change in the Brazilian social, political, 
and economic system. The prominent social forces were rooted 
in popular aspirations for change that would promote the de­
sired development. Nationalism was considered as the "key 
to development", and economic development was its main objective. 
The prevailing beliefs among nationalists were that the exist­
ing economic and social structures were exploitative and that 
transformation was essential to make the institutions viable.
The new populist leaders of the era were nationalistic. 
They supported the general theme of pursuing economic develop­
ment, and stressed redistribution of wealth and equal opportuni­
ty. Populism, the vanguard of the poor, was the force that
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mobilized the urban masses to demand increased participation 
and higher standards of living. Under populism, the masses 
also demanded land, higher wages, better health facilities, 
tax reform, and social welfare programs. These demands, which 
were included to alleviate the miseries of the indigents, 
were support themes for the Alliance for Progress goals of 
development and reform.
The reformist regime (Quadros-Goulart) was both nation­
alistic and populistic, and was positively related to the 
goals of the Alliance for Progress in that it was committed 
to the idealistic goals. Initially Goulart met the more 
radical demands of immediate redistribution and arbitrary 
occupation and division of land with resistance. He pre­
ferred to pursue more moderate refoirms. Later, he increased 
efforts to push structural reforms, demanded the enfranchise­
ment of illiterates, and demanded that the minimum wage levels 
be increased by 100 percent. In addition to these initiatives, 
Goulart signed decrees which nationalized all private oil 
refineries and made all underutilized properties of over 1,200 
acres that were located within six miles of federal highways 
subject to expropriation.
Hypothesis VII.
The prominent social forces were 
negatively related to the implementation 
of the Alliance for Progress.
We have indicated that the prominent social forces were
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positively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress. 
Although they were positively related to the goals of the 
Alliance for Progress, they were negatively related to the 
parameters of the game. The parameters, fundamental tenets 
in the American ideology, are utilized in defining the Ameri­
can national interest and in dictating American foreign policy. 
Hence, the American ideology dictated the sanctity of American 
private investment as a tool in American foreign policy. The 
American ideology rejected extensive change as enimical to 
the American tenet of preserving the status quo in the world 
order or guarding against radicalism. The American ideology 
rejected collaboration with communism and the existence of 
any form of communism as a threat to the national security of 
the United States and to international stability. Within the 
context of the American ideology, national security is the 
overwhelming factor dictating American foreign policy.
We have noted that the forces of nationalism and popu­
lism were, during the early 1960's, predominantly radical and 
xenophobic. Since the 1930’s, the fundamental theme of radi­
cal change and xenophobia had existed in Brazilian nationalism, 
and was manifested in the nationalistic critiques of the tra­
ditional Brazilian foreign policy. Such critiques stressed 
that it was impossible to protect the interests of Brazil 
within the context of close alignment with the United States. 
Although Kubitschek had relied upon American private capital 
in his industrialization drive of the late 19 50's, his position
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became that of the xenophobic nationalist near the end of 
his term.
When the reformist regime took the reins of government 
in the 1960's, the mainstay of Brazilian nationalism was de­
cidedly radical. The overwhelming population of Brazilian 
nationalist sought extensive revision in Brazil's foreign 
policy. They expressed, against the protests of the pragmatic 
revisionists, their views that Brazil's private investors were 
aligned with capitalist governments in a plot to limit Brazil 
to the exportation of primary products. They accused Brazilian 
exporters and Brazilians who worked for foreign firms of being 
the cause of Brazil's underdeveloped state. They considered 
private American investment in Brazil exploitative, and claimed 
that profit remittances were merely a new form of colonial ex­
ploitation. They condemned close alignment with the United 
States as a factor which would lead to the satellisation of 
Brazil, and viewed the cold war as a United States strategy 
to gain economic advantages from the developing countries of 
the world.
The key officials of the reformist regime desired ex­
tensive change. Hence, the radical nationalists were able to 
transform their far reaching demands into authoritative deci­
sions, actions, and policies. Among these were the expropria­
tion of the International Telephone and Telegraph subsidiary 
at Rio Grande do Sul and the passage of the Profit Remittance 
Law. Other demands of the radical nationalists were the im-
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mediate redistribution and arbitrary occupation and division 
of land, the enfranchisement of illiterates, a 100 percent 
increase in the minimum wage, the nationalization of all 
private oil refineries, and the expropriation of certain un­
derutilized properties.
The American strategic actors abhorred these radical 
acts and demands of the nationalists and populists, and rais- 
perceived the significance of their convergence with the 
Brazilian communists. The convergence of the demands of the 
radical nationalists and populists, on the one hand, with the 
Brazilian communists, on the other hand, tended to interweave 
all three forces in the perceptions of the strategic actors. 
Thus, all three forces were condemned as communistic as well 
as radical. The expropriation of the ITT subsidiary, the 
announcement of Quadros's independent foreign policy, and the 
passage of the Profit Remittance Law were perceived as acts 
against Americans and America and as being communist-inspired. 
American congressmen and American businessmen in Brazil re­
inforced these perceptions of the prominent forces.
Since these forces were xenophobic, were converging 
with one another, and were negatively related to the funda­
mental tenets in the American ideology, they were perceived 
by American strategic actors as a threat to American national 
security. In as much as the American strategic actors per­
ceived these forces as threats to the national security, the 
American actors met these forces with strong resistance. Since
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the initiatives which the social forces promoted were often 
positively related to the goals of the Alliance for Progress, 
the resistance with which the American actors met the social 
forces was also resistance to initiatives that would assist 
in the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Such 
resistance included the Isles of Sanity policy, the immediate 
recognition of the Brazilian military government, the announce­
ment of the Mann Doctrine, and the increased appropriations 
extended to support the military government.
In essence, the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy 
initiative, failed. In the American foreign policy-making 
process of reconciling diverse goals and values of a dichoto­
mized cast, the Kennedy men lost the game. Their prerogatives 
were compromised in the reconciliation process. The career 
men, strategic actors who preferred the traditional foreign 
policy approach, were victorious.
The gains of the career men were miniscule during the 
Kennedy Administration, for;during the Kennedy phase of the 
Alliance for Progress, some preponderant variables accrued to 
Kennedy men and to the support of the Alliance for Progress 
idealistic goals. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was president.
As president he possessed the power to choose some of the 
strategic actors in the cast. He did so by appointing men 
who were sympathetic to the goals of the Alliance for Progress, 
And although the mission of the United States Department of 
State was negatively related to the goals of the Alliance for
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Progress and the Secretary of State was a career man, Kennedy 
was able to influence the decisions that were made.
President Kennedy and the Kennedy men had given credence 
to the incipient social revolution in Brazil. The prominent 
social forces which combined to form the social revolution 
were positively related to the goals of the Alliance for 
Progress. Nationalism was at the crux of the ongoing de­
velopmental revolution. Populism combined with nationalism 
to demand changes in the economy, society, and political 
system that were crucial for the realization of the goal of 
economic development. Communism, indigenous and fragmented, 
converged with nationalism and populism in their demands for 
essential changes.
The United States Agency for International Development, 
whose mission coincided with and supported the goals of the 
Alliance for Progress, was established in 1961, just as Kennedy 
was launching the Alliance for Progress. The Agency for Inter­
national Development had a major responsibility for the admini­
stration of the foreign assistance program under the Alliance 
for Progress. The United States Agency for International De­
velopment, whose mission was to assist developing countries 
in administering their developmental programs, established a 
second mission in Recife. The Recife Mission, established 
in addition to the Rio Mission, was responsible for the ad­
ministration of the American assistance program in the North­
east. The establishment of this Recife Mission and the sign-
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ing of the Northeast Agreement affirmed the United States 
interest in the conditions of the poverty strickened North­
east region. The development of the Northeast was crucial 
to the attempt to end the social and economic dualism which 
characterized Brazil. The termination of social and economic 
dualism was a prerequisite for achieving the goal of economic 
development in Brazil. Thus, the establishment of the United 
States Agency for International Development Mission in Recife 
was positively related to the Alliance for Progress.
Hence, during the Kennedy phase, the decisions tended 
to conform to the ends of the Alliance for Progress. President 
Kennedy and his men gave support to the Alliance for Progress 
goals in Brazil and were able to evince similar decisions 
from career men, despite the divergence of their basic pre­
rogatives. We have noted that regardless of the skepticism 
v;ith which some Americans viewed Celso Furtado and the North­
east, President Kennedy was interested in the development of 
the Northeast. He sent a mission to the Northeast, and pre­
sided over the establishment of the Northeast Development 
program. When the Hickenlooper Amendment was introduced after 
the expropriation of the IT&T subsidiary. President Kennedy and 
Dean Rusk assailed the amendment. President Kennedy insisted 
on cooperating with and assisting the reformist government of 
Goulart. Donor Lion stressed that radicalization did not 
occur in the Northeast.
However, the decisions and actions that conformed to the
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ends of the Alliance for Progress during the Kennedy phase 
represented a tendency, not an absolute phenomenon. Despite 
the existence of some variables that accrued to support 
Kennedy and Kennedy men in the pursuit of the Alliance for 
Progress goals, there were variables that constrained their 
efforts. These constraints caused the Kennedy resolve to 
wane and waver, even during the Kennedy phase. Notable ex­
amples of this wavering are the decision to use impact aid 
in the Northeast and the initiation of the Isles of Sanity 
Policy.
This failure of decision and actions to conform to the 
ends of the Alliance for Progress during the Kennedy phase 
was caused by a coalescence of variables. Prominent among 
them were the parameters of the game. We have noted that 
the parameters, the shared values and images of the participants 
of the game, caused the strategic actors to conform in their 
decision-making, despite their political opposition. Dominant 
themes in the American ideology served as the parameters in 
the game. Although Kennedy and the Kennedy men had given cre­
dence to the incipient social revolution in Brazil as in line 
with the Alliance for Progress goals, they were unable to al­
ways make decisions that supported this resolve. The para­
meters were negatively related to the Alliance for Progress.
As negative variables they determined the boundaries within 
which the decisions of Kennedy men were made. In as much as 
the game was political, the Kennedy men were forced to respond
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to the American perceptions of radicalization in the North­
east or risk being labelled as radicals themselves. The 
Kennedy men were forced to respond to the American perceptions 
of a communist threat in Brazil or risk being labelled as 
"soft on communism". The Kennedy men were forced to respond 
to the American business community's plea for the protection 
of American investments or risk being accused of not believing 
in the sanctity of private enterprise and not protecting Ameri­
can interests.
During the Kennedy phase, Lincoln Gordon, a Kennedy 
man, succumbed to the parameter of belief in the sanctity of 
private enterprise by threatening to invoke the Hickenlooper 
Amendment against Brazil when Brizola expropriated the IT&T 
subsidiary. He succumbed to the parameter of aversion to 
radicalism by initiating the Isles of Sanity Policy. Kennedy, 
himself, succumbed to the parameter of aversion and fear of 
communism and the overwhelming importance of national securi­
ty by linking security with aid and by applying impact aid 
in the Northeast.
The United States Congress, an action-channel in the 
game, reinforced the parameters of aversion to communism and 
the overwhelming importance of national security as a cause 
for Kennedy's deviation from the developmental goal. In order 
to get appropriations for the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy 
utilized the communist threat. He justified his requests from 
Congress for economic assistance to Brazil on the basis of a
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threat of communism and a national security threat. The 
prominent social forces in Brazil were negatively related to 
the implementation of the Alliance for Progress during the 
Kennedy phase. Nationalism, populism, and communism caused 
American strategic actors to perceive the reformist govern­
ment in Brazil as anti-American. As negative features, they 
reinforced the effects of the parameters and the action- 
channel, the Congressional system.
During the Johnson phase, the conflicts between the 
decisions and actions that were taken in Brazil and the Alli­
ance for Progress goals were blatant. The failure to imple­
ment the Alliance for Progress during the Johnson phase 
stemmed from a coalescence of many variables. One preponderant 
factor was that Johnson, who was negatively disposed toward 
the Alliance for Progress goals and preferred the traditional 
policy, now had the power to select many of the strategic 
actors. The career men, who had served during the Kennedy 
Administration and remained during the Johnson Administration, 
were no longer prohibited from initiating policies in line 
with their preferred approach. Thomas C. Mann had been ap­
proached with the Alliance for Progress idea and failed to 
respond during the Kennedy Administration. Dean Rusk also 
seemed to acquiesce to the Kennedy prerogatives during the 
Kennedy phase. Lyndon BI Johnson, the new president, gave 
support to Dean Rusk's inclinations toward the traditional 
policy and increased the decision-making power of Thomas C.
Mann, a career man. President Johnson appointed Mann to the 
position of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs and increased the power that accrued to that position.
The parameters of the game coincided with the preroga­
tives of the career men and the traditional policy, and the 
career men were now the most powerful. The parameters were 
negatively related to the Alliance for Progress and weighed 
heavily on the side of the career men who sought to pursue 
the traditional policy. Both action-channels, which were 
negatively related to the Alliance for Progress, weighed 
heavily on the side of the career men.
Although the prominent social forces, the embodiment 
of the social revolution in Brazil, were positively related 
to the idealistic goals of the Alliance for Progress, they 
were negatively related to the implementation of the Alliance 
for Progress. The social forces were negatively related to 
the parameters of the game. The parameters caused a converg­
ence in perceptions, decisions, and actions of American stra­
tegic actors (both career men and Kennedy men).
The social forces were abhorred by the career men, who 
perceived them as radical, communistic, and therefore a threat 
to the national security. Since the social forces clashed with 
the parameters of the game, Kennedy men, who were now separated 
from the power and position of the Kennedy personality (such 
as Lincoln Gordon), also perceived them as a threat. The per­
ceptions of the Kennedy men and the career men were influenced
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and reinforced by the American business community and the 
cold warrior congressmen. Hence an alliance of career men, 
Kennedy men, American businessmen, and congressmen was formed 
to contain the social revolution in Brazil (which was a part 
of the thrust toward socio-economic development).
In the effort to contain these social forces, American 
businessmen, cold warrior congressmen, and American strategic 
actors, found an ally in the Brazilian military. The Brazil­
ian military was highly opposed to the prominent social forces 
in Brazil, decidedly pro-American (geopolitical oriented), and 
was the strongest institution in Brazil. Hence, the career 
men won, as the Kennedy men acquiesced, and together they 
threw their support behind the Brazilian military. The Mann 
Doctrine sanctified the role of the military to ensure the 
political stability of Latin American regimes. The United 
States strategic actors designed a contingency plan to overt­
ly intervene in the Brazilian military coup d'etat which over­
threw the reformist regime. The American strategic actors 
extended recognition to the Brazilian military government im­
mediately after the coup d'etat.
The Brazilian military, once in power and reinforced by 
the United States strategic actors, began to contain the promi­
nent social forces that were the concomitants in the social 
revolution. The United States Department of State's mission 
of ensuring stability was being fulfilled. The social revolu­
tion, which was now being contained, had been a part of the
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thrust toward socio-economic development. The containment 
of the social forces meant the containment of the movement 
toward socio-economic development.
As the United States Department of State's mission 
was being fulfilled by the installation of a harsh and sup­
pressive military regime in Brazil, the United States Agency 
for International Development seemed to retreat from its own 
mission of assisting in the economic development of the re­
cipient countries. Instead, it supported the United States 
Department of State in fulfilling its mission. Following the 
military coup d'etat of 196 4, the amount of economic assist­
ance in program loans, accorded to Brazil by the United States, 
increased tremendously. The Northeast Agreement, however, was 
terminated in 19 64, and as an action-channel the United States 
Agency for International Development's Rio Mission was designated 
as autonomous relative to the Recife Mission. With the termi­
nation of the Northeast Agreement and the decline of the Recife 
Mission, the upsurge in funds for development in Brazil was 
channeled through the Rio Mission to the more prosperous regions 
of Brazil, This meant a decline of funds that were to be uti­
lized in the Northeast region, the chief target under the Alli­
ance for Progress proclamation.
The consequences of these American decisions and actions 
in Brazil were manifested in the heightening of techno-economic 
development or economic modernization and a lack of socio­
economic development with a decline of democratic institutions
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and processes. The Brazilian military regime was highly ef­
ficient in techno-economic matters. The approach of the 
government was technocratic. Between 1967 and 196 8, the 
growth rate of the gross product rose from five percent to 
6.8 percent, a high point that had not nearly been attained 
since 1957-61. Between 1964 and 1968, the growth rate of 
the per capita income rose from less than one percent to five 
percent. The rate of growth of the industrial sector rose 
from 5.2 percent in 1964 to 13.2 percent in 1968.
Despite the economic attainment of the Brazilian mili­
tary regime, there was no progress in social and political 
areas, and the dualism and problems of regional disparity in­
creased. Between 1964 and 196 8, the military regime grew 
increasingly suppressive. Roberto Campos, the Planning Mini­
ster under Gastello Branco, was determined not to allow tech­
nically sound plans and austerity measures to be diluted and 
compromised because of public criticism. Although the goals 
of his Program of Economic Action of the Government (PAEG) 
included the amelioration of regional, sectoral, and social 
imbalances, the amelioration of imbalances was a goal that 
was not pursued. The lower echelons of society suffered due 
to extremely low real wages. The continued dualism and the 
plight of the workers attest to Campos insensitivity to the 
needs of the masses. The Military Police Inquiries, the purges, 
the cancellation of the political rights of the opposition, 
and the cancellation of elected mandates attest to the sup-
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pressive nature of tlie military government.
There was no stable and sensitive political mechanism 
that could relate the interests and demands of society to 
political power during tliis era. There was an all-out effort 
to erode and eliminate institutions that could relate the 
demands of the masses to political power. The president was 
given the power to suspend the political rights of citizens 
for ten years and to cancel elected mandates. Through the 
Institutional Acts, congressional power was gradually eroded. 
With the Fifth Institutional Act, the president was given the 
power to recess Congress. Through Complementary Act No. 38 
in December of 196 8, Congress was recessed. This spelled an 
end to representation and an overwhelming preponderance of 
power was placed in the hands of the executive.
In addition to the erosion of congressional power, 
popular organizations that would have related the demands of 
the masses to political power were eliminated after the coup 
d'etat of 196 4. Among the organizations were Popular Action, 
the Catholic Univesity Youth, the National Union of Students, 
the Basic Educational Movement, and the General Workers Com­
mand. Leaders of oppositional groups were either exiled or 
imprisoned. Their programs were deemed subversive. The 
multiparty system was abolished, and with it the Brazilian 
Workers Party was eliminated. Evidence of the suppressive 
nature of the new regime, the erosion and elimination of demo­
cratic institutions, and the preponderance of military executive
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power is discussed in Chapter IV. With respect to the dual­
ism in Brazil, we note Jorgenson's report that in 196 8 life 
for the peasants of the Northeast was harder than before the 
coup d'etat of 196 4. The termination of the Northeast Agree­
ment and the installation of the military regime represented 
a definite turn away from United States support of development 
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